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The Longer-Run Prospects for the U. S. Balance of Payments*

OCT 1 8 1966 INDEXED

JAMES W. ANGELL
Columbia University

Everyone knows that we have been having trouble with our balance of international payments for a number of years. The press is full of the question, and administration officials comment on it frequently. Yet the situation continues to be serious, has at times had an adverse effect on the implementation of our internal economic policies, and in my view is unlikely to cure itself automatically in the near-by future. On the contrary, I think that unless drastic new control measures are taken, the probabilities are that our payments position will deteriorate still further, and that ultimately we may even be thrown into a major foreign-exchange crisis. Except for unemployment, this is probably the most urgent *economic* problem that confronts us today.

The purpose of this paper is to present the main facts and apparent prospects that lead to these disquieting conclusions, and to appraise the possible solutions.

I

There can be no room for argument about the seriousness of our balance of payments situation. We have been running large payments deficits for many years; our monetary gold stock has been shrinking almost without interruption since 1958; and our net liquid dollar liabilities to foreigners have grown progressively larger. The payments

* This article is a revision of a paper presented before the New York chapter of the American Statistical Association on April 29, 1966.

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deficits have averaged over $2.8 billion a year ever since 1958.[1] Even in 1965, despite fairly severe controls over private capital exports, the deficit reached $1.3 billion; and recent official comments suggest that in 1966 it will probably get worse rather than better. To meet these deficits, since 1958 we have had to surrender over nine billion of our monetary gold stock ($1.6 billion in 1965 alone), and have increased our liquid dollar liabilities to foreigners by over thirteen billions, to a present total of some twenty-nine billion dollars.

It is obvious that we cannot go on this way a great deal longer. If we continue to lose gold at the same rate as in 1965, our reserves will be forced down to the legal minimum within three years. Thereafter, if the gold drain continues, we shall be compelled either to change our present laws or to stop gold payments. Moreover, any sudden and widespread loss of confidence in the dollar abroad—something which might well occur long before our gold reserves fell to the actual legal minimum—could easily sweep away the ingenious defensive arrangements that have been built up by the leading central banks and treasuries over the last few years, and could thus leave us adrift in a sea of enforced currency depreciation. Everyone devoutly hopes that these dire events will not happen, of course, but they are perfectly rational possibilities, and must be taken with deadly seriousness.

The first step toward finding an intelligent solution for these baffling and dangerous problems is clearly to try to determine what the groups of transactions are which seem to have been primarily responsible for our recent international-payments deficits.[2] The second

[1] I use here the Department of Commerce definition of deficits and surpluses: namely, the algebraic sum of the changes in government-owned stocks of gold and foreign currencies, plus changes in U.S. liquid dollar liabilities abroad. The "official reserves" definition includes only the first two items, and reports the average annual deficit since 1958 as only one billion dollars. All statistical data given here and later are from the Department of Commerce or the Federal Reserve Board, unless otherwise indicated.

[2] It can be asserted, of course, that any attempt to pick out particular debit items and then assign primary responsibility for the deficits to them is unwarranted, since *all* debit categories—especially merchandise imports, the largest single group—obviously contribute to the deficit. This is of course true. But if we are trying to reduce or eliminate the deficits, it is entirely legitimate to focus attention on particular large groups of debit items which have grown unusually rapidly in recent years, or which arise out of types of transactions which seem to be less essential to our economic life than some other types. It is then also

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step is then to explore the merits and defects of the various corrective measures that we could take.

II

Contrary to a common impression, our payments deficits have *not* been associated primarily with our much-attacked programs of foreign economic aid. These programs are large, but the money is spent chiefly inside the United States. Even in 1965, a peak year, the foreign-exchange drain amounted to only some $750 million. Rather, three other groups of transactions that required us to make large payments abroad have been of major importance. They are:

First, the government's so-called military expenditures abroad. These expenditures now run close to three billion dollars a year. They include troop pay, foreign construction costs, and the like, but do *not* cover military grants.

Second, U.S. tourist expenditures abroad, which have more than doubled in the last decade, and which in 1964 and 1965 averaged over $2.3 billion a year.

Third, and the largest of these three groups, U.S. private long-term capital exports. They have averaged over four billion dollars a year ever since 1958. In 1965 they totalled nearly $4.5 billion, despite the new Interest Equalization Tax on the income from portfolio investments abroad and despite the program of so-called "voluntary" restraints on direct investment. Of the 1965 total, $1.2 billion was portfolio investment and $3.3 billion was direct.

For the average of 1964 and 1965, the sum of these three big groups of debit items was over nine billion dollars a year.

They were partly but not completely offset by two big groups of credit items. The first was our favorable balance of trade, which in 1964 and 1965 averaged $5.7 billion a year. But this merchandise export surplus included exports financed by U.S. government grants and capital exports, which of course did not produce available foreign exchange and which, hence, could not help to reduce the current balance of payments deficits. Such exports must be deducted from the reported trade surplus. When this subtraction is made, we find that the trade surplus for balance of payments purposes was only three

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legitimate to consider whether such debits can be reduced, and if so, by what means.

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billion dollars a year for the average of 1964 and 1965, and for 1965 alone came to only $2.1 billion.

The second big group of credit transactions was our favorable balance on service items (including net private investment income, but omitting U.S. tourist expenditures abroad, already considered). This other-services balance averaged $5.8 billion a year in 1964 and 1965.

The sum of these two main groups of credit items, however, was only $7.9 billion a year for the average of 1964 and 1965; and this was cut by a variety of other small debit items totalling nearly one billion dollars a year. We were hence left with tremendous payments deficits in the two years, of $2.8 billion in 1964 and $1.3 billion in 1965—an average of over two billion dollars a year for the two years taken together. These deficits were covered by losses of gold and other monetary reserves averaging six hundred million dollars a year for 1964-65, and by increases in foreigners' holdings of liquid dollar assets averaging another $1.4 billion a year.

III

These are the principal facts about our balance of payments situation today. What is the outlook for the future?

I must say at once, and quite flatly, that unless some wholly unexpected event occurs, this outlook does not seem to me very encouraging. On the contrary, it is quite bleak. The overriding broad fact is that we as a nation are apparently caught on the horns of a peculiarly awkward dilemma. If we wish, we can probably achieve at least three of our major national economic and political objectives without running into serious contradictions among them. These three are the maintenance of a high rate of domestic economic growth, the maintenance and increase of our aid to less developed countries abroad, and the safeguarding of our international military and political commitments and policies. But we apparently cannot achieve all three of them, and *at the same time* achieve a fourth major and necessary objective, the maintenance of substantial equilibrium in our balance of international payments. The size of even our vast national resources seems to be too small, and the present mode of operation of our national economy too constraining on our freedom of action, to let us reach all four goals simultaneously. If this rather gloomy appraisal turns out to be anywhere near the truth, something will have

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to give. One or more of the four goals will have to be sacrificed, in part if not in whole, and the choice will have to be made in the not too distant future.

The grounds on which this pessimism is based lie in both the present characteristics and the probable future development of a number of the main groups of items in our balance of payments itself, most of them discussed briefly above.

First, U.S. government *military* expenditures abroad that require the purchase of foreign exchange. Their composition already has been outlined. They seem unlikely to fall very much over the next few years, even if the Vietnam war were to stop overnight, and they may well rise. Given the kind of world we now live in, and the policies and commitments of our government, it is hard to foresee any probable major development that will decrease them substantially.

Second, U.S. government *economic* aid programs abroad. In my own view, and despite the current flood of attacks on them in Congress and elsewhere, these programs are now far too small, not too large. They should be increased to as much as one to two per cent of our Gross National Product, instead of the relatively niggardly four-tenths of one per cent asked for in the bill now before Congress. Most of this money is spent in the United States, and has a directly stimulating effect on our own economic activity. It is nevertheless also true, however, that the burden imposed on our balance of payments is appreciable, though now relatively small, and an expansion of the aid program would of course increase this burden.

Third, our merchandise exports. These exports, which clearly must carry the main burden of supplying credits for our balance of payments, have been expanding fairly rapidly. But they have not been expanding nearly rapidly enough to eliminate our payments deficits, nor are they likely to. In the last ten years, since 1956, they have grown by some fifty-two per cent—about as fast as our dollar GNP. But our merchandise imports, though smaller in total volume, grew at a more rapid *rate*, by some sixty-eight per cent. This is what has prevented our favorable merchandise trade balance from taking over an increasing share of the task of meeting our overall payments deficits. In recent years, although the trade balance has fluctuated widely, it has had an almost horizontal general trend. Moreover, the exports of the world as a whole have grown in the same period, since 1956, nearly half again as rapidly as our own exports, by seventy-

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five per cent. The American share of the world export market has hence declined appreciably. Finally, in the strategic field of exports of manufactured goods, where we commonly think that we have a special superiority, our share of the world total dropped from twenty-nine per cent in 1956 to only twenty-one per cent last year. Our own exports of manufactures increased by sixty-eight per cent, but the world total increased by 125 per cent, or twice as much!

In the immediate sense, these changes in our relative trade position have been due in largest part to the extraordinary industrial expansion of Continental Europe and of Japan since the Korean War. And it is also true that these latter expansions can hardly continue indefinitely at so rapid an average rate. But the situation as a whole clearly does not suggest that the international competitiveness of American exports has been increasing markedly in recent years. There is, therefore, also not much ground for hoping that any dramatic expansion of our exports will suddenly solve our balance of payments problem in the near-by future, at least not unless some drastic form of corrective action is attempted.

Fourth, our merchandise imports. Here two sets of facts are striking. First, as already pointed out, through the last decade our imports have been growing rather more rapidly than our exports. It is obvious that nothing more than a mere continuation of these rates of relative change could eventually reduce or even wipe out our present favorable merchandise trade balance. Either result clearly could be disastrous to our overall balance of payments position.

Second is a fact which in some ways is even more important. Our imports are in general quite closely and positively correlated with our dollar GNP, as is well known. Since about 1957 or 1958, however, this relation has been spectacularly close, and, if it continues into the future, can have a further and highly adverse effect upon our international payments position. Since about 1957, the average elasticity of our imports with respect to dollar GNP has been close to plus 3.3. The equation for 1957-65, using year-to-year changes and with the deltas in per cents, is:[3]

$$\triangle M = 3.26\ (\triangle GNP - 3.56).$$

What this means is that when the annual rate of growth of dollar

[3] This regression equation is a formalization of the ideas suggested by Walther Lederer, *et al.*, *Survey of Current Business*, XLVI (1966), 17. The correlation co-

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GNP was less than about 3.5 per cent, imports usually fell. But when dollar GNP grew at a rate *higher* than about 3.5 per cent per year, usually imports not only rose but rose at an average rate some 3.3 times as fast as the rise in GNP! If these latter relations continue into the future, we shall obviously be in real difficulty. We are committed to trying to maintain an annual growth rate of dollar GNP which is much higher than 3.5 per cent: it is now roughly twice that. But if we succeed in this endeavor, we also virtually guarantee a large and much more than proportionate expansion of our imports, and a consequent increasingly adverse pressure on our balance of payments. We apparently will be able to have either high internal growth rates *or* balance of payments equilibrium, but not both at the same time.

Fifth, U.S. tourist expenditures abroad. They, too, are quite highly correlated with dollar GNP, showing an average elasticity in recent years of nearly plus one. They, too, will rise, and nearly in proportion, as GNP increases.

Sixth, U.S. private long-term capital exports. These exports have averaged over four billion dollars a year since 1958, as already stated, and in 1965, despite the intensive administration programs to cut them back, they totalled $4.5 billion. From at least one point of view, private capital exports constitute the biggest single leak in our balance of payments defenses.

The controversy over these capital exports has been large, loud, and heated, especially with respect to direct investments—which in 1965 totalled $3.3 billion. The business firms involved in the latter operations assert vehemently that a continued flow of new direct investment and consequent further expansion abroad is necessary, merely to maintain their competitive position in foreign markets. They also argue that the long-run benefits to the United States, in terms of the return flow of income, the indirect stimulus to subsequent U.S. exports which is produced by U.S. business operations abroad, and other gains far outweigh any initial adverse effects on the U.S. balance of payments at the time the investments themselves are made. It is also perfectly true that in every year but one since 1950, the return flow of dividends, royalties, and other income re-

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efficient is 0.929, and the coefficient of determination hence 0.863. The analogous equation for 1952-57 is almost the same: $\triangle M = 2.85\ (\triangle GNP - 4.0)$.

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ceipts from our direct investments abroad has exceeded substantially the volume of the new direct investments themselves.[4]

But there is more to it than this. First, much and perhaps the larger part of the funds used to finance our direct investments abroad has been spent initially, as a rule, for the construction of new plants built chiefly with *foreign* labor, materials, and equipment, and for the creation of new foreign production and sales organizations. Only the smaller part has usually gone initially into the purchase of U.S. goods as such.[5] Our recent direct investment has therefore not produced anything like an equal immediate demand for U.S. merchandise exports. What usually was wanted was in larger part not U.S. goods but foreign exchange. Much of this investment has, therefore, put serious adverse pressure on our current balance of international payments, and, if the recent patterns are maintained, will continue to do so—unlike, for example, the frequent British experience after the middle of the nineteenth century.[6]

Second, a substantial fraction of the income from our foreign investments is never brought home but is used to finance further expansion abroad, and hence never helps our balance of payments. This retained fraction could easily grow much larger. Third, when they first begin to operate, many of the foreign enterprises into which our direct investments flow may well continue to buy a substantial fraction of their supplies, replacement parts, and the like in the United States, thus helping our exports. Indeed, the U.S. companies involved make a good deal of this point. But with the passage of time, and as adequate foreign suppliers of the same things are developed, this type of demand for U.S. goods will almost certainly shrink. Why should the foreign enterprises pay freight charges from the United States and often foreign tariffs as well, when they do not have to?

[4] See the study by Judd Polk, *et al.*, *U.S. Production Abroad and the Balance of Payments* (New York, 1966), 34. This study was based primarily on reports and questionnaire replies from a large sample of U.S. corporations with foreign interests.

[5] Polk, 113, indicates that usually less than fifty per cent of the initial investment in plant and machinery, among the companies reporting, came from the United States. He does not say so, but presumably nearly *all* of the common materials used, labor except technicians, and the like were of foreign origin.

[6] Through "tied" loans and otherwise, a large part of British private foreign investment in the nineteenth century was accompanied by a nearly equivalent demand for British merchandise (rails, locomotives, machinery, and the like) to

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Finally, and I think most important of all, the overriding consequence of our recent direct investment abroad has been not so much the increased export of U.S. *goods* as the increased export of U.S. *skills and technologies,*[7] primarily those of production but also those of organization and of selling. This is doubtless all right in itself. But the new foreign enterprises were in largest part started or expanded precisely to avoid the transport costs, protective tariffs, internal regulations, wage differentials, and the like which had previously been hampering the export of U.S. goods themselves. As the new foreign enterprises begin to turn out products more or less like contemporary U.S. products, and made largely with American technologies, they are clearly likely to have an increasingly adverse effect upon the competitive position of the analogous manufactured exports of the United States itself—both in the foreign country initially concerned, and eventually in third markets.[8]

To put it in dramatic if oversimplified terms, our direct investments abroad can end up by wrecking much of the foreign markets for our own exports of manufactured goods! This is surely an important part of the explanation of the recent decline in our share of the total world market for such manufactured exports, which was commented on above; we are beating ourselves.[9] It is a sobering thought, and one which does not increase one's optimism about the future contributions of our merchandise exports to the deficits in our

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implement the investment itself, and hence did not put major pressure on the current British balance of payments.

[7] Polk, 105.

[8] This is precisely what began to happen to various classes of British exports after the turn of the last century, not so much in consequence of direct investment abroad as because of the export of British technologies, often without the knowledge or consent of the British firms concerned. But the whole problem of the primary and secondary effects of U.S. direct investment abroad on U.S. exports—including the questions listed above and a variety of others as well—is tangled, and sufficient quantitative evidence is not yet available to provide firm answers to many of these questions. Polk's study is written, on the whole, to defend rather than to attack our direct foreign investment, but it is by far the most penetrating and useful investigation of the subject that I know of. Also see the comments on Polk's study by John J. Powers Jr., in an address before the National Industrial Conference Board in New York on March 22, 1966 (mimeographed, distributed by Charles Pfizer and Company, New York).

[9] The direct investments abroad of the American oil companies are in the main a major exception to the preceding observations.

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balance of payments. We clearly face a complex problem here, and one which may not be capable of any simple solution.

Finally, the progressive deterioration of both our monetary reserves and our general international liquidity position obviously exposes us to serious short-run dangers, including the possibility of a major foreign-exchange crisis, which are *additional* to the adverse longer-run factors just analyzed.

IV

There are also, of course, a number of favorable factors in the outlook. Of these perhaps the most important are the very fact of a continued growth of our merchandise exports, even though at too slow a rate; the increasing inflow of income from our private investments abroad, even though by no means all such income is returned to this country; the growth of foreign tourism in the United States; and the fact that, despite all our difficulties, foreigners are still holding very large and even increasing volumes of liquid dollar liabilities.

But I think—to repeat—that on balance the overall outlook is far from encouraging. Barring the wholly unforeseen, I do not look for any major crisis in the immediate future. If we keep on losing monetary reserves, however—and we have been losing them at an average rate of over one billion dollars a year since 1958—it is obvious that sooner or later a breaking point must be reached. Even at best, this will happen when our reserves have fallen to the minimum size permitted by law. And if foreigners start to cash in their liquid dollar holdings in any large volume *before* our surplus reserves are used up, as they well may, the breaking point will be reached sooner rather than later.

Clearly the time to prepare for a possible crisis is before it hits, not afterward. What can we do?

There are a number of conceivable solutions. While some of them are practicable, however, others are not. Our theoretical freedom of action is in fact limited in a number of directions.

(1) We can hope for a greatly increased rate of economic growth abroad, that will stimulate the demand for our exports net of imports and thus reduce our payments deficit. Such an increase in foreign growth rates, however, does not seem very likely in the near future. Moreover, even if it did develop, the resulting increase in our exports

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would expand our GNP, and this in turn would probably cause our imports to rise more than in proportion.

(2) Alternatively, we can check severely or even reverse the expansion of the American economy, by fiscal and monetary measures. This would cause our imports to fall heavily. If domestic prices fell it would probably stimulate our exports, and it might thus eliminate the payments deficit. But no one can advocate this course seriously. The costs, chiefly in terms of increased unemployment, would be too severe.

(3) Theoretically, we can cut U.S. military expenditures abroad, heavily or even to zero. But our wide-ranging international commitments, and indeed the whole tenor of our long-established policies, make this alternative unlikely to be a practicable one.

(4) We can cut foreign economic aid still more, again even to zero. This course, however, would likewise not only reverse our long-established policies, but I believe would be completely contrary to our own long-run self-interest. Abandoning the less-developed countries would not only be morally repugnant to most of us, but would assuredly throw many of them into the greedy arms of the Communist world. Unless to meet a temporary emergency, such action would be merely stupid.

(5) We can raise our protective tariffs, so far as present treaty limitations permit, and thus cut our merchandise imports. But this, too, would completely reverse the policies of trade liberalization, which we have defended and promoted for more than twenty-five years. It would also hurt our own internal growth, which is heavily dependent on imports; and in the end, by reducing the supplies of dollar exchange available to foreigners, it might cut the foreign demand for our own exports—thus helping to defeat the whole purpose of helping our balance of payments.

(6) We can try to stimulate our merchandise exports directly, by means of subsidies, tax credits, and so forth. Such measures, however, would invite retaliation; and at least some of them presumably would violate the provisions of the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs. On balance, I doubt if we can hope for much from such devices.

(7) We can cut back heavily on U.S. travel abroad, or even prohibit it. Such interference with individual freedom is repugnant to most of us (though various foreign countries have long enforced

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such restrictions); it would cut heavily into the foreign-exchange earnings of our international carriers; and unless extensive exceptions were made—and extensive exceptions would help to defeat the very purpose in view—it would have adverse effects both on U.S. business activity abroad and on U.S. education. Nevertheless, we may well be forced into something of this sort.

(8) We can restrain much more severely those private capital exports which require the purchase of net additional foreign exchange, or even prohibit them entirely for a time. As pointed out earlier, such exports have been the biggest single leak in our balance of payments dike, and they deserve very serious attention. The Interest Rate Equalization Tax has had a marked effect in reducing the rate of portfolio investment abroad, but the program for voluntary controls over direct investment has not done much more, after the initial-impact effect, than to prevent the flood from rising at an even more rapid rate.

Various methods for increasing the present restraints are available, running from much heavier taxation to capital-export rationing, and even the outright prohibition of private capital exports.[10] The adoption of any such measures would produce understandably vehement protests from the business and banking interests affected. They almost certainly also would not be completely watertight. But the bulk of the desired results could be achieved if the government acted with firmness.

In the shorter run, the flow of income to the United States from *previous* foreign investment would remain undiminished, unless by deliberate action of the prospective recipients (and such withholding could be subjected to penalties). It also seems to me improbable, at least in the shorter run, that restricting private capital exports further would have much effect on the demand for U.S. exports from existing United States-associated firms abroad. In the longer run, on the other hand, it is true with respect to direct investment that the foreign branches, subsidiaries, and other associates of U.S. firms

[10] As an alternative, some students have proposed giving favorable tax treatment to investment income earned abroad that is returned to this country, to the return of capital now held abroad, and the like. Setting up and operating such a system of tax preferences, however, would encounter formidable administrative and perhaps also political difficulties; and in any event it is doubtful that the increase in the return flow of funds would be large enough to produce any great

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might eventually find their competitive position abroad substantially handicapped by a lack of sufficient new dollar nourishment.[11] But recent experience suggests that this possibility may have been exaggerated. Such enterprises have already had a good deal of success in obtaining reasonably adequate supplies of funds in foreign capital markets, and at endurable costs, when they are compelled to.[12] Hence even in the longer run, the return flow of income to us and hence our balance of payments need not be seriously injured by capital-export controls. The administrative problems would obviously be substantial, and no one likes this type of interference with free markets, but the results obtainable would seem to justify the costs.

(9) Finally, a good many academic economists have urged that we solve the whole balance of payments problem at one stroke by voluntarily devaluing the dollar, or even by going over to a regime of freely-fluctuating exchange rates. This possible course of action has various strong theoretical appeals, and in the longer run may become unavoidable, but in the present situation of the United States I do not think it would work.

There are several difficulties. First, other countries could depreciate, too, or retaliate in other ways, thus wiping out our initial advantage. Second, even if they did not, substantial parts of the payments we now make abroad are immune to the effects of changes in the exchange rates: namely, government military expenditures and economic-aid outlays abroad, and also all other private and governmental payments that are fixed in terms of foreign currencies. Exchange depreciation would not reduce the demands for foreign exchange on these accounts by a penny, and thereby would fail in these respects to produce any corrective effect on our balance of payments. Depreciation also might actually stimulate rather than check the export of private capital. Finally, it almost certainly would be followed soon by internal price increases and other forms of domestic inflation, which would quickly wipe out much or most of the initial gains

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reduction in the payments deficit, unless temporarily. The present attractions of foreign direct investment are great; and as Polk's study makes clear, the current-profit motive is often not dominant.

[11] See Polk, Chaps. 2 and 3, especially p. 59.

[12] Foreign borrowing by reporting U.S. corporations amounted to $967 million in 1965, and is expected to reach $1,480 million in 1966, New York *Times*, May 11, 1966.

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to our balance of payments in the merchandise and service accounts.[13] For the United States today, I therefore do not think that voluntary exchange depreciation offers a very attractive or indeed effective solution for the problem of our international payments deficits, as long as any other alternative is open to us.[14]

V

The overall conclusion to which I come is thus not very optimistic. I do not see much likelihood that, if no additional and pretty severe corrective action is taken, our international payments deficits will simply cure themselves. Indeed, both the policies and commitments of our government, and the complex relations among our GNP, merchandise exports, merchandise imports, and various service items virtually guarantee that they *cannot* cure themselves.

My further conclusion, then, is that the most desirable and least injurious major steps we can take, among those which are in practical fact open to us, are probably to enforce very substantial restrictions against U.S. travel abroad; and certainly to put much more severe brakes on those exports of private capital that require the purchase of net additional foreign exchange, especially long-term capital exports, for a substantial period. In 1965, as remarked before, long-term private capital exports alone were three times as large as the whole of our payments deficit. This is a leak we simply cannot continue to afford.

If we do thus limit private capital exports further, however, it must be in the hope, as with Mr. Micawber, that something else will eventually turn up. If only in our own long-run self-interest, we can hardly want to stop private capital exports for an indefinite period. But even imposing sharp additional limitations on private capital exports is a gamble. It may not work, in the sense that it may not wipe out our payments deficits or even reduce them to manageable size. If it does not, then I fear that the only alternative open to us will be exchange depreciation, forced on us by our eventual inability

[13] The U.S. exchange depreciation of 1933-34 was followed in the next two years by a *more* than proportional increase in wholesale prices.

[14] Exchange depreciation seems most likely to cure persistent and large balance of payments deficits when there has *already* been serious internal inflation simultaneously with over-valued exchange rates. This is hardly the situation in the United States today.

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to keep on paying off our foreign short-term obligations in gold when gold is demanded of us. Yet the costs of enforced depreciation would, I believe, be very high. Let us hope that we are not thrown into it despite ourselves.

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Lenin and the Social Democratic Schools for Underground Party Workers, 1909-11*

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It is interesting to speculate on the career V. I. Lenin would have chosen had he not lived in a time and a place where most intellectual professions were closed to men of non-conformist thought. It has been suggested that he had the makings of an admirable professor: his mind was well disciplined, his speech was articulate, and his knowledge was impressive. Only once, however, did the pressures of revolutionary and governmental leadership allow him to practice his pedagogical talents. During the summer of 1911, while living in the small French town of Longjumeau, he organized a little-known school for underground party workers. This article is primarily an account of that school. It is also a study of Lenin's schismatic approach toward two earlier schools established by his factional opponents at Capri and Bologna and of the role played by the Longjumeau graduates in the final splintering of the Russian Social Democratic Labor party (RSDRP) at the Prague Conference of 1912.[1]

* An abbreviated version of this article was presented to the Canadian Association of Slavists in June 1965.

[1] Western historians of party history, while occasionally noting the existence of these schools, have never studied their operations or significance. Soviet his-

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I

The unsuccessful Revolution of 1905 had two deleterious effects on the RSDRP. Inside Imperial Russia, the revolutionary intelligentsia —who had borne the burden of organizing, agitating, and propagandizing the urban masses—now were disillusioned with the underground and went into emigration, retired from revolutionary activity, or found themselves in Tsarist prisons. This meant that the tasks of leading and organizing the workers' movement had to be assumed by the workers themselves who lacked their predecessors' theoretical training and practical experience necessary for revolutionary propagation and underground survival.[2] This training, which was received by socialists in other European countries through apprenticeship in trade unions or the party apparatus, was unobtainable under Russian conditions since unions were *de facto* illegal and party activity *de jure* cause for arrest.

The second problem concerned the superstructure of the party in emigration which once again was rent by factional disagreements. The personality and organizational differences, which had split the party into "Majority" and "Minority" groups in 1903, were intensified by different responses to the failure of revolution in 1905. Both factions wished to utilize a combination of legal and illegal activities, but their emphases were different. The Mensheviks stressed legal work through the State Duma, trade unions, and cooperatives, while the Bolsheviks concentrated on illegal agitation and propaganda. No sooner had Lenin gained a tenuous victory over the Mensheviks at the London Congress of 1907, than a tendency developed inside his own faction that disavowed all legal activity and sought to continue the revolution despite the preponderance of counter-revolutionary forces. The leader of this new, left-Bolshevik tendency was Lenin's former right-hand man, A. A. Bogdanov. He gathered around him a prestigious group of émigrés who had in common a desire to escape Lenin's tutelage and an optimism concerning the immediate prospects of revolution. Included in this amorphous

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torians have recently shown some interest in Longjumeau, but no systematic treatment of the three schools has appeared since S. I. Livshits, *Partiinyi universitety podpol'ia* (Moscow, 1929).

[2] See results of a questionnaire circulated by Trotsky to members of the Social Democratic underground, *Pravda* (Vienna), No. 16 (Oct. 6, 1910), 2.

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group were *otzovists*, such as Bogdanov and G. Aleksinskii, who opposed all Duma participation; expropriators, such as L. B. Krasin, who advocated armed robberies for revolutionary causes; God-constructionists, such as A. V. Lunacharskii and Maxim Gorkii, who deified Marxism for popular consumption; and Machists, such as V. A. Bazarov, who tried to reconcile Marxism with positivism. While intellectually impressive and financially solvent (owing to the expropriations), these left-Bolsheviks were isolated from the foreign institutions controlled by Lenin and from the local Russian organizations.

A possible solution to the problems of both the local groups and the émigré dissidents was found in the "higher party schools" organized by the German, French, and Belgian Social Democrats.[3] For the leaderless organizations in Imperial Russia, a foreign party school could train a new generation of workers in the practical arts of propaganda, agitation, and illegal organization to replace the disillusioned intelligentsia. For the isolated left-Bolsheviks in emigration, a school under their control could indoctrinate a select group of workers who upon returning to Russia would form the cadres and contacts necessary for Bogdanov to circumvent Lenin's control of the foreign hierarchy.

For Lenin, the logic of these different rationales posed both a dilemma and an opportunity. He recognized the legitimate desire of the inexperienced workers for revolutionary training, but he also feared that a school in someone else's hands could be used to his factional disadvantage. He, therefore, opposed Bogdanov's efforts to establish schools at Capri and Bologna, but then, after left-Bolshevism had run its course in 1911, he set up an identical institution at Longjumeau to strengthen his own factional position vis-à-vis the Mensheviks.

II

The idea of a party school began to be voiced in left-Bolshevik circles during 1908. N. E. Vilonov, who knew the weaknesses of the local organizations from personal experience in the Urals, first suggested the formation of a "party university" when he visited Gorkii on

[3] Komitet Shkoly, *Ob organizatsii partiinoi shkoly*, leaflet ([Paris], 1910).

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the Isle of Capri.[4] In September, Aleksinskii publicly proposed that a "higher party school" be established to train émigrés for work in the Russian underground. Several months later, at the Fifth Party Conference, some of the Russian delegates expressed a similar desire for their own personnel. Seizing on these suggestions, Aleksinskii, Gorkii, and Vilonov (later joined by Bogdanov and Lunacharskii) formed an Organizational Committee for convening a school at Gorkii's villa. Vilonov drafted an appeal to the local Russian organizations concerning the proposed school which he sent to Lenin's *Proletarii* for publication. The editorial board of *Proletarii*, which served as the unofficial Bolshevik Center abroad, rejected this request as it had Aleksinkii's earlier proposal. The editors instead called on the committee to transfer its funds to the Bolshevik Center which then would establish a school in Paris.

Undaunted, Vilonov and Gorkii sent another appeal directly to the Moscow organizations requesting their participation. *Proletarii* replied with a resolution linking the proposed school with God-constructionism and implying that it would be neither Bolshevik nor Marxist in content. The Moscow Committee accepted the *Proletarii* version while the Oblast (Regional) Bureau of the important Central Industrial Region supported the Organizational Committee. Before the Bureau could sanction the school, however, its *otzovist* secretary (S. Vol'skii) was arrested. Faced with the obstructionism of *Proletarii* and the possibility of the school's stillbirth, Vilonov left for Moscow to present his case personally. The local organizations readily acknowledged their desire for the school and agreed to sanction it on the condition that ideological leadership would rest with the Bolshevik Center. Vilonov accepted this condition and promptly informed the Organizational Committee of his intention to visit Paris to negotiate the final details with Lenin.[5] But as he was to find out later, his non-factional approach was not shared by his associates. This should have been evident when he was ordered to return directly to Capri without stopping in the French capital.

[4] A. V. Lunacharskii, *Velikii perevorot (Oktiabr 'skaia revoliutsiia)* (Petrograd, 1919), 45.

[5] *Otchet pervoi vysshei sotsialdemokraticheskoi propagandistsko-agitatorskoi shkoly dlia rabochikh* (hereafter cited as *Otchet pervoi*) (n.p. [1910]), 2; S. I. Livshits, "Kapriiskaia partiinaia shkola (1909 g.)," *Proletarskaia revoliutsiia*, No. 29 (1924), 36-48, 74.

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Lenin, in the meantime, had noted that "our affairs at present are in a sorry state. There will probably be a split . . . ."[6] He had tolerated Bogdanov's ideological differences as long as they did not present an organizational threat. But the formation of an independent left-Bolshevik school presented just such a threat. The split took place at the June 1909 meeting of the enlarged editorial board of *Proletarii. Otzovism* was condemned, Bogdanov was read out of the faction, and the Bolshevik Center formally stated that it took "no responsibility for the school."[7]

In early August Vilonov and his twelve protégés arrived on the idyllic Isle of Capri where they were joined by three additional Russian students and thirteen émigré auditors[8] for the "First Higher Social Democratic Propagandist-Agitator School for Workers." The setting was incongruous, to say the least. The school was situated in an aristocratic villa; it was financed by Gorkii's royalties and the contributions of his non-revolutionary admirers; and it was taught by some of the foremost Russian intellectuals of the early twentieth century. Its impressive curriculum included lectures by Gorkii on Russian literature, by M. N. Pokrovskii on Russian history, by Lunacharskii on Russian culture, by M. N. Liadov on party history, and by Bogdanov on political economy. The lectures were, in fact, too theoretical for the young and inadequately educated students. Consequently, increased attention was paid during the last half of the course to more practical if less stimulating material.[9]

Even on Capri the factional struggle could not be forgotten. Two weeks after his arrival, Vilonov told the students that they should

[6] V. I. Lenin, *Polnoe sobranie sochinenii* (5th ed.; Moscow, 1965), LV, 292.

[7] Institut Marksa-Engel'sa-Lenina-Stalina, *Kommunisticheskaia partiia sovetskogo soiuza v rezoliutsiiakh i resheniiakh s'ezdov, konferentsii i plenumov TsK* (hereinafter cited as *KPSS v rez.*) (7th ed.; Moscow, 1954), I, 228.

[8] The distinction between auditors and students was administrative rather than pedogogical. Auditors, unlike students, represented themselves rather than local organizations and thus they could neither vote at school meetings nor expect their expenses to be paid by the institution. The majority had to commit themselves to returning to Russia upon the termination of the school.

[9] For descriptions of the Capri School see *Otchet pervoi*, 3-13; Livshits, "Kapriiskaia partiinaia shkola," 33-74; V. Kosarev, "Partiinaia shkola na ostrove kapri" in *Revoliutsiia i VKP (b) v materialakh i dokumentakh* (Moscow, 1927), V, 310-22; I. I. Pankratov, "V Parizh k Leninu" in *O Vladimire Il'iche Lenine* (Moscow, 1963), 102-06; A. V. Lunacharskii, *Sobranie sochinenii* (Moscow, 1964), II, 36-40; V. Kosarev, "Il'ich protiv 'Vperedovtsev' " in *O Lenine: vospominaniia* (Moscow, 1925), II, 133-38.

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fulfill their mandates by inviting the Bolshevik Center to assume ideological leadership as well as requesting its literary and financial assistance. They also asked Lenin and two of his associates to speak at the school so as to counterbalance the eight left-Bolshevik lecturers. Lenin's reply of August 18 was curt and negative. The only assistance he would extend the school was to send a backfile of *Proletarii* and to invite the students to visit Paris for a supplementary set of lectures on their return trip to Russia. Eight Capri students reacted in a manner that must have surprised the Bolshevik leader. They wrote him again, this time in the name of the Moscow Committee, threatening him with party discipline should he not appear. Lenin's condescending response detailed the facts of party life for these "good little lads [*rebiata*] who still lacked political sophistication."[10] He attacked their lecturers and again invited the students to Paris. Since Lenin would not come to them, the students decided to go to him. On the suggestion of their mentors, they insisted that the entire school should be accommodated in the French capital and that the Bolshevik Center should pay all expenses. Lenin, as expected, rejected these conditions, but a split was developing within the school as a result of his correspondence. This schism became overt in late October when Bogdanov enumerated his beliefs and suggested that they become the basis of a formal political platform. This clearly factional step was unacceptable to Vilonov and five of the students. The latter wrote Lenin about Bogdanov's intentions, stating their unwillingness to remain within the school, and requesting that *Proletarii* inform the Moscow organization of recent developments. Lenin replied that they should try to win over the neutral students; the Oblast Bureau withdrew its sanction of the school and told its students to go to Paris; and *Proletarii* published the entire correspondence for the party to see.[11]

The five students and the school's organizer, Vilonov, were promptly expelled for corresponding with the Bolshevik Center. In early November, they went to the "foreign Petersburg," as Lenin referred to Paris, where they heard two dozen lectures given by

[10] Kosarov, "Partiinaia shkola na ostrove kapri," 316.

[11] The tortuous course of this correspondence can be followed in *Sotsial-Demokrat*, Nos. 9-11 (Nov. 13, 1909-Feb. 26, 1910); *Proletarii*, Nos. 47/48-50 plus supplements of Sept. 18-Dec. 11, 1909; Lenin, XLVII, 183-216; *Otchet pervoi*, 13-22.

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Lenin and seven other Bolsheviks. A month later the remaining students came to Paris and listened (perhaps less receptively) to the same set of lectures. By January 1910 most of the Capri students were back in Russia practicing their new skills. One less proficient graduate, however, A. S. Romanov, allowed himself to fall into police hands. To ease his punishment he provided the Okhrana with the names of his colleagues who were promptly removed from circulation.[12]

As Lenin had anticipated, Capri became a new factional center. Just before the second group of students departed, they and their lecturers established a newspaper, *Vperëd*, a "literary" faction of the same name, and a new Organizational Committee to call a second factional school.

III

This split in the Bolshevik ranks came at a very inopportune moment for Lenin. In January 1910 a Plenum of the Central Committee, which was summoned against his wishes, tried for the last time to impose unity upon the party's centrifugal factions. Deserted by the Vperëdists and by some "Conciliator" Bolsheviks, who sincerely wished to conciliate factional differences, Lenin lost control of the party machinery. He was forced to suspend *Proletarii*, to divide his factional treasury between the Central Committee and three German "trustees," and to accept the existence of the Vperëdists within the party.

While rejecting the Vperëdist suggestion that the Plenum sanction a second school under their control, the Central Committee recognized the necessity for a school and established a nine-man, inter-factional School Commission in which the Bolsheviks like the Vperëdists had only two representatives. The meeting expressed the hope that the "Vperëdists could be dissuaded from organizing a separate school and would join in the planning of a unified school."[13] This expectation was ephemeral, however, since the Vperëdist plans

[12] M. A. Tsiavlovskii (ed.), *Bol'sheviki: dokumenty po istorii bol'shevizma s 1903 po 1916 god byvshago moscovkago okhrannago otdeleniia* (Moscow, 1918), xxiv. Romanov was not, as sometimes stated, in the service of the Okhrana when he came to Capri, but he surely was when he appeared at the Prague Conference two years later. For his account of the school see *ibid.*, 24-25.

[13] *KPSS v rez.*, I, 240.

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were already well advanced. In March 1910 Aleksinskii and Pokrovskii left the School Commission on the pretext that it would not allow students and lecturers a decisive voice in the proposed "unified school." They also claimed, with some justification, that the School Commission "lacked serious intent."[14] The fifteen hundred francs allocated the commission was indeed insufficient for its professed intentions, and the one leaflet it published during the first eleven months of 1910 was aimed more at counteracting Vperëdist efforts than at recruiting students.[15]

Lenin's opponents were more diligent. In June the new Organizational Committee issued an appeal for local groups to elect experienced students to what it defined as a "party but not an all-party school."[16] To assist in these elections, F. I. Kalinin—the secretary of the Vperëd faction and a graduate of Capri—was sent to Russia with instructions that "only in rare cases" should the students be "members of other factions."[17] He encountered opposition, however, from local organizations which wanted a truly "all-party school" and from the Okhrana which wanted no school at all. Consequently, Kalinin was forced to appoint many of the twenty designated students and of these only twelve made it abroad where they were joined by nine émigré auditors.

The Organizational Committee, in the meantime, had found financial supporters to replace Gorkii and his literary friends who were tired of God-constructionism and factionalism. In August 1909 the Miass post office in the Urals had been raided by some party members who subsequently decided to invest sixteen thousand francs of the expropriated funds in a school that would teach their para-military techniques. Since expropriations were in disrepute with the rest of the party, the Vperëdists became the recipients of this legacy. Four of the Miass participants also took advantage of

[14] *Otchet vtoroi vysshei sotsialdemokraticheskoi propagandistsko-agitatorskoi shkoly dlia rabochikh* (hereafter cited as *Otchet vtoroi*) (Paris, 1911), 3.

[15] *Ob organizatsii partiinoi shkoly*. This leaflet succeeded in soliciting at least one student, G. K. Ordzhonikidze, who was then living in Persia. Ordzhonikidze, after coming to Paris, became one of Lenin's chief lieutenants in the forthcoming campaign against the Mensheviks. See I. M. Dubinskii-Mukhadze, *Ordzhonikidze* (Moscow, 1963), 89-90.

[16] *Otchet vtoroi*, 5.

[17] S. I. Livshits, "Partiinaia shkola v Bolon'e (1910-1911)," *Proletarskaia revoliutsiia*, No. 50 (1926), 118.

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their enforced absence from Russia to enroll in the school where, according to a police spy, they used their "independent income" to live a life of comparative luxury.[18]

Bologna was selected as the site of the second Vperëd school since its socialist municipal government was amenable to such enterprises and promised to keep Tsarist interlopers at bay. The school held its opening ceremonies on November 21, 1910, in an auditorium of the Garibaldi Peoples University. Shortly thereafter classes were moved to a four room apartment rented by Bogdanov and Lunacharskii. As at Capri, there were two lectures daily except Sunday when the students visited local museums under the guidance of Lunacharskii who served as the school's director and only translator. Unlike at Capri, the twelve lecturers included some non-Vperëdists—Leon Trotsky and Alexandra Kollontai—and their classes tended to be more practical and less theoretical than at the first school. The evenings in particular were devoted to practicing agitational speeches, setting up mock propaganda circles, and even editing two "underground" newspapers.[19]

Lenin's efforts were again directed toward disrupting his competitor's school. To discredit Bologna, the Bolsheviks spread rumors about the source of the school's finances and then demanded the establishment of a special commission to investigate these rumors after the Vperëdists had denied them.[20] Lenin also wrote I. K. Vul'pe, the one Bolshevik student at Bologna, encouraging him to disorganize and even to destroy the school from within.[21] Repeating his Capri tactics, Lenin declined to lecture at Bologna and again invited the students to come to Paris for a supplementary course of instruction. The Vperëdists, however, had learned from their Capri experience. They first requested an official invitation from the Foreign Bureau of the Central Committee and three thousand francs from the School Commission for traveling and living expenses. When the latter offered to reimburse the Russian students but not the

[18] Tsiavlovskii, 47. The expropriators had hoped orginally to attend the Capri school where they had heard, "officers are being trained for the armed uprising," *Pravda* (Vienna), No. 17 (Dec. 3, 1910), 2.

[19] For accounts of the Bologna school see Tsiavlovskii, 44-48; Livshits, "Partiinaia shkola v Bolon'e," 109-44; N. A. Semashko, "O dvukh zagranichnykh partiinykh shkolakh," *Proletarskaia revoliutsiia*, No. 74 (1928), 142-51; *Otchet vtoroi*, 11-25; Lunacharskii, *Velikii perevorot*, 50-51.

[20] *Golos Sotsial-Demokrata*, No. 26 (Dec. 1911), 19; Lenin, XX, 159.

[21] Livshits, "Partiinaia shkola v Bolon'e," 128.

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émigré auditors, the Vperëdists demanded that the students be given the right to determine lecturers and topics in Paris. The School Commission refused and instead sent its Bolshevik representative, N. A. Semashko, to negotiate with individual students. When this divisive tactic failed, Semashko reiterated the commission's earlier offer to accommodate all except the auditors.

In March 1911, having completed their studies in Bologna, the entire school—students, auditors, and lecturers—packed their belongings and went to Paris. Upon arrival they demanded total compensation for their trip and the continuation of their Bologna lectures. The School Commission not only refused but also stopped paying their room and board.

The students then took their case before the sympathetic and non-Bolshevik Foreign Bureau and threatened to tell their story to the "international socialist proletariat."[22] Grudgingly, the School Commission paid the bill but canceled the supplementary lectures.[23]

Despite this token victory over Lenin, Vperëdism was dead by the end of 1911. The faction's proposed third school never materialized; its journal ceased publication; and its students once again found themselves in Tsarist prisons, thanks to the information provided the Okhrana by Bologna's assistant secretary and sometime *provocateur*. The true cause of the faction's demise lay in its loss of popular appeal. The Russian workers no longer had faith in *Vperëd*'s revolutionary slogans as reaction waxed and the chances for insurrection waned. Even the émigré leaders sensed this: Bagdanov devoted more of his time to science, Gorkii to literature, and Pokrovskii to the writing rather than the making of history.

IV

Now that he was free from Vperëd competition, Lenin turned his attention to the Mensheviks. The experience of the past five years

[22] *Otchet vtoroi*, 31. These protracted negotiations can be followed in *ibid.*, 25-30; Lenin, XLVIII, 4-5; "Otchet pervoi partiinoi shkoly v Lonzhiumo," *Istoricheskii arkhiv*, No. 5 (1962), 50-54; Semashko, "O dvukh zagranichnykh partiinykh shkolakh," 150-51.

[23] Lenin had gone to some length planning these lectures which seemingly were intended for the Paris émigré colony as well as for the Bologna students. See N. N. Surovtseva and R. Z. IUnitskaia, "O deiatel'nosti V. I. Lenina v 1911 goda," *Voprosy istorii KPSS*, No. 5 (1961), 104-07. The only lectures the students heard while in Paris were given by IU. O. Martov and F. I. Dan concerning the Menshevik position on party issues.

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had convinced him that even nominal unity with the Mensheviks was impossible and that a clear break was desirable. His immediate objective was to escape the restrictions placed upon the Bolsheviks by the January 1910 Plenum. In this he was assisted by the withdrawal of the Mensheviks from *Sotsial-Demokrat*, leaving him in control of the party's Central Organ, and by the departure of the Vperëdists and frequent absence of the Mensheviks from the School Commission. The commission, in effect, became a five-man body controlled by its Bolshevik representatives, G. E. Zinoviev and Semashko, with the assistance of their Polish ally, V. L. Leder. Thus Lenin could use the Central Organ and the School Commission to pave the way for his ultimate objective—an exclusively Bolshevik conference which would formally expel the Mensheviks from the party. In these changed circumstances, a factional school that could provide the trained conveners and indoctrinated delegates for his conference would be of immense practical importance to Lenin.

The two prerequisites for a successful school, as the Vperëdists had demonstrated, were money and hand-picked students. The commission's treasury was at first very modest; it had received fifteen hundred francs from the January Plenum and a similar amount from a party musicale (*vecherinka*) held for the school's benefit. This sum was paltry when compared to the 20,587 francs spent by the Vperëdists on the Bologna school[24] and was obviously insufficient when the estimated cost of transporting and training one student was eight hundred francs. During 1910 the School Commission turned to the usually generous German Social Democratic party, but the latter had committed all of its available funds to the forthcoming *Reichstag* election campaign. They also appealed to the Russian émigré groups in Western Europe and the United States but the "response was not sufficient to begin school preparations. These material difficulties completely paralyzed"[25] the commission until the Bolsheviks gained effective control of the body in late 1910. Overnight the school's financial problems were solved. Lenin released ten thousand francs from the funds that should have been transferred to the German "trustees" the previous January.[26]

[24] *Otchet vtoroi*, 31.

[25] "Otchet . . . Lonzhiumo," 39.

[26] The loss of Longjumeau's financial report makes accurate accounting of its expenses difficult. For available information see *ibid.*, 39, 51; Tsiavlovskii, 59,

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The School Commission now began to recruit students in earnest. It drafted an elaborate curriculum for the school and it issued a second appeal for local organizations to elect prospective students.[27] In March 1911, when it was evident that the response to the appeal was negligible, the commission borrowed the Vperëd tactic of sending a foreign agent to expedite the elections. The commission's rules clearly stated that "students will be elected by local organizations" and suggested that a *raion* (district) committee or conference was the appropriate electoral body.[28] Nevertheless, the agent of the commission, S. M. Semkov, received instructions from Lenin to select students himself if he could not find a "suitable" local organization to do the job. In St. Petersburg the first group with which he made contact refused to discuss the proposed school. He then held an informal meeting of party workers which approved the idea of the school but declined the responsibility of sending students. In the end, Semkov personally chose three party members—a draft dodger, a pregnant woman, and a very surprised worker—to represent St. Petersburg against the vigorous protests of two powerful but non-Bolshevik *raion* committees.[29] This story was repeated in Ekaterinoslav, where he selected a young student after the only existing organization opposed the school.[30] Thus, by a variety of stratagems, Semkov found thirteen students supposedly from nine local organizations, gave them 150 francs each, and sent them off to Lenin.

65; Livshits, *Partiinyi universitety podpol'ia*, 107, 132-33. These sources disagree about whether the ten thousand francs came from funds Lenin should have transferred to the Central Committee or to the German "trustees" after the January 1910 Plenum. The distinction is somewhat academic since Lenin apparently kept both portions in his own hands until June 1911 when the "trustees" finally demanded custody. See Leonard Schapiro, *The Communist Party of the Soviet Union* (New York, 1960), 119-21.

[27] For the texts of these announcements see Semashko, "O dvukh zagranichnykh partiinykh shkolakh," 145-46; and "Otchet . . . Lonzhiumo," 50-52.

[28] *Ob organizatsii partiinoi shkoly.*

[29] The worker, I. S. Belostotskii, when informed of his unexpected election to Lenin's Paris school, replied, "In Paris? Which Paris?" N. Kartashov and L. Konstantinovsii, "Uchenik Lenina," *Ural*, No. 8 (1963), 64. For the opposite sides in the St. Petersburg elections see "Otchet . . . Lonzhiumo," 41 and *Listok zagranichnago biuro tsentral'nago komiteta*, No. 1 (Sept. 8, 1911), 9.

[30] For a more detailed account, see R. C. Elwood, "The R.S.D.R.P. in Ekaterinoslav: Profile of an Underground Organization, 1907-14," *Canadian Slavonic Papers*, VII (1965), 212-13.

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While awaiting his pupils, Lenin took steps both to acquire additional financial support for his school and also to establish the necessary bodies for calling his all-Bolshevik conference. On May 26, 1911, Semashko demanded that the Foreign Bureau call a plenum of the Central Committee. When the Bureau refused, he accused it of being "undisciplined," picked up the records and treasury of the party, and "rode off on [his] bicycle."[31] On May 27 another of Lenin's henchmen, A. I. Rykov, invited "all Central Committee members living abroad" to attend a pseudo-plenum. This blatantly illegal gathering proceeded to establish two Bolshevik-controlled bodies, the Foreign Organizing Commission and the Technical Commission, which were instructed to prepare an "all-party" conference. Lenin then approached the German "trustees" and convinced them to give his Technical Commission thirty thousand francs with which he could finance both his school and his conference.[32]

The students began arriving in Paris during May. They made their way to Lenin's modest apartment on rue Marie Rose where he interrogated them at length about conditions in Russia. Lenin and Zinoviev used the interim, while awaiting the late arrivals, to give the less advanced students some preparatory instruction in political theory. Together with their protégés, they even constructed a mock-up of a trade union journal. Finally in June 1911, when two-thirds of the pupils had arrived, the school was officially opened.

Paris, however, was an unsuitable location for this so-called "embryo of the . . . Communist universities of the future."[33] Not only were prices higher in the French capital, but the émigré colony of some eighty thousand Russians was interlaced with factional feuds and *agents provocateurs*. Lenin thus chose to convene the school in Longjumeau, a small rural town nineteen kilometers south of Paris, which he and Krupskaia had passed through on one of their frequent bicycle trips. The location of Longjumeau made it possible for lecturers to come from Paris, either by tram or more often by bicycle, while at the same time discouraging student distractions and outside observation. Lenin developed a fetish for se-

[31] N. A. Semashko, *Prozhitoe i perezhitoe* (Moscow, 1960), 52.
[32] Schapiro, 122.
[33] P. Kerzhentsev, *Life of Lenin* (New York, 1939), 133.

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curity. All cyclists peddling down from Paris were instructed to keep a sharp watch over their shoulder for unwanted "shadows." Lenin insisted that every student be given a new nickname that had no relation to either his Christian name or his party pseudonym. Even Longjumeau was given a *nom de guerre: oslitsa* or she-ass,[34] which reflects rather poorly on Lenin's linguistic and agrarian knowledge since he had obviously confused *jumeau* (twin) with *jument* (mare).

Longjumeau's prior claim to fame was inconsequential. It was the site of an inconclusive truce during the religious wars and the setting for Adolphe Adam's comic opera, "Le Postillon de Longjumeau." The town was located in the valley of the Yvette River surrounded on all sides by monotonous fields of wheat. Few visitors, other than the occasional fisherman, found cause to visit this dreary place during the hot summer months. The sudden influx of several dozen Russians consequently did not go unnoticed and indeed caused some alarm. The several thousand inhabitants of Longjumeau, who at first considered their strange visitors to be anarchists, were reassured only when their mayor was informed by a French socialist deputy that the Russians were merely village school teachers using the summer to "improve their education."[35] In the evening the villagers would listen to the students singing songs of their native country in the local café. One student recalled, perhaps apocryphally, how Lenin once directed a joint chorus of the "Marseillaise" with the students and peasants singing at the same time but in different languages.[36]

Lenin, Krupskaia, and Krupskaia's mother lived at one end of the town's only street at 91 Grande Rue in two small, dark, and barely furnished rooms rented from a village tanner. In the morning, the future chairman of the Council of People's Commissars would be seen in his shirt sleeves queuing up at the well to fetch the day's water.[37] In the evening he was forced to listen to the endless succession of carts rumbling through Longjumeau on their

[34] N. A. Semashko, "Partiinaia shkola pod Parizhem v 1911 g.," *Proletarskaia revoliutsiia*, No. 2 (1923), 606.

[35] Tsiavlovskii, 69-70.

[36] I. S. Belostotskii, "Moi vstrechi s Leninym," *Ural*, No. 4 (1962), 135.

[37] I. Mordkovich, "Parizhskie vpechatleniia," *Staryi bol'shevik*, No. 4 (1933), 136.

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way to the Paris market. Zinoviev, his family, and most of the students also lived in rooms rented for them by the School Commission in private homes or in the one uncomfortable workers' hostel.

The center of school operations was at number seventeen—a house, courtyard, and metal worker's shop leased for the summer by Inessa Armand. On the first floor of the house was a kitchen, presided over by a Paris émigré, and a large communal dining room where the students as well as the Lenins and Zinovievs took their meals. Inessa, her twelve-year-old son, and three of the older students had quarters on the second floor. Out in the courtyard, unintentionally segregated from the other students, slept still another Russian who also happened to be an agent of the police. The metal worker's shop became the school's classroom after the students cleaned out the debris of its previous occupant. Its furnishings were Spartan: twenty wicker chairs, a long, homemade table, and a lecturer's desk. In these rather remote and dingy surroundings, which were in marked contrast to Gorkii's villa and Garibaldi University, Lenin opened his first and last party school.[88]

Ten of the thirteen students from the Russian underground had arrived in Longjumeau when the first class met on June 20, 1911. These students, like their counterparts at Capri and Bologna, were representative of the younger generation of non-intelligentsia which the émigré hierarchy was attempting to train for factional and local party responsibilities. The majority were in their mid-twenties and had been in the party for an average of seven years; two-thirds were Great Russians by nationality, and with one exception they were industrial workers or artisans by profession. The five auditors, carefully chosen by Lenin from the Paris émigré colony, were slightly older and more experienced.

Factional allegiance rather than intellectual capacity had obviously been the criterion used by Lenin and Semkov in selecting these students. Twelve of the eighteen trainees were Bolsheviks,

[88] For a description of Longjumeau's physical surroundings see B. A. Breslav, *O V. I. Lenine: beglye vospominaniia* (Moscow, 1934), 36-40; Jean Freville, *Inessa Armand: Une grande figure de la révolution russe* (Paris, 1957), 70-73; N. K. Krupskaya, *Reminiscences of Lenin* (Moscow, 1959), 219-21; M. Aldanov, "Lonzhiumo," *Sovremennyia zapiski*, LX (1936), 428-34. Photographs of the school will be found in Breslav and in E. Kazakevich, "Lenin v Parizhe," *Inostrannaia literatura*, No. 1 (1962), 186-90.

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one was a follower of Plekhanov who at this time followed Lenin, one was a Vperëdist, one claimed to be a non-factionalist, and three were Mensheviks. With the exception of the auditors, who spent most of their time running errands for Lenin, they were surprisingly undistinguished and undedicated considering the importance which both Lenin and the local organizations attached to the school. One rather dense textile worker from Moscow was chased out of Longjumeau by his comrades for his addiction to poetry rather than to political theory. Two students spent most of the semester incapacitated—one having a baby and the other recovering from typhus—while two others undermined Lenin's elaborate security measures by devoting their time to collecting information for the Okhrana.[39]

The students theoretically had an equal voice in the management of their school. Five of them were co-opted to the School Commission which was empowered to decide matters pertaining to courses and lecturers with the concurrence of the newly formed College of Students. This exclusively student body, in addition to "discussing independently all questions of student life,"[40] elected a president-treasurer, I. S. Belostotskii, who presided over student meetings and dispensed pocket money; a secretary, I. V. Prisiagin, who arranged the lecture schedule; and a librarian, I. D. Chugurin. But as everyone realized, "the one and only manager and master of the school"[41] was Lenin who—by dint of his personality, popularity, and prestige—determined overall school policy.

The organization of the school's faculty posed the only real challenge to Lenin's pre-eminent position. Since the Bolsheviks did not possess sufficient intellectual talent to staff the school, the School Commission was forced by necessity and by party opinion to invite

[39] Very little biographical information is available concerning the Longjumeau students, partly because few of them reached positions of prominence in the Soviet regime. See, particularly, Livshits, *Partiinyi universitety podpol'ia*, 108-13, and Tsiavlovskii, 61-65; some additional and at times contradictory material can be culled from the memoirs of Krupskaia and Breslav. One of the *provocateurs*, S. Iskrianistov, had reservations about his true calling despite the doubling of his salary by the police after his "acceptance" at Longjumeau. He resisted returning to Russia, would carry no messages for Lenin, and eventually committed suicide rather than inform on his colleagues. The other agent, M. N. Malinovskii, did his job well.

[40] "Otchet . . . Lonzhiumo," 42.

[41] Tsiavlovskii, 65.

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outside lecturers. As the price for their participation, seven leading Menshevik and Vperëdist intellectuals demanded the establishment of a College of Lecturers. Lenin, realizing that his followers might be outvoted in the proposed body, used the threat of his resignation to have the College rejected. This prompted Martov and Dan to decline their invitations. Pokrovskii announced that he had "promised himself not to participate in further factional undertakings,"[42] and Gorkii wrote that ill health would keep him from coming to Longjumeau. Their former Capri associates, Vol'skii and Lunacharskii, agreed to lecture but soon quarreled with Lenin and left before their courses were completed. Less welcome were the refusals of Rosa Luxemburg and George Plekhanov, owing to the *Reichstag* election and the "Paris heat," respectively. In all, only thirteen of the twenty-five invited lecturers took part in the school. Thus, Lenin and his four Bolshevik colleagues were assured of ideological domination by their teaching of the controversial political courses and by the absence of their prestigious factional opponents.

Lenin began the school day with an hour and a half talk at eight in the morning, after which Inessa Armand often conducted his seminar, leaving Lenin free to cycle to Paris on party business. After lunch in the communal dining room, two of the other teachers gave two hour lectures. Near the end of the summer, an occasional sparsely attended lecture was held following the evening meal in an effort to cover the planned curriculum. The subject matter was mostly historical or theoretical. Zinoviev gave a "clear and systematic" history of the RSDRP; Riazanov was "dry, scholarly and hard to understand" when lecturing on trade unions in Russia and the West; Inessa "showed herself to be a very weak lecturer and nothing was gained" from her talks on Belgian socialism.[43] Probably the most interesting and least useful were Lunacharskii's four discourses on Russian culture supplemented by guided tours of the Louvre.

Owing to the nature of Soviet heliolatry, far more is known about Lenin's fifty-six lectures on dialectical materialism, political economy, the Stolypin agrarian reform, and the party platform. He was one of the few speakers competent to lecture on his subject-

[42] "Otchet . . . Lonzhiumo," 44.

[43] These course descriptions were provided the Okhrana by one of their agents at Longjumeau. Tsiavlovskii, 66-67.

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matter and, as one would expect, he was well organized, articulate, and a disciplinarian. Two little girls, who once brought him the proverbial teacher's apple, were sternly reprimanded by the Bolshevik leader for disturbing his class. To test his students' knowledge, Lenin often posed questions for homework or for discussion periods, such as, "After the revolution, what would you do with the banks if you were leading the nation?" The correct answer was not, as one student suggested, "Do away with them, Vladimir Il'ich."[44]

In the occasional seminars students were taught to write articles, to deliver speeches, or to conduct party correspondence. Generally, however, their instruction had little relevance to the realities of local party life. Lenin apparently was more interested in developing loyal Bolsheviks who were ideologically consistent with his point of view than he was in training workers in the arts of the underground. Some of the students, still failing to realize that Lenin's purpose in holding the school was different from theirs in coming to Longjumeau, later criticized this lack of practical training.[45]

The summer at Longjumeau was not entirely spent in the classroom. Lenin insisted that no work be done on Sunday when the students often took cycling trips or walks through the French countryside. Since only four members of the school owned bicycles, Lenin frequently was seen carrying a student on his handle bars. One of the most popular excursions was to cycle twelve kilometers to the Seine for an afternoon of swimming. Belostotskii relates how Lenin once challenged him to a two-lap race across the river and then scolded his younger protégé for tiring out an old man.[46] One senses that the Lenin the students saw on these trips, or the Lenin who sang peasant songs and played chess with his students, was a more relaxed and human individual than the cold, calculating, factional leader usually encountered in his many biographies.

On their free days the students might also go to Paris where they would visit a museum with Lunacharskii, or the landmarks of

[44] A. Ivanova, "Vstrechi v Lonzhiumo," *Don*, No. 4 (1958), 23. For Lenin as a lecturer, see Breslav, 47-51; I. S. Belostotskii, "Vstrechi s Leninym," *IUzhnyi ural*, No. 30 (1958), 5; Marc Vichniac, *Lénine* (Paris, 1932), 74.

[45] Tsiavlovskii, 70; "Otchet . . . Lonzhiumo," 49.

[46] Belostotskii, "Vstrechi s Leninym," 6. See also Breslav, 42; David Shub, *Lenin: A Biography* (New York, 1951), 116; Kartashov and Konstantinovskii, 75-76; A. I. Dogadov, "Pamiati uchetelia-tovarishcha," in *O Lenine: vospominaniia* (Moscow, 1925), II, 139-41.

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the French Revolution, or the Chamber of Deputies to hear Jean Jaurès speak. They of course celebrated Bastille Day in Paris but, according to the observant Okhrana agent, spent too much of the school's money drinking wine.[47] Occasionally, "the closest group—Il'ich [Lenin], Armand, Sergo [Ordzhonikidze], Lunacharskii—went to the theater on the outskirts of Paris"[48] to see one of the proletarian plays forbidden in the city proper. What is interesting about these evenings at the theater is not so much Lenin's early appreciation of socialist realism, but the fact that Inessa Armand and not Krupskaia was included in his "closest group" (*bolee tesnoi kompaniei*). Here is another side of Il'ich not seen by his biographers until a few years ago.

Lenin first met Inessa Armand in 1909. She was five years younger than he and very attractive. She was proficient in several European languages and at playing the piano—talents which Lenin appreciated and often utilized.[49] According to Krupskaia, Inessa "took an active part in organizing the party school"[50] and, as already mentioned, conducted Lenin's seminars and lectured without great skill on Belgian socialism. No other woman, not even Krupskaia who had previously instructed the Capri students in Paris, taught at Longjumeau and no other speaker had Lenin in attendance at all his lectures. Most of the time between the end of Longjumeau and the outbreak of the Revolution, Inessa lived either next door, across the street, or in the same house as the Lenins. She also received more letters from him during this period than any other relative, friend, or party member.[51] And finally, besides giving numerous reports for Lenin at international gatherings, she was one of the chosen few to ride with him through Germany in the famous "sealed train."

[47] Tsiavlovskii, 70. For the Paris excursions see also "Otchet . . . Lonzhiumo," 48-49.

[48] Dubinskii-Mukhadze, 91.

[49] N. Valentinov, *Vstrechi s Leninym* (New York, 1953), 98-99.

[50] *Pravda*, Oct. 3, 1920.

[51] Lenin, XLVIII-XLIX. From December 1913 to their departure for Russia, Lenin wrote 103 letters to Inessa. Many of these epistles mysteriously have lost their first pages—probably because Lenin used the familiar tense and went beyond his usual "*Dorogoi drug*" salutation. For the most balanced treatment of this "affair," see Bertram Wolfe, "Lenin and Inessa Armand," *Slavic Review*, XXII (1963), 96-114.

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Despite these signs of comradely favor, there is no firm evidence to support the claims of recent writers[52] that Inessa Armand was Lenin's mistress or that Krupskaia dutifully offered to leave her husband during the summer of 1911. The available information indicates only that Inessa occupied a privileged place in Lenin's life and that their relationship probably grew closer as a result of the three months spent together in Longjumeau.

While Longjumeau was one of the most relaxing interludes in Lenin's revolutionary career, he never lost sight of the school's *raison d'être*. Inside the school itself there was none of the factional quarreling that nearly destroyed the earlier schools. By a combination of careful selecting of students, using his imposing personality judiciously, and having his wife inspect all student mail,[53] Lenin was able to preserve internal unity. Indeed, his students even became his policemen. Once while visiting L. B. Kamenev, a leading Bolshevik and a Longjumeau lecturer, some students discovered a pile of Trotskyite literature belonging to Kamenev's wife (and Trotsky's sister). One young worker, telling Lenin of the discovery, suggested that party discipline called for Kamenev to leave his wife. Lenin assured him that this was carrying school unity a bit too far.[54]

Outside the school, however, the factional struggle was intensifying. The Foreign Organizing Commission and the Technical Commission, which Lenin formed illegally in June, came under the control of the "Conciliator" Bolsheviks who had strong reservations about the factional nature of Lenin's school and his proposed conference. When it became apparent in July that the two commissions were indeed working toward a truly "all-party" conference, Lenin decided to circumvent his own creations by sending three Longjumeau auditors back to Russia to form a new commission that would call an "all-Bolshevik" conference as originally planned. Later that month, Ordzhonikidze announced that he was going to Paris for an ear operation, and B. A. Breslav decided to visit his sick wife in Switzerland.[55] Instead, they joined a third auditor, I. I. Shvarts, and returned to the underground where in October

[52] Stefan T. Possony, *Lenin: The Compulsive Revolutionary* (Chicago, 1964), 119-25; Marcel Body, "Alexandra Kollontai," *Preuves*, II (April 1952), 17.
[53] Tsiavlovskii, 69.
[54] Ivanova, 25.
[55] Tsiavlovskii, 65.

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they formed the "Russian Organizing Commission for calling an all-party conference."

The Technical Commission, which opposed the auditors' mission, responded by rejecting the school's request for additional funds. Only after Lenin's public protest to the Central Committee did the commission reluctantly grant five thousand francs to pay Longjumeau's remaining expenses.[56] This money was soon exhausted. On August 30, the students held a farewell party in Longjumeau. Each was given two hundred francs, the address of a new underground organization, and instructions to work for the convening of the conference and if possible their own election to it.

V

When the Sixth Party Conference met in Prague on January 18, 1912, it was obvious that the auditors and the students had done their work well. Among the local delegates sat Ordzhonikidze, Dogadov, Zevin, Zinoviev—all Longjumeau personnel—and M. I. Gurovich, a young Pole who had lived in Longjumeau the previous summer. Ex-professors Lenin, Semashko, and Kamenev sat at the dais representing three foreign organizations. Thus, of the eighteen delegates, eight had been at Longjumeau[57] and the remainder had been recruited by Longjumeau graduates. Even more important, only two of the eighteen were followers of Lenin's sometime ally, Plekhanov; all the rest were loyal Bolsheviks.

These delegates, who in most cases "represented" non-existent organizations or insignificant splinters of existing bodies, found no difficulty in accepting Lenin's program. The conference promptly declared that the Mensheviks "had placed themselves outside the party"[58] and it elected a new Central Committee, new Foreign and Russian Bureaus, and a new Central Organ—all of which were controlled by the Bolsheviks.

[56] Lenin, XX, 294; Livshits, *Partiinyi universitety podpol'ia*, 133.

[57] Two other Longjumeau students—Breslav and Shvarts—were elected as delegates but were arrested before they could cross the border. The police felt that conference delegate L. P. Serebriakov had also attended the school but this appears unlikely. It should be noted that one of the Okhrana agents at Prague, A. S. Romanov, had been part of the first Capri contingent that listened to Lenin's supplementary lectures in 1909.

[58] *KPSS v rez.*, I, 283.

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It has been argued that this was a Pyrrhic victory for Lenin.[59] Since the Okhrana had two of its representatives at both Longjumeau and the Prague Conference, every student or delegate who returned to Russia found himself in jail by the end of 1912. The local organizations, which had counted on the émigré schools to develop a new generation of underground leaders, still lacked trained propagandists, agitators, and organizers. Thus, the revival of worker unrest that took place in many parts of Russia before the War was often independent of the incapacitated Social Democratic movement. Judged in these terms, the party schools were a failure. But Lenin's purpose in disrupting the Vperëdist schools and in creating Longjumeau was not so much to satisfy underground requirements as it was to gain control of the party machinery. Judged by this criterion, his policy was indeed a success.

[59] Schapiro, 125-40.

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National Economic Interest Groups and Policy Formation in the EEC*

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One of the most fascinating aspects of the decision-making process in the European Economic Community is what Leon Lindberg has called the "constant and complex interaction and interpenetration between Community and national institutions, policies, and processes."[1] To comprehend fully the background, evolution, and implications of major Community decisions, they must be analyzed in terms of interaction and interpenetration between the pursuit of goals by internal political forces within the member countries, the domestic politics of each member state, the interstate politics within the Community, and pressures exerted by third countries both on the national and Community level.

This article will focus on a small but significant segment of this complex Community decision-making process, namely, the general strategies and techniques that influential national economic interest groups in the member states employ for the eliciting of favorable decisions and policies by the Community institutions. This discussion will concentrate on national interest groups and not on the European-level umbrella organizations such as COPA, UNICE, or

* An oral version of this article was delivered at the European Institute of Columbia University in March 1966. The author wishes to express his gratitude to the Ford Foundation for financial support which made it possible to carry out field research during the summer of 1965.

[1] Leon Lindberg, "Decision Making and Integration in the European Community," *International Organization*, XIX (1965), 58.

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the European Secretariat of the CISL,[2] although certain functions of these organizations are relevant. Several questions concerning the activities of industrial, agricultural, and labor groups, primarily, will be examined. Do these groups seek to influence Community institutions directly, or do they prefer to operate through their national governments? If both European institutions and national governments are targets, where do these groups place their main efforts? If "demands" as "inputs" into the Community political system—using David Easton's terms[3]—are channeled through the national governments, what role is assigned to or played by domestic political parties? If demands flow directly to Community institutions, which of these institutions, the Commission, the Council of Ministers, the Committee of Permanent Representatives, the European Parliament, the Economic and Social Committee, or any other, are considered to be most accessible? Where, then, is such access regarded as most profitable in terms of favorable action? What value is accorded to channeling demands through the European-level umbrella organizations? Finally, what are some of the usual methods and techniques employed for the presentation of interest-group demands to the Community institutions?

Answers to these questions stem mainly from approximately seventy interviews conducted in the summer of 1965 with officials of the most influential national economic interest groups, major political parties, and pertinent government ministries in the member states.[4] In addition, conversations with a number of Community officials were of value in shedding light on obscure points and in confirming or refuting statements made by the respondents during

[2] Abbreviations for Comité des Organisations Professionelles Agricoles de la C.E.E., Union des Industries de la Communauté Européene, and Confédération Internationale des Syndicats Libres. For more details on these and other umbrella organizations, see Leon Lindberg, *The Political Dynamics of European Integration* (Stanford, 1963) 96-103.

[3] *A Systems Analysis of Political Life* (New York, 1965), 158-219. Demands and support are the "inputs" into a political system; decisions and policies, the "output." Support depends on more than momentary gratification of demands; it signifies the maintenance of a minimal level of attachment to the values and institutions of a system.

[4] Interviews were held with officials of the following types of organizations: Italy—6 industrial and agricultural, 2 labor, 6 political, 3 government ministries, 1 newspaper; France—7 industrial and agricultural, 2 labor, 6 political, 1 newspaper, 2 government ministries; Germany—4 industrial and agricultural, 1 labor, 3 political, 1 newspaper, 2 government ministries; Netherlands—2 in-

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the interviews. Although these interviews did not deal exclusively with the procedures used by economic interest groups to influence the Community decision-making process, a substantial part of each interview was devoted to this subject. In order to obtain depth in the interviews, the questions were largely open-ended.[5]

It would be presumptuous to claim that the information gathered from the interviews provides a comprehensive and fully accurate picture of the manifold activities in which these groups are engaged. The information elicited often was spotty, and individual respondents may not always have been in full possession of all facts. Nevertheless, the observations reported in this paper may serve as a modest empirical contribution toward a better understanding of the intricacies of the Community decision-making process and may thereby assist in the formulation of theories of political systems and the complex phenomenon of community-building.[6]

Direct or Indirect Approach to the Community Institutions

From the replies of respondents during the interviews it is abundantly clear that a substantial majority (seventy per cent) of economic interest groups in the member states considers the flow of demands through the national governments more likely to be successful than those made directly to the Community institutions. Only twenty-two per cent of the respondents believe that direct presentation of demands to the Common Market organs is more advantageous, and eight per cent do not seem to have a definite opinion on this issue. Taking into account only the agricultural and industrial groups, the percentage in favor of channeling demands through the national governments is even greater, exceeding ninety per cent. This does not mean that the direct approach to Common Market institutions is being overlooked; indeed, it is not. However, the major efforts of these groups are aimed at the national governments.

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dustrial and agricultural, 1 labor, 4 political, 1 government ministry; Belgium—2 industrial and agricultural, 1 labor, 2 political, 1 government ministry; Luxembourg—2 industrial and agricultural, 1 government ministry.

[5] A major thrust of the interviews was to elicit group elite attitudes toward the evolving external relations of the Common Market and possible determination of likely future trends of this relationship.

[6] For example, see Ernest B. Haas, *The Uniting of Europe* (Stanford, 1958); P. E. Jacob and J. V. Toscano (eds.), *The Integration of Political Communities* (Philadelphia and New York, 1964); A. Etzioni, *Political Unification* (New York, 1965).

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Three obvious reasons account for this priority in emphasis: first, the Council of Ministers, representing the interests of the member states, is the final authority in the Community decision-making process; secondly, the interaction between national interest groups and national administrations, cultivated and cemented over long periods of time, normally operates smoothly and effectively; and third, potent political leverage can be applied through the electoral processes and representative institutions on the governments in the member states. This reasoning is reflected in the following typical comments: A German newspaper editor stated that "the main thrust of economic interest groups will continue to be directed through the national governments as long as the Council of Ministers had the last word." A representative of an important French farm group declared that "political influence can be exercised much more dynamically in Paris than in Brussels." There also seems to be a desire in some quarters that Council pre-eminence should be continued, which suggests a certain amount of grass roots support for de Gaulle's views. Reflecting this sentiment was the emphatic statement of an official of a prominent agricultural group in Belgium that "the Council must retain most of the power and the authority of the Commission should be reduced."

Evidently in disagreement with the majority opinion of the agricultural and industrial groups is the president of the main agricultural organization in Luxembourg, the *Centrale Paysanne Luxembourgoise*. He viewed direct Community channels as more effective than working through the national administration, arguing that it is the Commission which formulates the proposals upon which the Council must act. However, the fact that the individualist president of the *Centrale Paysanne* has not always been on the best of terms with the Luxembourg government may suggest a better explanation for his preference for direct access to Common Market organs. This seems to confirm the hypothesis advanced by students of interest-group activity in the United States that these groups seek to operate at the level of the political system (federal, state, or local (where favorable action is most likely to be taken.[7]

In contrast to agricultural and industrial interest groups, a sub-

[7] See David B. Truman, *The Governmental Process* (New York, 1960), 322-32 and Harmon Zeigler, *Interest Groups in American Society* (Englewood Cliffs, N. J., 1964), 42-53.

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stantial number of labor unions—although perhaps not a majority —seems to look more to Brussels than to their own capitals for the promotion of their interests. In this category fall the non-communist unions in France, Italy, and Belgium; on the other hand, the labor unions in Germany and the Netherlands, particularly the DGB (German Federation of Trade Unions) and the NVV (Dutch Association of Labor Unions), seem to prefer pressing their demands through their national governments. The communist unions, which for many years have not been interested in European-level activities, are now seeking seats on the Economic and Social Committee. To obtain this representation would require action by the national governments which so far has not been forthcoming. In order to make their influence felt on the European level, the CGT (French General Confederation of Labor) and the CGIL (General Confederation of Italian Labor) have organized an Action Committee; one of its objectives is to gain operative access to the Commission and the Council.[8] We should note that in general organized labor in Brussels is less influential than industry and agriculture. A French union official sought to rationalize this predicament by stating that "industry spends the most money in Brussels and agriculture is the best organized."

The Route Through the National Governments

If demands transmitted by agricultural and industrial groups to the Community-level decision-making apparatus are routed through the national governments, the primary targets are the governmental agencies dealing with foreign trade. For important decisions, access to the premier and individual cabinet members is also sought. This seems to be the case especially in France, where de Gaulle and his cabinet play the decisive role in all economic matters and subordinate officials are reluctant in assuming responsibility for major decisions. The Conseil National du Patronat Français is said to have particularly good relations with Prime Minister Pompidou, and the representative of the FNSEA, France's largest agricultural organization, declared with pride that former agriculture minister Pisani always took the FNSEA viewpoint into careful consideration when making a decision in agricultural matters. However, all economic

[8] *Agence Europe*, March 23, 1966.

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interest groups in France realize that while de Gaulle, perhaps more now than before, acknowledges a measure of their political power, he tends to make decisions as he sees fit and gives mostly lip service to interest groups.[9]

A secondary target of agricultural and industrial interest groups in all member states are the foreign ministries. A respondent in the German Foreign Ministry stated that at times interest groups seeking a favorable decision from Community institutions approach simultaneously the Ministries of Economics and/or Agriculture, the Foreign Ministry, and the Office of the Chancellor. Occasionally there are disputes and arguments between the ministries serving a specific clientele, on the one hand, and the Foreign Ministry, on the other, because the latter tends to look at an issue more in terms of the national interest. Normally, however, all ministries attempt to present a united front. The secretaries of state of the three ministries plus the secretary of state of the Finance Ministry constitute a continuous coordinating committee and seek to formulate arbitration proposals acceptable to interest groups while taking into consideration the "public interest." Many of these proposals are accepted by the interest groups and thus form the basis for the reconciliation of conflicting interests.

Similar arbitrating functions are also performed by the appropriate ministries in the other member states. Perhaps one can distinguish three stages of arbitration on the national level. The first stage may take place in clientele ministries and might involve conflicting interests within agriculture or within industry. A second stage of arbitration, touching upon the interests of various segments of the economy and concerning more than one ministry, may be carried out by inter-ministerial coordinating committees. Finally, if particularly important economic interests are involved bearing on the "national interest" of a member state, or if solutions by inter-ministerial committees cannot be found for an especially severe conflict of interests, the cabinet becomes the final arbitrator. In de Gaulle's France, of course, cabinet-level arbitration is likely to occur much more frequently than in the other member states.

Utilizing again David Easton's terminology, the government officials who arbitrate between conflicting economic interests on var-

[9] See Nicholas Wahl, "The French Political System," in S. H. Beer and A. B. Ulam (eds.), *Patterns of Government* (New York, 1962), 421.

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ious levels of national government perform the functions of "gatekeepers." They reduce the number and content of interest-group demands that are processed through the national governments on their way to the Community decision-making apparatus. As the demands move closer to the point of possible implementation as binding decisions or policies, they constantly become smaller in number, although the smaller number may incorporate some or perhaps all of the content of many of the demands that had been eliminated as independent units.[10]

The gatekeeping functions of national civil servants with regard to interest-group demands on Common Market institutions demonstrate clearly that these officials are placed in a highly strategic position of authority and control within the Community decision-making process. The replies of the respondents suggest not only that the civil servants fully appreciate this position of power, but also that most of them are unwilling to relinquish their power of decision over interest-group demands and over the shaping of Community policy in general. Although the EEC Treaty requires a gradual transfer of decision-making powers from the national governments to the Community in certain fields of economic policy formulation and implementation, it is quite likely that the very understandable desire of national civil servants to retain their power position, perhaps perceived as something of a vested interest, constitutes an impediment to the smooth transfer of decision-making competences to the Community institutions. It is interesting to note that according to observations by the respondents, officials in clientele ministries tend to be much more sanguine in their determination to retain their power of decision than foreign service officers. One reason for this difference may be that officials in clientele departments have much closer ties to interest groups which, for a variety of reasons, they do not want to loosen. On the other hand, foreign service officials are traditionally less subject to and perhaps also more immune to interest-group pressures, because in the formulation and implementation of foreign policy the "national interest" is generally accepted as taking precedence over private economic interests.[11]

[10] Easton, 133-35.

[11] One or two of the respondents suggested that job changes of the officials engaged in gatekeeping functions would eventually diminish the adverse reac-

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In this connection it is highly significant that a substantial number of interest-group representatives and not a few political party officials had serious doubts about the wisdom of introducing expanded qualified majority voting in the Council of Ministers in January 1966, as envisaged by the EEC Treaty. Since some of my interviews took place before the June 30, 1965, debacle that triggered the Common Market crisis, it is evident that de Gaulle's desire to maintain a veto on so-called vital questions had grass roots support prior to that date. It certainly was shared by many respondents in all categories and in all member states in interviews after that date. It seems to me that support for continuing unanimity in Council decisions on the part of interest-group and political party elites tends indirectly to bolster and to protract the attitude of reluctance toward the gradual transfer of power to the Community level held by national civil servants. At the same time, this reluctance on the part of national officials, and its subtle influence upon governmental policy formation in the member states, may restrain the member governments from adopting a more constructive view toward the implementation of the principle of qualified majority voting. Despite strong opposition by France's Common Market partners against weakening changes of this principle, proposed by the French Foreign Minister during the Luxembourg Conference in January 1966, information gained from the interviews suggests that the position of the "five" was most likely prompted by tactical considerations, and that at least Germany, Italy, and Luxembourg would view with apprehension the application of this principle in so-called vital issues.

Role of Political Parties

What is the role of political parties in the member states with regard to demands of economic interest groups channeled through national governments to Community institutions? Do officials of these groups consider political party support important in obtaining governmental backing for their Community-level demands?

Judging from the replies of the respondents, it seems that most

tion of part of the civil service to the transfer of decision-making powers to the Community institutions. A few others felt that most officials in due time would acquiesce in this change of power and become reconciled with their new status.

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economic interest groups in the member states seek to enlist the assistance of political parties in their pursuit of objectives on the European level. At a minimum, they wish to keep open the channels of communication to the party organizations. Even in France, where party officials admit freely that the influence of their parties, including the UNR, upon governmental policy-making is small at present, economic interest groups maintain relations with political parties. The representative of the Patronat stated specifically that his organization maintained its connections with all parties, including the Communists, and used legislative study groups to acquaint legislators with its projects and goals. However, some other economic interest groups in France, such as the CGPME, representing small and medium-sized commercial and industrial enterprises, and the FNSEA, the foremost spokesman of French agriculture, appear to exclude the Communist party from their contacts. In any case, the objective of all groups in maintaining relations with parliamentarians is to ensure that the necessary contacts with parties are available if the political situation in France should change or if perhaps the European Parliament should eventually be elected by direct suffrage. In the meantime, close connections with party members holding prominent posts in different Community institutions—for example, M. Lecourt as a justice of the Court of the Communities or M. Poher in the European Parliament—are regarded as immediately useful because these men are in a position to exercise subtle, although obviously limited, influence in favor of French groups.

In Italy and the Netherlands a few respondents questioned the effectiveness of political parties in advancing economic interest-group demands. The representative of Fiat thought that political opinions of and within the parties in Italy were too diffuse—witness, for example, the many factions among the Christian Democrats—to make parties useful tools for the attainment of economic objectives on the Community level. An official of the largest Dutch labor union viewed political parties as relatively ineffective for the promotion of union objectives and believed that in order to be successful the main effort had to be channeled directly to the administration.

Other respondents in the member states, however, with the exception of France, appeared to place a relatively high value on political party aid in obtaining the Community-level goals of economic

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interest groups. In fact, an official of IRI, the Italian state holding corporation owning a controlling interest in a large number and variety of Italian industries, stated that his company sought to exercise its influence primarily through the major parties. The representative of the BDI, the foremost manufacturing group in Germany, also expressed his satisfaction with the aid rendered by the political parties in the pursuit of objectives on the European plane. In the Netherlands, close collaboration exists between the associations of Protestant and Catholic manufacturers, on one side, and the parties of the respective religious beliefs, on the other. At least in Belgium, but perhaps also in other member states, it seems that in exceptionally important cases prominent parliamentarians may personally intervene on behalf of economic interest groups at the ministries.

To the extent that political parties are able to offer effective assistance to interest-group demands, they also function as gatekeepers. They may select for transmission through national governments to Community institutions those demands they consider politically beneficial and compatible with the parties' goals; they may seek to reformulate other demands in order to bring them in line with those they already represent; or they may reject them altogether.

Access to Community Institutions

When economic interest groups channel their demands successfully through the national governments, the presumption and expectation is that the ministers participating in the final stage of the Community decision-making process in the Council will seek aggressively to have these demands reflected in Council decisions. For this reason direct access to the Council is rarely sought. With regard to the other Community institutions which play roles in the formation of Community policy, there are differing views among the respondents concerning accessibility and potential profitability after access has been gained.

Before examining these views we must, however, first inquire whether economic interest groups in the member states desire to obtain and maintain direct access to these institutions or whether this is a task entrusted to the umbrella organizations that have been formed on the European level. There seems to be general agreement that the objectives of national economic interest groups tend to be-

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come diluted in such organizations as COPA or UNICE because the structuring of a united front requires the reconciliation of conflicting economic interests. This, in turn, requires bargains and compromises, seeming to confirm Lindberg's observation of these organizations that "common positions are reached when interests coincide, but otherwise decision-making is of the lowest-common-denominator type, with final agreement rarely exceeding what the least cooperative participant is willing to grant."[12] Nevertheless, whatever compromises have been worked out, they are generally adhered to, although this does not seem to prevent some national groups from also working discreetly through their national governments or making direct approaches to various Community institutions, particularly if such groups should persist in seeking their own specific goals.

Despite the fact that national interest groups continue to seek direct access to Community institutions, most respondents state that it would be a mistake to underestimate the significance of the umbrella organizations. The Commission's practice of a systematic consultation of certain interest groups and its insistence that common opinions be presented to the Commission, rather than six sets of positions evolved by six different national groups, clearly demonstrate the value of the umbrella organizations. We must also note, however, that occasionally when no consensus could be reached in European organizations, the Commission has consented to hear national groups.[13] Another useful aspect of umbrella organizations is that it is easier for them than for six national groups to arrange consultations with the committees of the European Parliament and with the specialized sections of the Economic and Social Committee. Finally, in those cases where agreement regarding objectives had been reached by the six national groups, most respondents thought that the umbrella organizations had shown themselves moderately effective in obtaining favorable decisions from Community institutions.[14]

[12] Lindberg, *European Economic Integration*, 99, see also 333-39.

[13] Industrial groups are consulted less often than agricultural groups because the EEC Treaty is more specific in areas of their interest. The consultative committees, composed of representatives of various interest groups formed by the Commission, are found mainly in the agricultural sector of the economy.

[14] In fact, the president of the CGPME, representing small and medium enterprises in France, was so convinced of the value of European-level organizations

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Among the Community institutions, the Commission appeared to many respondents to be the most lucrative target, yet it was conceded that success, at least on the level of the commissioners themselves, was often quite elusive. One respondent, an official of a large national confederation of manufacturing groups in Belgium, stated that although regular attempts were made to get in touch with Commission members, they frequently claimed to be busy. When they consented to receive a representative, they listened, but were difficult to persuade. This respondent also complained that the Commission's use of government experts from the member states often led to the adoption of compromise solutions that neglected certain national interests. A respondent belonging to an agricultural group in France declared that while Commission vice-president Sicco Mansholt was very courteous, he was not easy to influence, and that in general the present Commission members attempted to remain aloof from interest-group pressures.[15] Even COPA and UNICE, organizations whose establishment was strongly encouraged by the Commission, seem to have encountered similar attitudes on the part of Commission members. More fruitful, according to respondents, were contacts with middle- and upper middle-rank Commission officials. Through them it was possible to obtain advance information on proposals planned by the Commission and to disseminate information memos which might serve to influence the individuals who were doing the "pick and shovel" preparation for the elaboration of Commission proposals.

What are the attitudes of economic interest groups with regard to access to the Committee of Permanent Representatives and what are the strategies employed? There can be little doubt that this Committee plays a crucial role in the evolution of Community policy, perhaps much more so than is usually assumed. It not only prepares the Council decisions, but is also normally consulted by the Commission before the latter submits a proposal to the Council

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that he had made strong efforts to persuade kindred-minded groups in the other member states to form such an organization for the promotion of their mutual interests. So far his efforts have not met with success.

[15] Another respondent thought that if the current "strong" Commission members were replaced by "weak" members, perhaps as a result of the de Gaulle crisis, it would be easier to exert interest-group influence on the top level of the Commission.

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of Ministers, a procedure which has been formalized to a certain extent by the meeting of foreign ministers in January 1966. For the performance of these tasks the Committee has a staff of about three hundred civil servants from the six member states which is organized into a number of working groups and special sub-committees patterned after the administrative structure of the Commission.

There may be some question about the wisdom of national groups seeking access to the Committee of Permanent Representatives because they already operate through the national governments and the members of the six delegations receive their instructions from the national ministries. There may be the danger that intervention at the Committee level would create confusion and reduce the chances for success. However, the working groups, special subcommittees, and, finally, the Committee as a whole may arbitrate conflicting national economic interests as well as conflicting economic interests of the member states; as such, they act as additional sets of gatekeepers controlling the progress of national interest-group demands. In fact, because of the consultation of pertinent working groups by the Commission, the groups and special committees may perform the first gatekeeping functions on the European level. In addition, it has been noted in the national ministries —very much to the distress of officials there—that some sort of subtle ideological metamorphosis seems to take place in the minds of some staff members of the Permanent Representatives. They appear to adopt a more "European" rather than a strictly national orientation in their perception of what is best for the pursuit of their governments' objectives. Although staff members may receive quite explicit instructions from their governments, they usually phone their colleagues on a working group to determine areas of agreement. If agreement appears difficult, they may then phone their governments to request a change of instructions. For all these reasons the economic interest groups in the member states may wish to seek access to the Committee of Permanent Representatives; their strategies, however, vary from country to country.

From the replies of the respondents, it appears that the Italians seek and maintain the most frequent contacts with members of the Committee. In fact, they not only pay regularly scheduled visits to their own delegation, but also are said to have made contact

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with the delegations of other member states, in particular the German delegation, to seek support for an Italian demand. The Luxembourg groups also have frequent contacts with their delegation, but the purpose seems to be mainly exchange of information.[16] The German interest groups also have a fair number of contacts with members of their delegation. The BDI seems to be most active at the seat of the Committee, and representatives of this organization often visit the ambassador. At times, German industrialists also pay visits to the delegation. There are few contacts between the Belgian groups and the delegation proper, but social relationships between interest-group officials and delegation members may be used to further group demands. One Belgium respondent stated that he had asked a member of his delegation to phone his colleagues of the other member states to persuade them to support the Belgian group's point of view. Contacts between Dutch interest groups and their delegations seem to be rare, but if they are made occasionally, they are solicited on the "working-level" rather than on the ambassadorial level. Finally, French interest groups are said to initiate contacts with their delegation only rarely because they fully understand that such contacts are resented by the national ministries.

The Community institution obviously designed, and thus seemingly best suited, for the promotion of national interest-group demands would appear to be the Economic and Social Committee (ESC). The majority of respondents, however, thought that this Committee was not an effective instrument for the advancement of interests of national economic groups. Some labor union officials felt that membership in the Committee was a means through which they could exercise a measure of influence on Community policy formation, but this sentiment was not shared by all union respondents. In fact, one union official expressed the opinion that business had been more successful than labor in using the Committee to further its demands. An official of an industrial group suggested that the exercise of influence depended on the position an individual held in the Committee, and that chairmen and reporters of working groups and specialized sections were indeed in a position to sway the Commission on some issues. Nevertheless, while the ESC does

[16] In fact, at times the Luxembourg delegation itself takes the initiative and visits the Luxembourg interest groups.

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not seem to be viewed as a very effective instrument to influence the Community decision-making process, it does constitute a forum where national interest groups may be able to persuade interest groups in other member states to support their objectives. Moreover, through this medium they may induce other member governments to collaborate with their own government in the Committee of Permanent Representatives or the Council in pressing for a favorable decision with respect to these objectives.

Access to the European Parliament and the parliamentary deputies was considered by most respondents as even less important and remunerative than an approach through the ESC.[17] In view of its very restricted powers, most respondents thought that only direct election of deputies and an increase in powers could alter the present attitude of economic interest groups toward the Parliament.

There are other potential targets on the Community level for economic interest groups, for example, the Court of the European Communities, the European Investment Bank, and the Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund. Respondents did not express themselves with regard to these institutions, but there is evidence that some attempts, though perhaps unsuccessful, have been made to influence the judges of the Court through social contacts, through the presentation or publication of scholarly papers, and through the initiation of test cases. In view of the generally very high regard in which judicial institutions are held in Western Europe, this is a most delicate issue and little is said about it in the open.

Methods and Techniques

It would exceed the scope of this article to examine the methods and techniques employed by economic interest groups in the member states to press their demands with national institutions. Excellent studies have been made by such scholars as Ehrmann, LaPalombara, Kogan, Meynaud, Deutsch, and others. However, it might be of interest to summarize some of the methods and techniques used by national interest groups and large business firms on the Euro-

[17] Because of the close cooperation of the Social Democrats in the Parliament, the feeling existed that the united front presented by socialist deputies on most issues could be of limited use to some interest groups if their interests were to find a favorable acceptance by the Social Democratic groupings.

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pean level, either directly by their own representatives or by officials of the umbrella organizations.

The most common method of seeking to influence the formation of Community policy is the submission of reports, studies, statistics, and resolutions, mainly to working-level Community civil servants, but on occasion also to top-echelon officials. These documents may contain a specific position taken by the submitting interest groups with regard to a Commission proposal, or they may offer suggestions for future action. The timing of submission is a crucial factor; some respondents felt that it was best to submit the pertinent documents when the project of concern to a group was in the early planning stage; others thought that the most strategic time was when the preparations for a proposal had reached the stage at which top officials (directors and directors-general) presented it to the Commission. Beyond that point in time, it was considered to be too late to influence effectively the substance of the proposal.

With regard to the question whether to mobilize public opinion to back up interest-group demands, no consensus exists among interest-group officials. Representatives of agricultural and industrial groups tended to feel that their organizations can be more effective if their relationships to Community institutions are kept confidential. On the other hand, labor unions and consumer groups seemed to prefer maximum publicity for their activities, perhaps because they do not enjoy the same good contacts as the agricultural and industrial groups, and also because they are mass organizations whose leadership must inform members in order to retain their goodwill.

In addition to the submission of reports, statistics, and other materials, and perhaps to strengthen their impact, economic interest groups engage in a variety of social contacts which are used also to obtain information about Community activities. High officials are entertained in restaurants or at home, and middle-rank officials are invited to have a cocktail after work, something which is being called, from the viewpoint of the interest-group representative, drinking an "aperitif d'information." Respondents explain that no disparaging implications attach to such affairs. In fact, Commission President Hallstein is said to favor them—he himself was the center of a large party given by the Mannesmann Works in July of 1965 —and a high official of the Commission is supposed to have ad-

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monished his subordinates that if they accept a dinner from the Shell Oil Company, they must also accept a social engagement from Standard Oil.[18] In any case, these contacts greatly strengthen the ties between Community civil servants and interest-group representatives and facilitate access to Community institutions by the latter. However, these ties also provide channels through which Community organs may exercise some influence upon policy formation in the capitals of the member states; for example, if an interest group and the Commission are in agreement on a project but the Council of Ministers withholds its approval or balks at its implementation. Moreover, similar to the subtle ideological metamorphosis which some of the staff members of the Permanent Committee seem to undergo, officials of umbrella organizations in Brussels also tend to become "Community-oriented." As such they may serve as instruments through which Community organs can influence national groups and, perhaps, in time, the member governments.

Conclusion

In summary, several major points emerge from this study of strategies and techniques of national economic interest groups to elicit favorable decisions and policies from Community institutions. First, a large majority of the groups place primary emphasis on routing demands through national governments and assign secondary priority to the direct approach to Community institutions. Second, many national civil servants in pertinent ministries are reluctant to relinquish their key positions (gatekeeping functions) with respect to interest-group demands and tend to resist the transfer of decision-making powers to Community officials, thereby providing additional backing to the preference of interest groups for the national government route. Third, most national interest groups do

[18] See the interesting study made by the Europa Instituut, University of Amsterdam, *Les Groupes de Pression dans la C.E.E.* (Amsterdam, 1965), 12, 13. This study which concentrates on Dutch interest groups and umbrella organizations confirms much that was discovered in the interviews conducted by the author. Of interest is also a statement by a high official of the Shell Oil Company with regard to the resident "contact operators" which Shell has in several capitals and in Brussels. These men are called into the main office every three to four months so that the contact effort is well coordinated as far as Community policy is concerned.

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not seem to perceive European-level umbrella organizations as very effective in attaining their objectives and fear a dilution of their individual goals in the process of bargaining. Fourth, while the Commission is regarded as being the most lucrative target on the Community level, national interest-group efforts to influence that body often fail, and it appears that the Committee of Permanent Representatives is becoming an increasingly attractive target for access. Fifth, political parties play a varying role in assisting economic interest groups in achieving their European-level objectives, and even in France, where party effectiveness is at present at a very low level, interest-group officials maintain active relations with party organizations. Sixth, the ability of agricultural and industrial groups to elicit favorable decisions on the Community level is uniformly considered greater than that of labor unions. There is no agreement, however, on whether agricultural or industrial groups are more effective in their efforts.

It is quite obvious that the Commission fully appreciates the importance of maximum interaction with interest groups which, in fact, may also serve as "protectors" in the event of serious conflict between the Commission and member governments. One may even conjecture that Hallstein's encouragement of increased contacts of the Commission staff with interest-group representatives was perhaps to serve the purpose of stimulating a shift in the expectations and activities of interest groups to the European level in order to bolster the integrative process. Clearly, if national interest groups were to perceive that direct access to Community institutions would pay off, such a development would increase the "utilitarian powers" of the elites guiding the political integration effort.[19] These elites consist mainly of the Commission and its staff, as well as certain elements in the member states, such as the Monnet Action Committee. If eventually the European Parliament were to be elected directly and the Commission made at least partially responsible to the Parliament, giving national interest groups more political leverage on the Commission through the electoral process, a strong shift to the direct route would be an almost certain consequence, and political integration would be moved forward. But the unfavorable political conditions prevailing in some of the member states

[19] See Etzioni, 94.

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make such developments very unlikely in the foreseeable future. In the meantime, the Commission must seek to elaborate the "common interest" and is in a very difficult position to accommodate individual demands.

In terms of David Easton's concepts regarding the functioning of political systems, what do these findings suggest? According to Easton, a political system may be depicted as "a set of interactions through which valued things are authoritatively allocated for a society" and through which "demands are processed into outputs," that is, decisions, policies, and actions in general. From another perspective, Easton views it as a means through which the resources and energies of society are mobilized and oriented to the pursuit of goals. This last concept, he points out, highlights the need for marshaling the support of members if the system is to function properly. Support signifies a minimal level of attachment to the institutions, regime, and values of the system.[20]

Clearly these concepts are appropriate to the EEC as a political system. They suggest that the support of governments and residents in the member states for the Community system as laid out by the EEC Treaty is a necessity, if it is to operate effectively and satisfactorily. Seen in this light, the continued emphasis placed by national economic interest groups on the national government route to attain Community-level objectives, the adverse attitudes of many national civil servants to the transfer of power to Community officials, and the somewhat unfavorable perception national group officials have regarding the effectiveness of European-level umbrella organizations imply a certain erosion of support. This erosion creates stress in the Community system since it is apt to subvert the ingenious Commission-Council decision-making mechanism as envisioned by the EEC Treaty, is likely to undermine "Community sentiment," and may well impair the "spill-over" process as far as it is operative.[21] The erosion of support and the resultant stress are not likely to be fatal to the Community system; rather, we may anticipate that the operational machinery will adapt itself to these conditions. However, this stress may contribute to a reduction in

[20] Easton, 153; see also 158-229, 57-69.

[21] Haas, 9-10, 376; see also Ernest B. Haas, "Technocracy, Pluralism, and the New Europe," in Stephen R. Graubard (ed.), *The New Europe* (Cambridge, Mass., 1964), 64-65.

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the supranational nature of the decision-making process and may result in an approximation to a more traditional inter-governmental relationship between member states.

Many Americans seem to regard political integration as an intrinsic value and measure the progress of the Common Market by its advance toward political unification. There is also a widespread belief among Americans that the logic of economic integration in due time will necessarily engender political integration. Historical experience does not appear to bear out this hypothesis. Benelux, founded in 1944 as a customs union and later advanced to the status of an economic union by means of several successive treaties between the three member governments, has not progressed further toward political unification.[22] The German *Zollverein* did not beget the German empire of 1871 through the logic of economic integration; it was the political will of Bismarck and the dominance and excellence of Prussia's administration and military establishment that were responsible for this result.[23] While we may be dissatisfied with the progress of political integration in the EEC, let us not forget that at the end of World War II, few in America and Europe would have anticipated the replacement of six national markets by one large regional market within the relatively short span of twenty years. Indeed, this is in itself a remarkable achievement.

[22] See the excellent study by Pierre Pescatore, "La notion du marché commun dans les traités instituant l'Union économic belgo-luxembourgoise, le Benelux et les Communautés européenes," in *En Hommage à Victor Gothot* (Liege, 1962), 497-546. Pescatore, one of the most astute observers of integration of the "six," states that the significance of an economic union may not at all lie in the possibility of political unification, but that the formation of large markets may have the purpose of permitting the member states to conserve their political autonomy (p. 545).

[23] See W. O. Henderson, *The Zollverein* (2nd ed.; Chicago, 1959).

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Whiggism in India

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I

Lord Acton once said that the French Revolution was inspired by "the system of an international extra-territorial universal Whig."[1] What he had in mind was the radical Whiggism, which, based on Locke's idea of Natural Rights, had traveled from England to France and America. The Indian nationalist movement was also inspired by a "system of an international extra-territorial universal Whig," but this was a conservative version of Whiggism based on Locke's concept of Community Supremacy. This understanding of political society came to India mainly through Edmund Burke who had "pushed Locke's theories [of contract, law, rights, society, and state] to conservative conclusions";[2] and, directly or indirectly, it was this system that became the principal source of inspiration to Indian socio-political thinking. Other ideas, tendencies, and systems made their appearance, but only to make the Burkean analysis more acceptable. How and why the thought of Indian liberals was inspired chiefly by Burkean conservatism is an intricate and intriguing problem that deserves exploration.

So great was Burke's popularity with the Indian patriotic elite that the bureaucracy suspected that his works fostered disloyalty and radicalism, and in the opening years of the present century for a time interdicted his writing at Calcutta University.[3] The Bom-

[1] Lord Acton, *Lectures on the French Revolution* (London, 1910), 20.
[2] Alfred Cobban, *Edmund Burke* (London, 1929), 53.
[3] S. N. Banerjea, *A Nation in Making* (London, 1925), 142.

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bay government, too, contemplated removing some of his works from the university syllabus.[4] That Burke was regarded as a radical by a fearful bureaucracy is not surprising, but what about intellectual India? The testimony of Gopal Krishna Gokhale (1866-1914), the leader of the nationalist elite for about a decade, is illuminating. He hailed the presence of Morley at the India Office, because "he was the reverent student of Burke, the disciple of Mill, the friend and biographer of Gladstone."[5] For the nationalist elite Burke passed for a progressive, if not a revolutionary. Natesan and Company of Madras, publishers of nationalist literature, gave Burke the place of honor as a "friend" in their "Friends of India" series.

Why did Burke become the favorite author and philosopher of generations of Indian literati? One reason was that his speeches and writings on India satisfied the patriot's elemental, though negative, urge to denounce the ruling power. The "conqueror's critic is our friend." The East India Company was the conqueror of India, and the best exposition of its misdeeds is found in late eighteenth-century British literature. Of these critical writings, Burke's were most effective. Motives of the author apart, the Indian patriot's blood was stirred while reading passages from his *Impeachment of Warren Hastings*.[6] This naturally earned for him the affection and reverence of the patriot, and it was not at all unnatural that he became a "Friend of India."

But the patriot was also moved by the positive urge for a radical change in the conditions of the country. Before World War I the French Revolution had a romantic appeal for him,[7] and he was eager to study its literature. What better work could there be than the one penned by the "Friend of India"? For, to the patriot at

[4] C. H. Setalvad, *Recollections and Reflections* (Bombay, 1946), 200.

[5] Gokhale's presidential address, Benares Congress, 1905, in *Speeches of Gokhale* (Madras, 1916), 841.

[6] For example, "I impeach Warren Hastings . . . of high crimes and misdemeanors. I impeach him in the name of the Commons. . . . I impeach him in the name of the people of India, whose laws, rights and liberties he had laid waste and desolate. I impeach him in the name, and by virtue of eternal laws of justice, which he has cruelly outraged, injured, and oppressed, in both sexes, in every age, rank, situation and condition of life." *The Speeches of Edmund Burke* (London, 1873), I, 231.

[7] The example of Raja Ram Mohan Roy, the Father of Modern India, is significant. It is said that at the Cape, despite serious physical disability, he boarded a French frigate to pay homage to the French Revolution and its principles.

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least of the pre-Gandhian period, Burke "stood out . . . as a leader of mankind, a prophet of race, calling aloud . . . for justice, social order, integrity and humanity."[8] So the *Reflections on the Revolution in France* was read. And before the involved philosophy of that bible of conservatism could be comprehended, rhetorical passages were committed to memory and repeated in classrooms and on platforms. Gokhale, it is said, would recite this book on a bet to his neighbor, who "would sit for hours waiting for even one mistake," in the vain hope of getting one anna for an error.[9] Thus the Indian progressive elite completed the mental exercise which should have done honor to a conservative youth. Puzzles there are in the history of social thinking, but perhaps very few are of this magnitude. Thus a search for revolutionary strategy, tactics, and philosophy impelled the patriotic literati to study the *Reflections*, and impressionable minds assimilated Whiggism. How? The panegyric on the British political system and on Whiggism sustained them. For them as for Burke, "the constitution was sacred . . . as the voice of the Church and orders of her saints are sacred to the believer."[10]

The study of the *Reflections* assuaged another positive urge of the patriot, namely, to know the ruling virtues of the Ruling Race. For the Indian patriot, parliamentary institutions were seen as the main factor in Britain's greatness, and he always aspired after such institutions for India. To this end, so the pre-Gandhian patriot thought, it was essential to assimilate those virtues which had made the English great. The *Reflections* was a veritable storehouse of those virtues, which were synonymous with Whiggism. So, the study of the *Reflections* engendered an admiration for Whiggism, and admiration led to imitation.

Mock parliaments, mock impeachments and debates constituted important extra-curricular academic activities in schools and colleges. Could there be a better guide than Burke? He was invariably recommended by elders, boys learned by heart passages from his speeches. It is said that no day for a college debate "was missed without his [Gokhale's] quoting elaborately from Burke's *Reflections*."[11] For improving diction, too, Burke was recommended to

[8] G. A. Natesan, *Edmund Burke* (Madras, 1912), 16.
[9] J. S. Hayland, *Gokhale* (Calcutta, 1933), 16.
[10] John Morley, *Edmund Burke* (London, 1867), 121.
[11] T. K. Sahani, *Gopal Krishna Gokhale* (Bombay, 1929), 39.

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the adolescent. In short, he became an indispensable companion of the future elite. The Burkean style of oration, cultivated during impressionable adolescence, proved an asset in later life. The habit of mind, developed during youth by study of the conservative philosophy of Burke, could not but influence the thought processes of the Indian patriotic elite.

II

What was the character of this elite? In 1920, Ramsay MacDonald asserted that the Indian liberal nationalists had "naturally passed into the ranks of statesmen."[12] The fact is that statesmanship was the hallmark of the elite. In the Congress, Gandhi, the saint-statesman, was surrounded by followers who were either agitators aspiring to be statesmen or statesmen threatening to be agitators. Who could be a better guide than Burke? Even socialist Harold Laski admitted that Burke had "endured as a permanent manual of political wisdom without which statesmen are as sailors on an uncharted sea."[13] Then, the English political authors and leaders (the Mills, Bright, Macaulay, Cobden, Maine, Gladstone, and Morley) whom the literati, especially of the pre-Gandhian period, studied were either statesmen-philosophers or philosopher-statesmen. Burke was the natural guide of them all. Through them also Burkean Whiggism entered Indian intellectual life. True, during the Gandhian period the study of these luminaries considerably decreased. But the die was already cast. The habit of public life, the lines of socio-political development, the mode of thinking had quite matured. In the Gandhian era as well, therefore, the ghost of Whiggism continued lurking at the back, if not at the front, door.

The basic assumptions of Whiggism—the natural leadership of aristocracy, the political incapacity of the masses, and the great partnership of the civil society—were echoed in modern India. Let us look at the first two. In the pre-Gandhian period the Indian National Congress, as S. N. Banerjea asserted in his presidential address of 1895, stood for representative institutions of a modified character, not for the masses, but for the educated "who by reason of their culture and enlightenment, their association with English ideas, and their familiarity with the English method of government

[12] J. R. MacDonald, *The Government of India* (New York, 1920), 19.

[13] H. J. Laski, *Political Thought in England from Locke to Bentham* (London, 1949), 172.

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might be presumed to be qualified for such a boon."[14] The statement speaks for itself: the aristocracy of intellect constituted the leadership of the nation and was to be the beneficiary of political power; the masses lacked political capability.

In the Gandhian period the message of the Congress was carried to the masses, who received it enthusiastically. Gandhi and the Congress spoke for, and in behalf of, the common man. Despite this, the political prejudices of the preceding period persisted. Now the leadership was of an aristocracy which could practice the difficult virtue of ascetic self-denial and the equally difficult art of non-violence. The masses were presumed to be incapable of practicing, let alone mastering, non-violence. And Gandhi was the supreme judge of fitness for non-violence. Gandhi himself indirectly confessed this character of the Congress in the Lahore Congress (1929) while winding up the debate on the Independence Resolution and replying to Subhash Chandra Bose's amendment suggesting establishment of a parallel government. "Do you think," he asked, "you can establish a parallel government when the Congress flag does not fly even in a thousand villages?"[15] Nehru's advice in his presidential address (1936) endorsed indirectly the Whiggish character of the Congress leadership when he declared that "the Congress must be not only *for* the masses, as it claims to be, but *of* the masses; only then will it really be for the masses."[16] Later history shows that the situation did not change materially, that political life continued to echo Whig social prejudices.

Thus there was clear similarity between Whiggism and Indian socio-political leadership in respect of social character and social prejudices. Not for nothing did the elite love to read and memorize Burke. Inclusion in the curriculum and recommendation for purposes of oration and diction alone would not have made him a favorite philosopher, a "Friend of India." There was intellectual affinity, one may say spiritual affinity, between Burke and the Indian literati. If, during the Gandhian period, the study of Burke declined, it was not because the character and prejudices of leadership had changed, but because the study of Western literature—except for purposes of examinations—was generally on the decline.

[14] *Congress Presidential Addresses* (Madras, 1931), 214.
[15] *The Indian Annual Register*, II (1929), 309.
[16] *Ibid.*, I (1936), 268.

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This similarity with Whiggism, strengthened by the study of Burke's writings, inevitably influenced the thought processes of Indian leadership.

III

The central purpose of all progressive movements of modern India was to advance from medievalism to modernity in the socio-economic sphere and from slavery and despotism to freedom and democracy in the political sphere. All progressive thinking was, therefore, concerned with these problems. Naturally, the first and the most important theme of socio-political speculation was that of method. This had been the subject of the long nation-wide debate for three-quarters of a century. The second subject of speculation was the character of society and the nation. The third theme was the form of an ideal society and state. On all these the imprint of Whiggism was marked, though it was very rarely direct and so not easily discernible. Let us take these themes in order.

Whiggism is a synonym of gradualism, flexibility, elasticity, constitutionalism, and moderation. Britain prides itself on being the classical home of these virtues. The British constitution, as well as the society and nation, the Whigs believed, were characterized by balance, equipoise, and harmony. To these features Burke added organic growth and historic continuity. A few sentences are worth quoting. In 1688 "we did not have a revolution, we prevented one." The individuals "would do better to avail themselves of the general bank and capital of nations and ages." "Our constitution is a prescriptive constitution." Prescription "is the most solid of all titles." "Even when I changed, it should be to preserve." The ideal of a statesman is "a disposition to preserve and an ability to improve." Add to these the Burkean law of change, the Victorian "compromise," Tennyson's "from precedent to precedent," and Webb's "inevitability of gradualness"—the vocabulary of Whiggist or liberal methodology is almost complete.

It seems that from his grave Burke has presided over the drama of progress in modern Britain, the British Empire, and modern India. A student of Indo-British history will find the scales removed from his eyes on reading Burke's words in a letter to Sir Hercules Langrische in 1792. Admitting the law of change as the most powerful law of nature, he argued that "all that we can do, and that human wisdom can do, is to provide that the change shall proceed by

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insensible degrees." This process has the benefits of change without its inconveniences. It prevents "the unfixing of old interests at once"—a phenomenon which is apt to breed "a black and sullen discontent" in the dispossessed. At the same time it prevents the beneficiaries "from being intoxicated with a draught of power, which they always abuse with a licentious insolence."[17] The transfer of power to India in 1947 was one of the best examples of this liberal process of change. Britain left India with good grace and without "a black and sullen discontent." The Indian beneficiaries were placed in such a position that they were neither "intoxicated" with power nor could abuse power "with a licentious insolence." Originally this method of social change was called Whiggist. Now it has been adopted by Western Liberalism and even by Social Democracy. Perhaps this is the greatest legacy of Burke to humanity.

The Indian methodology followed this pattern. By and large, the keynotes of progress were gradualism, flexibility, elasticity, constitutionalism, moderation, organic growth, historic continuity, and change by "insensible degrees." Social reformism generally followed the sober, balanced, and liberal line laid down by M. G. Ranade—to win over the conservatives and not to antagonize them. In the political sphere the strategy and tactics of the predecessors of Gandhi were reputedly Whiggist or Liberal. Their faith in the efficacy of that methodology was the product of the infant stage of nationalism and of their study of Burke and English history. Their indefeasible faith in moderation earned for them the label of "Moderates." To their tactics of prayers, pleas, protests, petitions, resolutions, agitation, and legislative activities were added some new elements during the Bengal Partition Agitation (1905-10). These were Swadeshi, boycott, and passive resistance, which gave teeth to the liberal strategy of constitutionalism, gradualism, moderation, and progress by "insensible degrees." So far as violent activities were concerned, they were sporadic and spontaneous, and they never found a place in the approved creed of the Congress.

Now a pertinent question arises: Did Gandhism constitute a basic change? The answer is, No. It was a continuation of the Whiggist or Liberal tradition, for Gandhi assimilated the spirit of the philosophy and outlook of Gokhale, whom Gandhi called a saint, his

[17] Quoted in Russell Kirk, *The Conservative Mind* (London, 1954), 50.

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Guru or Master. And what was the essence of Gokhale's thought? For him the *Reflections* was the "life-long reservoir both for thought and language."[18] "To have heard Gokhale lecturing on Burke's *Reflections* was to have drunk at the fountain-head of constitutionalism and moderation."[19] Gandhi's genius transformed the Master's virtue into a new ethico-political system in such a way that the whole looked like a totally new phenomenon. He confessed to Louis Fischer: "I am essentially a man of compromise." His ideal soldier or Satyagrahi "is ever ready for fight" and at the same time "must be equally eager for peace"; he "must welcome any honourable opportunity for peace."[20] Because of Gandhi's method "even our more reactionary people," said Nehru, his rationalist disciple, "are not so rigid in their reaction as they are probably in Europe and America. And even our most advanced people . . . are somehow influenced by Gandhi. He created connecting links between conflicting interests."[21] Can there be any doubt about Gandhi's Whiggism?

Gandhi was Asoka and Burke in one—an accepted and conscious Asokan, a crypto and unconscious Burkean. The latter aspect needs explanation. Broadly and basically the methods of socio-political change are two—liberal and non-liberal. The former is characterized by non-violence, gradualism, moderation, progress by "insensible degrees," non-coercive adjustments, and class peace. The latter includes class war, violence, and sharp mutations. The liberal method is, in fact, a continuation of Burkean Whiggism. Taking over the liberal technique, Gandhi improved upon it, and made its teeth—Swadeshi, boycott, and passive resistance—bite more effectively. To the traditional liberal tactics it added civil disobedience, non-co-operation, constructive program, and ascetic self-denial. Even one of these would have sufficed to immortalize the author. Perhaps, after Burke's, Gandhi's was the greatest contribution to the liberal methodology, as, after Asoka's, his was the greatest contribution to the Indian tradition of non-violence.

Thus, as a technique of socio-political progress, Gandhism was a

[18] Sahani, 38.
[19] *Ibid.*, 55.
[20] Quoted in G. K. Dhawan, *Political Philosophy of Mahatma Gandhi* (Ahmedabad, 1957), 138, 136.
[21] T. Mende, *Conversations with Mr. Nehru* (London, 1956), 140.

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variant of Whiggism or Liberalism—more correctly, a metamorphosed Liberalism, an Indianized Liberalism. The process of metamorphosis or Indianization was absolutely essential. Without that a slave nation would not readily accept and employ the tools borrowed from the ruling nation to end its rule. The task was indeed extraordinarily difficult. Perhaps the chief cause for the ready acceptance of the Gandhian methodology by Nehru and the patriotic elite was that it was supplementary and complementary to Nehru's liberal humanism as well as to the Burkean-Gokhaleite ideals of so many of the elite. To sum up: the contribution of Burkean Whiggism to progressive humanity was in the sphere of the methodology of socio-political change. This methodology became an inalienable part of Western Liberalism. It has been adopted by Democratic Socialism and approved even by Moscow Communism. Gandhi metamorphosed it in such a way as to make it look wholly Indian. This was no mean contribution, for in this form it was psychologically welcome not only to India but also to the countries of Afro-Asia in their struggle against European domination. From this point of view the study and adoption of Burkean Whiggism by the Indian elite was a healthy phenomenon.

IV

In the other two subjects of speculation the influence of Burkean Whiggism was much more involved and complex than in the sphere of methodology. In these spheres, the influence did not prove to be healthy for national progress. Here the impact was of the purely conservative aspect of Burkean Whiggism. Let us take the second subject of speculation, namely, the character of society and the nation. Here the influence was of the third basic assumption of Whiggism—the great partnership of civil society. Burke stated the Whig view of society in memorable words:

> It is a partnership in all science; a partnership in all art; a partnership in every virtue, and in all perfection. As the ends of such a partnership cannot be obtained in many generations, it becomes a partnership not only between those who are living, but between those who are living, those who are dead, and those who are to be born.

Further, "when great multitudes act together, under that 'discipline of nature,' I recognise the people." The nation is "an idea of continuity, which extends in time as well as in number and space."

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Finally, "the individual is foolish; the multitude, for the moment is foolish, when they act without deliberation; but the species is wise, and, when time is given to it, always acts right."

The spirit of this Burkean chauvinism seems to have reigned supreme in Indian thinking. The patriot was overwhelmed by the glory and achievements of ancient India so well established by the researches of European orientalists and Indian scholars. Pride in that heritage morally made up for wounded self-respect. M. G. Ranade (1842-1900), a pioneer of the Indian renaissance in the Bombay Presidency, who exercised considerable influence on social reformers and nationalist leaders, echoed Burke: "We cannot break with the past altogether; with our past we should not break altogether, for it is a rich inheritance, and we have no reason to be ashamed of it." He reiterated the Burkean ideal of statesmanship—"While respecting the past, we must seek to correct the parasitic growths that have encrusted, and sucked life out of it."[22] This way of thinking was sober, balanced, liberal, constructive, and cautious. It characterized a school of thought represented by Nehru at a later period. There was another school, however, and it ruled intellectual life for a long time. At times it out-did Burkean chauvinism, leading to disastrous consequences. Today in one shape or another it is represented, on the one hand, by the Jan Sangh, and, on the other, by the Sarvodaya movement.[23] Conditions of colonialism considerably helped the growth, popularity, and dominance of this school of chauvinistic nationalism, which out-Burked Burke without many of its advocates having read a word by or about him. This paradox requires explanation.

In the thought of the chauvinist nationalists, Indian society is prescriptive; it has existed time out of mind. It is infallible, embodying the wisdom of ancient sages and law-givers. It represents organic growth and historic continuity, for centuries it has remained generally unchanged and unchangeable. Besides these qualities which Burke had attributed to English society, nation, and constitu-

[22] Quoted in M. A. Buch, *Rise and Growth of Indian Liberalism* (Baroda, 1938), 125.

[23] The chauvinistic Jan Sangh is a political party with a Hindu communal bias. The Sarvodaya ("Good of All") movement, led by Vinoba Bhave, a disciple of Gandhi, seeks the solution of problems through the Gandhian technique of non-violence and upholds the anti-modernity aspect of Gandhism. Its ideal is a pyramidical organization with the village as its base.

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tion, Indian society possessed one more. It was a great absorbent; all foreigners (except the English) were absorbed by it. It had been a hostess, as Tagore characterized it, to different groups of foreigners. Was something more required to make the Indian society sacrosanct? "Burke spent his life on his knees before the great mystery of social life."[24] The Indian Burkes went a step further. They lay prostrate before the great mystery of Indian society. The story does not end here. British rule and the impact of the West had seriously disturbed the centuries-old social edifice, but it was argued that once that rule and that impact were done away with the pristine glory of the autochthonous society would be restored. Does not this attitude very much agree with that of the seventeenth-century Whigs in their struggle against Stuart despotism?

This way of thinking was simple, straight, and alluring. It produced nostalgia for the past and contempt for the alien; it fostered purism and insularism. And it overpowered the national mind. In fact, this chauvinistic climate made generations of the adolescent politically articulate. The first few generations of nationalists were moderate chauvinists. S. N. Banerjea's early lectures on Chaitanya, on the rise of the Sikh power and on Mazzini, and M. G. Ranade's *The Rise of the Marhatta Power* are indicative of their moderation. The generation which attained maturity at the end of the last century and the generations that followed it were extreme chauvinists. The ever-growing frustration created by conditions of colonial rule was the main reason for their extremism. The ranks of the militant chauvinists rapidly swelled, and as they entered the Indian National Congress they soon threatened to oust the liberal nationalists from its leadership and that of the nation. At the Surat Congress (1907) the latter succeeded in shielding their leadership, in outmaneuvering the former. But beyond this they could not go; in fact, they were not intellectually equipped to do so. As a team of intellectuals they remain unsurpassed in India even today. And yet they failed to direct the national mind into rational and healthy channels. The reasons for their failure were many and complex.

One of the main reasons was that the liberal nationalists were overwhelmed by the massiveness of the Indian society. Still more important was the fact that the only philosophy that they had

[24] Cobban, 88.

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studied and imbibed was Burkean. The major premise of Burke's philosophy was the prescriptive view of society and nation. "He changed his front, but he never changed his ground."[25] It was this ground, the prescriptive view, that had made him pour rhetorical wrath on those who acted against that view—whether they were the Company's rulers in India or revolutionaries in France. Indirectly, then, it was this ground that made Burke a "Friend of India," a favorite guide and philosopher of the liberal patriotic elite. And the extreme chauvinists had instinctively taken over the major premise of Burke. They were broadcasting his viewpoint, of course, without studying a word of it. In the first decade of the century the extremists spoke Burkean philosophy while the liberals spoke Burkean language. The latter were at the end of their tether. The former had taken the wind out of the sails of the latter and made them look bewildered and ideologically disarmed. Could a Banerjea, who, as he himself confessed, owed his greatest intellectual debt to Burke, whose political philosophy had "so largely moulded my own views about government and society,"[26] advance a different philosophy of society and nation? Or, could a Gokhale, who had "greedily imbibed" Burke's philosophy, attempt such a difficult task?

This incapacity of the liberal intellectuals had serious repercussions. For about half a century chauvinism and its concomitants—nostalgia and contempt, purism and insularism—had almost undisputed sway over the national mind. Whoever might have controlled the various public organizations, the national mind was under the full grip of chauvinism. It fostered the spirit of self-help, self-respect, self-sacrifice, self-reliance, and self-confidence. The hero of chauvinism was not the conservative peasant, but the inconvenienced, frustrated, disgruntled, bewildered, struggling, and progessive bourgeois and litterateur. Many a westernized youth gladly and proudly took to the simple, austere, and unsophisticated Gandhian way of life. Many a patriot smilingly climbed the gallows. Chauvinism became the mightiest force in the struggle for freedom, democracy, and progress. It was this atmosphere that accounted for the tremendous popularity of Gandhi's *Hind Swaraj*,[27] product of a

[25] Morley, 53.

[26] Banerjea, 142.

[27] ([Johannesburg], 1909). The gifts of science and civilization were condemned outright. For example, the British Parliament was characterized as "a

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chauvinistic intellect, on his entry into Indian politics. His ideal of Ram Raj[28]—a utopia projected into the past—and his condemnation of the Satanic Civilization (the present materialist civilization) of the West satisfied the feelings of nostalgia and contempt as well as the yearning for purism and insularism. All this was only one side of the picture; there was another side, too. And for the latter the nation paid, and continues to pay, dearly.

The basic assumption of the chauvinist thinking was the Whig assumption of the great partnership of civil society. The ardent nationalist thought in terms of the partnership of Indian society. But the matter did not prove so simple and straight. India presents a complex social milieu. The society is characterized by diversities in all walks of life. Add to this background the facts of arrested and uneven economic development, frustrated bourgeoisie and literati, increasing political consciousness and economic acquisitiveness, reactionary feudalism and medievalism, and, above all, "divide et imperia." Chauvinism got mixed up with communalism and linguism, the latter fostering division of the country according to languages. India became a land of competing chauvinisms, competing nostalgias, competing contempts, competing purisms, competing insularisms. To the Hindu chauvinist, partnership was of Hindu Society; to the Muslim chauvinist, Islamic Society; to the Sikh chauvinist, Sikh Society; and to a south Indian chauvinist, Dravidian Society. This way of thinking hardened into a mode of feeling. Passions controlled thought. Iqbal, who wrote a popular nationalist song emphasizing that religion does not teach enmity, inspired the idea of "Pakistan." In vain did the patriot repeat parrot-like that India was a land of unity in diversity and plead for a partnership of Indian society. The emergence of Nehruism, too, could not stem the tide of disruption. Such was the genesis of Akhand Bharat ("Undivided India"), Pakistan, Sikhistan, and Dravidstan. Such was the upshot

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sterile woman and a prostitute"; parliaments as "really emblems of slavery"; railways as having "spread the bubonic plague" in India and "a most dangerous institution"; hospitals as "institutions for propagating sin"; modern education as "mainly false"; machinery as "a great sin."

[28] Ram Raj means rule of Rama, a ruler of the kingdom of Ayodhya in ancient India. Valmiki's epic has immortalized Rama and his life story. His name, his life story, and the connected characters are objects of reverence to every Hindu. His rule is a synonym for the kingdom of God or kingdom of Love.

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of the intellectual incapacity of the liberal nationalists, resulting from their blind reliance on Burke.

V

The third subject of socio-political speculation was the form of ideal society and state. Here, too, the influence of Burkean Whiggism was indirect. Under the influence of Benthamism the English established a monistic politico-legal structure in India.[29] This the patriot assailed. Ranade criticized it for having subjected the people to one set of laws, one kind of economy, and one form of polity. The chauvinistic wave took the elite a step further. The turn of the century saw B. C. Pal, Annie Besant, and others elaborating schemes of reconstruction with the village at the base and a world federation at the apex. Various justifications were put forth in favor of these hierarchical federal schemes and against the existing monistic system. It was argued that the former were in conformity with the national genius and the pluralistic indigenous society. Later on citations from Guild Socialist and pluralist literature were not infrequent. The Indological researches of the Jayaswal School[30]—bolder and more chauvinistic than scientific—had shown the existence of democratic socio-political institutions in the hoary past. Much weight was lent by them to chauvinistic thinking. The frustrated and nostalgic patriot came to develop a child-like fancy for the ancient self-regulating and self-sufficient village communities. The greatest strength and justification was provided by the argument that even foreign administrators had appreciated the ancient village communities and had pleaded for their continuance. More than the Ramdhun—Gandhi's favorite prayer song and now the favorite of millions—the patriot chanted the words of the British colonial administrator, Charles T. Metcalfe (1785-1846)—"they [the village communities] seemed to last where nothing else lasts"[31]—little realizing that Whiggism was thereby becoming the playback philosophy of the Indian socio-political drama. For Metcalfe's appreciation of the indigenous institutions represented the outlook

[29] See F. Stokes, *The English Utilitarians and India* (Oxford, 1959).

[30] This school of historians, which holds that all the positive, but none of the negative, features of the modern age were present in ancient India, was led by the late Dr. K. P. Jayaswal.

[31] Radhakumud Mookerji, *Local Government in India* (Delhi, 1958), 2-3.

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of the paternalistic school of early English administrators who "brought to the Indian problems Burke's notion of history."[32]

Small wonder that in this atmosphere the Gandhian ideas of Ram Raj and Satanic Civilization found a spontaneous welcome. They acted as moral balm to the mental agony of the chauvinistic patriot. The superb statesman in him, however, gave both Ram Raj and Satanic Civilization an appropriate place in his strategy. Ram Raj was merely a social myth for drawing millions of rural folk into the freedom movement. In practical politics he blessed readily and ungrudgingly the rational-cum-democratic concepts, institutions, and outlook. How else could Fundamental Rights, Constituent Assembly, Planning, Industrialization, Parliamentary Democracy, Anti-Fascism, and Internationalism find top priority in the Congress program? At times he dissociated himself and withdrew from active politics (1924, 1934, 1939, and 1947), but never on the issue of Ram Raj. With Gandhi the Ram Raj was a curio of the antechamber, though a favorite one. The charismatic leader had two ideals, two faces, two sets of followers—one realistic and the other idealistic. This made his enigmatic personality all the more enigmatic. Nehru, of whom he proclaimed, "When I am gone, he will speak my language," represents the realistic ideal. Vinoba Bhave and Jaya Prakash Narayan[33] represent the idealist or chauvinist ideal of the Master. This makes Morris-Jones observe that Indian politics "takes place at two different levels or in two distinct modes, the one western and secular, and the other religious and Indian."[34]

A brief analysis will show how far the second level or mode is "religious and Indian." It is represented by the Vinoba-Narayan way of thinking. It embodies two dominant tendencies, the chauvinistic and nostalgic, best represented by the Ram Raj, and the antimaterialist, born out of the frustration of the non-industrialist patriot and best represented by the Satanic Civilization. During the period of struggle, these two concepts of Ram Raj and Satanic Civilization had tremendous inspirational value. The myth of the Ram

[32] Stokes, 15.

[33] Jaya Prakash Narayan, who had been a prominent socialist leader for a number of years, took an active part in the underground "Quit India" movement of 1942. After independence he abandoned politics and became one of the leaders of the Sarvodaya movement.

[34] W. H. Morris-Jones, *Parliament in India* (London, 1957), 37.

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Raj was a means for making the people articulate. The Vinoba-Narayan school makes it an end in itself. With Vinoba the mythical is real, and with Narayan, rational, as well. From the antechamber the Master's curio is brought to the drawing room, and, after a bit of polishing, presented and advertized as the only undiluted Indian or Gandhian heritage. To the exponents of this school parliamentary institutions, big democratic campaigns, big election programs, big machines, big plans, big projects, big figures, and big buildings are anathema. The nation is implored to discard these institutions on the ground that they are not in conformity with the national genius. The Constituent Assembly, it is implied, relied on reason and on knowledge of foreign countries in mapping out the future of the nation; it did not adhere to the national genius or to human nature as it is in India. This sort of reasoning is closer to Burkean conservatism than to any other system. Burke had laid it down that "politics is to be adjusted not to human reasoning but to human nature."

Now, what constitutes the national genius or human nature in India? The hallmark of the national genius, so the Vinoba-Narayan school asserts, is world-and-life-negation, not the world-and-life-affirmation which enabled the nation to excel in so many spheres—a phenomenon which made the patriot hold his head high. The ideal of the indigenous socio-political life is said to be the placidity of the village of the hoary past, not the thrill of that democratic struggle of the immediate past in which Narayan at least had a significant and adventurous part. In this mode of thinking, negation, placidity, and insularism take the place of affirmation, activity, and internationalism. Today the Parliament and the Plan have become symbols of progress and national integration; they embody the dreams of the martyrs and the leaders of the national struggle; they make India the school for Asia and an object of envy for Afro-Asia. Not so to the Vinoba-Narayan school, whose philosophy "leads at least to the feeling that political institutions of modern India are unworthy of notice; at worst, it produces, with the aid of much loose thinking, a sentiment of contempt and a series of ill-judged condemnations."[35]

It seems some phenomena act on the body politic like toddy—invigorating and healthy, when fresh; detrimental and unhealthy,

[35] *Ibid.*, 41.

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when fermented by time. During the period of struggle, the chauvinistic mode of thinking had encouraged such feeling, such loose thinking, such contempt, and such condemnation regarding the political institutions introduced by the English. It had positive as well as negative benefits. Pride of indigenous institutions fostered nationalism. Hatred of alien institutions produced hatred against foreign rule. Now the situation is entirely changed, and consequently that mode of thinking is like fermented toddy. It may be preserved and presented in bottles with fascinating labels—Vinoba's Sarvodaya bottle and Narayan's Basic Democracy bottle or Partyless Democracy bottle or Communitarian Polity bottle. Its representatives or salesmen may guarantee purity and sanctity. But all this cannot alter the basic facts of fermentation and of new environment. True, present-day institutions are not without defects. True, they are, to some extent, of foreign origin and continuations of the pre-independence structure. But then they are the legacy of a century-old struggle and have become as Indian as the Himalayas. Education of the people, maintenance of democracy, and warding off of anti-democratic forces are among the many benefits of these institutions. The need of the hour is to strengthen them, to reform them, to make them more democratic. In this atmosphere the Vinoba-Narayan mode of thinking is like fermented toddy, to say the least. Its greatest benefit is to provide a basis for moral criticism of an age characterized by materialism, centralism, and officialdom.[86]

The past chauvinist distrusted the foreign rulers; the present chauvinist distrusts his own people. The former would not rely on foreigners to shape the nation's institutions; the latter will not rely on his own people to run these institutions. Judged by sociological standards, both are social conservatives. But even with their conservatism, the former led the people toward freedom, democracy, and progress. They looked back in order to go ahead. The latter, on the other hand, led the people away from freedom, democracy, and progress. They look back in order to revive the past. The inarticulate major premise of a conservative is the old Whiggist assumption, namely, the political incapacity of the masses. But no sane conservative can afford repeating Burke in toto; the people cannot be called "the swinish multitude." They cannot be disfranchised by

[86] See author's article, "Sarvodaya—A Critical Study," *The Indian Journal of Political Science*, XXI (1960), 39-61.

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asking, "How can he get wisdom that holds the plough and glorieth in the goad; that driveth the oxen and is occupied in their labors; and whose talk is of bullocks." Changed times require changed strategy, changed arguments, and changed language. If conservatism is to be acceptable, it must be presented in a pretty framework. How is it possible? By idealizing political and social primitivism and by making the enfranchised people believe that the frog-in-the-well mode of life is in their interest and in the interest of genuine democracy and is in conformity with the genius of the people and the ideal of the Father of the Nation. Thus conservatism is made an object of adoration. What a foreign commentator views as religious and Indian is, in fact, neither. It is conservative chauvinism, Burke brought up-to-date. The context is changed, the content remains the same.

VI

Such was the effect of the reception of British Whiggism of the community-supremacy variety on Indian socio-political life and thinking. The most important factor that made the reception possible was the close resemblance of social character and socio-political prejudices between the British Whigs and the modern Indian elite. Naturally Britain's Irish preceptor became India's preceptor as well. For generations of the Indian literati Burke had been an indispensable and valuable aid to oration, diction, and statesmanship. Until the First World War Burkean Whiggism had been the dominant intellectual furniture of the Indian literati. And it was during that period that the main lines of socio-political life, progress, and thinking were drawn. Gandhism was not a hindrance but an aid to its development along those lines. So the conservative Whiggism of Burke has been the most powerful foreign system that has guided Indian progress and thought. The imprint of that system is on all three subjects of speculation—the method of achieving social progress; the nature of society and the nation; and the character of the ideal state.

In the last two spheres of thinking the influence has been direct and indirect, clear and involved. Why? India was not a clean slate. It had its history and a complex social background. Chauvinism, which became the leading characteristic of the Indian literati, provided a potential moral force to the frustrated bourgeoisie and literati. It fostered the spirit of self-sacrifice, self-help, self-reli-

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ance, and self-confidence in the patriot. The ardent students of Burke indirectly helped chauvinism to rule the national mind not by their intellectual support, but by their intellectual failure. How was this irony possible? The pre-Gandhian intellectual stalwarts were forced into the position of helpless onlookers. Their over-reliance on Burke did not enable them to evolve a balanced, rational, sober, and convincing philosophy of nationalism as a healthy counter-weight to conservative chauvinism. The latter was characterized less by a rational approach than by an emotional power which helped its rapid expansion. It hardened into a habit of mind, a mode of feeling, and a way of living.

In a complex social milieu and under conditions of colonialism, conservative chauvinism entered communal, linguistic, and sectarian spheres. Narrow chauvinisms emerged and threatened to engulf the nation itself. Competing chauvinisms, nostalgias, contempts, purisms, and insularisms corroded national life and thought. In this tragic drama British imperialism acted as patron, guide, actor, director, and judge—all according to exigencies. Finally the partition, making millions refugees in their homeland, could not be avoided. Even then the disease of the mind was not cured; it continues to menace national life and thought in the shape of linguism and sectarianism. After independence its other manifestation—the Vinoba-Narayan mode of thinking—threatened the nascent democracy and expanding technocracy. Many a time in the evening of life the bewildered, frustrated, and fatigued patriots returned to that nostalgia for the past which they had articulated during their adolescence. And this was justified, even idealized, with all the aid of the knowledge of contemporary philosophies and movements acquired during youth. In effect, then, chauvinism, which was one of the midwives of the Indian revolution, threatens to destroy it.

A word must be said about Nehruism, a great force but never a movement. It is an amalgam of liberal chauvinism, liberal humanism, rationalism, Gandhism, Marxism, and Social Democracy. One of its basic ingredients is the liberal humanism that Nehru imbibed during his school and college days in England. The Whig origin of that tradition is unmistakable. In the thirties Nehruism appeared on the scene as a counter-weight to the chauvinistic mode of thinking. It buttressed, and was buttressed by, leftist ideologies. But time weighed heavily against them. The tide of chauvinism could not be

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stemmed. The evil had become too deep-seated and beyond repair. Its emotional power could not be rebutted by rational thinking. Chauvinism proved to be like a hectic fever—in the beginning, easy to cure but difficult to diagnose, while in the developed stage, easy to diagnose but difficult to cure. So Nehruism was practically elbowed out. It was forced to limit itself to institutions and concepts like Fundamental Rights, Planning, Technocracy, Constitutent Assembly, Parliamentary Democracy, Internationalism, and Anti-Fascism. The national mind remained under the grip of that element of chauvinism which fed on communalism, linguism, and sectarianism. After independence the other ingredient, namely, the Vinoba-Narayan outlook, too, raised its head. Today Nehruite and leftist secularism and dynamism have to face these two pincer-like currents of thought.

In the sphere of method the impact has been a healthy one. By "insensible degrees" Gandhi transformed Gokhale's liberal methodology based on British Whiggist tradition. The superb artist in him sharpened its existing teeth, went on adding new ones, and made them bite jointly and separately. He couched the philosophy in the religious, mystical language of India, and the chauvinistic climate linked it with ancient India, with the Buddha and with Asoka. Forgotten was Gokhale, the preceptor of Gandhi and a student of Burke. Forgotten was British liberal and Whiggist tradition. The metamorphosis was absolutely essential. The frustrated colonial bourgeoisie and literati would not accept and adopt techniques of foreign origin to end foreign rule. They longed for something new. And Gandhism satisfied that longing. It made them proud. The nation, so they argued, could give something new to the world even under conditions of slavery. Thus the Indian revolution was inspired by Burkean thought. The metamorphosed thought became India's legacy to the struggling countries of Africo-Asia and to the world. In this sense modern India internationalized, extra-territorialized, and universalized "the system of an international extra-territorial universal Whig."

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Political Patterns in Colonial New York City: The General Assembly Election of 1768

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The importance of the American Revolution as a watershed in American history is illustrated by the frequent re-evaluations to which it is subjected as historical viewpoints change. Though the military phase now arouses relatively little controversy, the political and social implications of the Revolutionary era have been debated by historians throughout much of the twentieth century. One of the most significant interpretations evolving out of this was the Beard-Becker class struggle thesis, which was gradually absorbed into numerous American history textbooks and which depicted a disenfranchised and discontented colonial majority under the aristocratic thumb of a landed and commercial ruling class. According to this thesis the revolutionists carried a two-edged sword, one side severing the ties to England and the other cutting the bonds placed about them by the American aristocracy. This view of colonial life at the time of the Revolution has been under steady assault for the past decade.

Because restricted suffrage was so often cited as major proof of the undemocratic character of colonial society, those challenging this thesis have offered a spate of studies showing that the existence of a property qualification for voting did not necessarily exclude the ma-

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jority of adult white males from the polls. Robert E. Brown's initial study of voting patterns in Massachusetts, published in 1952, was closely followed by similar investigations of other colonies which added to the growing suspicion that substantial textbook revisions were in order.[1] By 1960, when Chilton Williamson published his general survey of early American suffrage conditions, showing that manhood suffrage never dropped below fifty per cent and in most colonies ranged from sixty-five to ninety per cent, the broad suffrage school had achieved full respectability.[2]

The pace of research has accelerated in the social as well as the physical sciences, however, and historical theses are no longer permitted to stand unchallenged for the period of two or three decades that was once their customary life span. A still newer phase of the argument has now become discernible. Just as it began to appear that one dogma might simply be replaced by another, we hear new questions being asked about the reliability of suffrage studies as evidence of a Revolutionary generation actively involved in the political processes of a "democratic" society. Although many scholars now accept the view that the voting privilege was more broadly held than was previously acknowledged, some are already questioning the assertion that "middle-class democracy," as we understand the term today, existed to the extent claimed by such an historian as Robert E. Brown. Those challenging this view point out that possession of the vote is not an automatic guarantee of democracy, and suggest that greater attention be paid to voting procedures and voter apathy, as well as the question of whether elected officials drawn with such

[1] Robert E. Brown, "Democracy in Colonial Massachusetts," *New England Quarterly*, XXV (1952), 291-313. A more detailed examination of this subject appears in Robert E. Brown, *Middle-Class Democracy and the Revolution in Massachusetts, 1691-1780* (Ithaca, 1955). Brown has extended his thesis to the colony of Virginia in a new book, Robert E. and B. Katherine Brown, *Virginia, 1705-1786: Democracy or Aristocracy?* (East Lansing, 1964). The other studies are: Richard P. McCormick, *The History of Voting in New Jersey* (New Brunswick, 1953); David S. Lovejoy, *Rhode Island Politics and the American Revolution, 1760-1776* (Providence, 1958); Milton Klein, "Democracy and Politics in Colonial New York," *New York History*, XL (1959), 221-46; Charles S. Grant, *Democracy in the Connecticut Frontier Town of Kent* (New York, 1961). Two other outstanding studies of somewhat broader scope are Charles S. Sydnor, *Gentlemen Freeholders* (Chapel Hill, 1952) and Theodore Thayer, *Pennsylvania Politics and the Growth of Democracy, 1740-1776* (Harrisburg, 1953).

[2] Chilton Williamson, *American Suffrage from Property to Democracy, 1760-1860* (Princeton, 1960), Chap. 2.

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regularity from the ranks of the aristocracy were truly representative in the modern sense.[3] One study raises anew the question of whether the New England town meeting was the school for democracy which tradition has made it, or whether it was simply, as the author states, "neither better nor worse than the men who controlled it."[4]

Of course it is quite proper that our picture of the Revolutionary period should not be subject to easy assumptions. As articles by Richard Morris and Bernard Bailyn have made clear, the impact of a national revolution upon the institutions of a people must necessarily be profound.[5] Bailyn asserts that Enlightenment theories of social and political reform had been partially absorbed into American institutions by 1776, but that the Revolution gave new impetus and validity to these concepts, hastening their broader acceptance. Morris believes that there was "something more to the Spirit of '76 than Redcoats Go Home!"[6] and proposes that strong convictions on the subject be withheld until the records of the period have been more thoroughly researched. We know that political forms varied substantially from colony to colony—and even from town to town. Also, as any Namierite quickly will point out, voting patterns often were influenced by purely local interests and traditions.

Although recent scholarship is using the techniques of modern sociology to probe political behavior in greater depth, it is interesting to note how often it turns back to the old question of who could and did vote. This interest derives largely from the apparently logical assumption that since a property qualification was required by law, its "purpose" must have been to exclude some portion of the population from the polls. That this was indeed the effect of such qualifications in England, from whence the colonists inherited the concept of the freehold, is well known. Yet, two factors mitigated the exclu-

[3] Staughton Lynd, "Who Should Rule at Home? Dutchess County, New York in the American Revolution," *William and Mary Quarterly*, XVIII (1961), 330-59; J. R. Pole, "Historians and the Problem of Early American Democracy," *American Historical Review*, LXVII (1962), 626-46; John Cary, "Statistical Method and the Brown Thesis on Colonial Democracy," with a Rebuttal by Robert E. Brown, *William and Mary Quarterly*, XX (1963), 251-76.

[4] David Syrett, "Town Meeting Politics in Massachusetts, 1776-1786," *William and Mary Quarterly*, XXI (1964), 366.

[5] Bernard Bailyn, "Political Experience and Enlightenment Ideas in Eighteenth Century America," *American Historical Review*, LXVII (1962), 339-51; Richard B. Morris, "Class Struggle and the American Revolution," *William and Mary Quarterly*, XIX (1962), 3-29.

[6] Morris, 29.

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sionary effects of this tradition in America: the widespread availability of land, and the common practice of conferring freemanship in the cities, which conveyed the right to vote.[7] Accepting all this, we are still faced with the problem of determining what the political patterns were in specific places at specific times. Only when this is understood will it be possible to refine our interpretation of the social and political effects of the Revolution.

The present study is an effort to add constructively to the growing volume of research on this subject by investigating the political behavior of some citizens of New York City at the time of the 1768 assembly election.

I

Colonial historians have long been attracted to New York and Virginia as the outstanding examples of aristocratic domination of colonial politics. Although no one has yet examined New York with the analytical eye that Charles Sydnor cast on Virginia, Carl Becker's history of New York political parties strongly influenced subsequent evaluation of New York politics at the time of the Revolution.[8] Becker's emphasis on the undemocratic aspect is unmistakable. In 1907 he wrote, "It is perhaps safe to say that over half of the male population [of New York Colony] above the age of twenty-one was without political privilege of any sort . . . . in the revolutionary period the very absence of privilege became a matter of tremendous significance."[9] Becker's study was relied upon by other writers of New York history such as Dixon Ryan Fox, who also emphasized the aristocratic nature of New York's political leadership.[10] In recent years there have been studies of the political patterns in specific areas of New York colony, such as those by Lynd and Klein, but no general survey is available. Checks of scattered tax districts and townships indicate, however, that in 1779 a minimum of fifty per cent of the adult males were freeholders, with some estimates running as high

[7] A third factor: "it was apparently customary in some, if not all, colonies to allow all adult males, when known to the community and to any degree liked, to vote," Williamson, 49. A variation of this was "the practice of creating freeholds at the time of a crucial election," *ibid.*, 50. In some places, any kind of personal property was sufficient to qualify.

[8] Carl Becker, *The History of Political Parties in the Province of New York, 1760-1776* (Madison, 1907).

[9] Becker, 11.

[10] Dixon Ryan Fox, *The Decline of Aristocracy in the Politics of New York* (New York, 1919).

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as eighty per cent.[11] Historians generally agree that the franchise was more broadly held in the colonial cities than in the rural areas owing to the European custom of freemanship, or the admitting of merchants and craftsmen to membership in the municipal corporation, which privilege included the right to vote.

The main body of election law in colonial New York was established between 1691 and 1701. In the Election Act of 1699, voters were described as persons twenty-one years old, "dwelling and resident" having "Land or Tenem'ts Improved to ye vallue of fforty pounds" three months prior to issuance of election writs.[12] This requirement was eased somewhat in 1701 by modifications assuring the validity of a freehold maintained during the lifetime of a man and his wife and specifying that a mortgage on the property did not invalidate the freehold.[13] This provision allowed leased property to qualify as a freehold. The rules concerning freemanship in New York City were first set forth in the Dongan Charter of 1686 and continued by the Montgomerie Charter of 1731. Historically this "burgher right" was intended to reserve an economic monopoly to the resident craftsmen of each city; however, in New York City freemanship quickly lost its original purpose. It is the opinion of one student of the period that citizens continued to seek this privilege largely because of the accompanying political benefits.[14] In the seventeen-sixties the cost of freemanship for each "Handy Craft Tradesman" was twenty shillings plus fees; for merchants and shopkeepers born in the city it was three pounds, and those not native born were required to pay five pounds.[15] It is unlikely that this cost prohibited many from becoming freemen, as it has been estimated that in the seventeen-sixties carpenters, for example, earned from five to eight and a half shillings per day[16] and the list of those admitted as freemen includes many porters and cartmen, as well as some listed only

[11] Williamson, 27-28.

[12] *The Colonial Laws of New York from the Year 1664 to the Revolution*, 5 Vols. (Albany, 1894), I, 405-08.

[13] *Ibid.*, I, 452-53.

[14] See Beverly McAnear, "The Place of the Freeman in Old New York," *New York History*, XXI (1940), 418-30, for a full discussion of the political ramifications of freemanship.

[15] *Minutes of the Common Council of the City of New York* (New York, 1905) (hereinafter referred to as MCC), IV, 96-97; V, 326.

[16] Samuel McKee Jr., *Labor in Colonial New York, 1664-1776* (New York, 1935), 28.

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as laborers.[17] Furthermore, any applicant who had been born in or had served his apprenticeship in the city could be admitted free of cost except for payment of a few shillings in fees.[18]

II

Some of the political practices of the colonial period have been labeled as distinctly undemocratic by twentieth-century writers. It is frequently charged that vote buying and the lack of a secret ballot so corrupted the electoral process that it made a true expression of public opinion impossible. The viva-voce voting method was not uncommon in the American colonies, and only in New York did agitation for a secret ballot become a major political issue. Controversy began as early as the seventeen-thirties, but reached a peak in 1769 when some New Yorkers demanded a secret ballot in a hotly contested election between the Livingston and DeLancey factions.[19] Historians differ substantially in their evaluation of the effects of viva-voce voting. Carl Becker and Dorothy Dillon believe the voice vote threatened the independence of the voter by exposing his views to the watchful eye of his employer or landlord. Charles Sydnor and others, however, point out that many eighteenth-century voters felt that the "poll" encouraged honesty in an era of haphazard record-keeping and when there was a sizeable non-English-speaking population.[20]

The New York City press reflected the controversy when a bill for the secret ballot was introduced in the General Assembly in the 1769-70 session. This discussion is best summed up in one issue of the New York *Gazette and Weekly Mercury* in which the opposing viewpoints are presented side by side.[21] According to those who wanted a secret ballot, "a Law of that Nature has been long desired by all the judicious Friends to Liberty in this City" in order to "secure

[17] *The Burghers of New Amsterdam and the Freemen of New York*, New York Historical Society *Collections* (hereinafter referred to as NYHS *Coll.*), XVIII (1885).

[18] See McAnear, 428-30 for a discussion of variations in the scale of fees in the eighteenth century.

[19] "A Handbill in Favor of Elections by Ballot Published December 1769," William Smith Papers, Box #198-206, New York Public Library.

[20] Becker, 14-15; Dorothy Dillon, *The New York Triumvirate* (New York, 1949), 110; Charles S. Sydnor and Noble E. Cunningham Jr., "Voting in Early America," *American Heritage*, IV (1952), 6; Klein, 231-32.

[21] New York *Gazette and Weekly Mercury*, Jan. 8, 1770.

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the Freedom of the People, and to guard against the various Arts of Corruption." It was claimed that at a meeting on December 28, 1769, the overwhelming majority of freeholders and freemen had called for a secret ballot. Those opposing the secret ballot maintained that at their meeting on January 5, 1770, the great majority had approved the current viva-voce method and considered the secret ballot "a dangerous Innovation, directly contrary to the old Laws and Customs of the Realm. . . . we cannot consent, therefore, that the Right of delivering our Suffrages openly and publickly, should be torn from us, and that we should be obliged in a secret and clandestine Manner" to elect representatives. The Assembly bill was defeated by a vote of thirteen to twelve,[22] which would seem to indicate that men were honestly divided on this question at all levels of political interest. Furthermore, the very fact that so much discussion was aroused by this controversy implies that the people expected to have some influence upon the way their voting privileges might be altered.

There is evidence that vote buying and corrupt political methods were sometimes employed in colonial elections, but when compared with political practices in New York during a later era, the transgressions of the seventeen-sixties seem mild indeed. One colonial citizen calling himself "Cleomenes" disapproved of excessive political courtship in the following terms:

> A most friendly intercourse seems established in all parts between gentlemen of estates and their tenants, between the rich and the poor; every gentleman's table is now free and open to his friends, and he thinks it an honour to receive a visit from the meanest freeholder, nay condescends to shake hands with the dirtiest mechanic in the country . . . all this hospitality was political craft . . . no better than downright corruption. . . . Do you think . . . that true hospitality and good manners will shew themselves but once in seven years?[23]

Another view was expressed by a former New York City resident who hoped that rumors of people selling their "Votes for a Dram" were not true: "I have spent an Evening with Labourers, especially near the Time of holding Elections, that I might judge how they stood affected . . . . they always drank their own Beer, and gave their

[22] *Journal of the Votes and Proceedings of the General Assembly of the Colony of New-York, from 1766-1776* (Albany, 1820), Jan. 9, 1770.

[23] New York *Journal*, Feb. 18, 1768.

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Votes like sober honest Men."[24] Although these comments do not establish the amount of vote buying and corruption, they tend to reinforce the image of a broad electorate since the "meanest freeholder," the "dirtiest mechanic," the "poor," and "Labourers" were all apparently fair subjects for political persuasion. It is as logical to assume that these practices reflected voter independence or apathy as it is to assume that they were the manifestations of an undemocratic and corrupt political system.

Religious restrictions have sometimes been cited as tending to narrow the colonial electorate. It is true that Catholics were disenfranchised in New York in 1701[25] as were Jews in 1737.[26] However, the limited number of Catholics in New York in the seventeen-sixties makes the 1701 law unimportant to this study; there is ample evidence, moreover, that the restriction was not enforced against Jews in as much as a number of Jewish names appear on the poll lists. Peter Kalm noted in 1748 that Jews in New York City "enjoy all the privileges common to the other inhabitants of this town and province."[27]

Apathy as a factor in colonial politics has long been of interest to political historians. Becker noted a "widespread indifference to political matters" in colonial New York; several subsequent studies examining the question of apathy have ascribed it to preoccupation with the tasks of daily life, inaccessibility of the polls, an absence of sharply defined political issues, and a prevailing deference by the masses to the aristocracy.[28] On the other hand, New York City, because of its compactness and the vitality of its newspapers, might be expected to contain a more politically aware citizenry than would be found in a rural setting.[29] Milton Klein has estimated that the per-

[24] New York *Journal*, Feb. 25, 1768.

[25] *Colonial Laws of New York*, I, 553.

[26] *Journals of the Votes and Proceedings of the General Assembly of the Colony of New-York, 1691-1765* (New York, 1764-66), I, 712.

[27] Peter Kalm, *Travels Into North America* (London, 1772), I, 191. For a discussion of the high status enjoyed by New York City Jews in this period, see Virginia Harrington, *The New York Merchant on the Eve of the Revolution* (New York, 1935), 17-18

[28] Becker, 14; E. S. Griffith, *History of American City Government* (New York, 1938); Williamson, 43-45

[29] The newspapers of the middle eighteenth century are filled with political messages in the weeks preceding each of the assembly elections. There are frequent admonitions to the public to exercise the franchise with wisdom and inde-

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centage of adult white males voting in the three colonial assembly elections held in the City in the seventeen-sixties was 56.1, 53.6, and 40.6. This stands up well against the 1964 presidential election, when but sixty-two per cent of the eligible electorate voted.[30]

III

Yet the question of how many were eligible to vote, as opposed to how many in fact did vote, is of continuing interest for an understanding of political life in colonial New York City—and conversely it should be remembered that the question of how many did not bother to vote is not the same question as how many were excluded from voting. It is not possible to establish a clear statistical base for voter eligibility in the eighteenth century, all City tax records prior to 1789 having been lost or destroyed by fire. But, fortunately, City poll lists for the colonial assembly elections of the seventeen-sixties have been preserved and, as assembly elections had the strictest eligibility requirements, these lists are a valuable source of information.[31] We know from the poll list that 1,924 voters, or 53.6 per cent of the adult white males, participated in the 1768 assembly election held in New York City from March 7 through March 11—the largest numerical turnout of voters in that decade. By drawing up a list of adult, white, male, New York City residents of sufficient substance to qualify as freeholders or freemen, and comparing this list with the 1768 poll, it should be possible to make a more judicious estimate of the importance of apathy in this election.

A thorough search of the records preserved from this period revealed that the most valid list of names could be secured from wills drawn within approximately one year after the March 1768 election. These wills are a rich source of information about the New York colonial period. In addition to the testator, from three to ten other people are mentioned in each will—heirs, executors, and witnesses, whose occupational and financial statuses are often described. It can reasonably be assumed that all executors and witnesses named

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pendence, but there are no general exhortations to get out and vote. New York *Gazette or, The Weekly Post-Boy*, Feb. 5, 1761; New York *Journal*, March 3, 1768.

[30] Klein, 221; *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, March 26, 1965, 465.

[31] *A Copy of the Poll List of the Election for Representatives for the City and County of New York . . . MDCCLXI* (New York, 1880); *ibid., MDCCLXVIII; ibid., MDCCLXIX.*

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in such a legal instrument were of voting age, but New York City residency and freehold or freemanship qualification required further verification. A study of the wills produced 126 names which could be satisfactorily verified from cross references in the List of Freemen, the Minutes of the Common Council, other wills, the poll lists, and similar sources.

An example of the method used can be observed in the case of a colonial citizen named James Armstrong. Armstrong was made a freeman on July 13, 1756, and then was listed as a witness to a will on March 19, 1768. It is assumed that he was eligible to vote in the March 1768 election. Or there is the case of James Roosevelt, who never became a freeman, but petitioned the Common Council as a freeholder on August 24, 1767, and was witness to a will on June 8, 1768. Again it is a fairly safe assumption that he was eligible to vote in March of 1768. Then there is the unique case of Whitehead Hicks, Mayor of New York City in 1768, who did not bother to vote in any of the elections of the seventeen-sixties. Obviously he was eligible, and it is difficult to suppress a mild curiosity as to how His Honor reconciled his apathy as a voter with his public position.

Following is the list of 126 names culled from the wills.[32] The occupation is listed where obtainable, as well as a note on how each name was verified and an accounting of participation in the 1768 election.

Participation in New York City Election of 1768

Name	*Occupation*	*Verification*[33]	*Does Name Appear on 1768 Poll?*
Abijah Abbott	carpenter	A	Yes
Samuel Achmuty	minister	H	No
John Acklay	carpenter	A	Yes
David Algeo	merchant	A	Yes
Charles Ward Apthorpe	gentleman	J	No
James Armstrong	grocer	G	No

[32] *Abstracts of Wills*, NYHS *Coll.*, XXXI (1898); *ibid.*, XXXII (1899).

[33] The code for verification is as follows: (A) *A Copy of the Poll List, MDCCLXVIII* (B) *ibid., MDCCLXI;* (C) *ibid., MDCCLXIX;* (D) *Abstracts of Wills*, XXXI (1898); (E) *ibid.*, XXXII (1899); (F) *MCC;* (G) *Burghers of New Amsterdam;* (H) I. N. P. Stokes, *Iconography of Manhattan Island* (New York, 1915-28);

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Participation in New York City Election of 1768, *continued*

Name	*Occupation*	*Verification*[33]	*Does Name Appear on 1768 Poll?*
Jacob Banks	seacaptain	D	No
William Bayard	gentleman	C	No
William Beekman Jr.	gentleman	A	Yes
Thomas Braine	gentleman	A	Yes
Joris Brinckerhoff	gentleman	A	Yes
Dirck Brinckerhoff	shopkeeper	A	Yes
Dirck " (nephew)	shopkeeper	A	Yes
Abraham Brinckerhoff	shopkeeper	A	Yes
Jeremiah Brower	shopkeeper	A	Yes
John Brower	upholsterer	A	Yes
Duncan Brown	mariner	A	Yes
Thomas Brown	merchant	A	Yes
Evert Byvanck	merchant	A	Yes
John Byvanck	merchant	A	Yes
David Clarkson	gentleman	A	Yes
Levinus Clarkson	merchant	D, G	No
John Clopper	baker	A	Yes
Peter Cornell	masoner	A	Yes
Garret Cosine	trader	A	Yes
Walter Cosine	—	A	Yes
Peter F. Curtenius	merchant	A	Yes
Henry Cuyler	merchant & lawyer	A	Yes
Bernard DeForest	shopkeeper	A	Yes
Elias Desbrosses	merchant	A	Yes
Adam Dobbs	blacksmith	B	No
Charles Dobbs	bricklayer	A	Yes
William Dobbs	keeper of the bridewell	A	Yes
John Dunlap	merchant	A	Yes
Samuel Edmonds	bricklayer	A	Yes
James Emott	lawyer	D, F, L	No
Samuel Falkenham	leather dresser	C	No

(I) *The Arts and Crafts in New York, 1726-1776*, NYHS *Coll.*, LXIX (1936); (J) *The Letters and Papers of Cadwallader Colden*, NYHS *Coll.*, LVI (1923); (K) *ibid.*, LXVIII (1935); (L) Calendar of New York Colonial Commissions, 1680-1772, *New York Historical Society Quarterly*, X-XII (1926-28).

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Participation in New York City Election of 1768, *continued*

Name	*Occupation*	*Verification*[33]	*Does Name Appear on 1768 Poll?*
Richard Fletcher	schoolmaster	D, E	No
Gilbert Forbes	merchant	A	Yes
Joseph Forbes	cordwainer	A	Yes
Joseph Fox	—	A	Yes
John French	—	D	No
Matthew Gibson	ship chandler	D	No
William W. Gilbert	public measurer	A	Yes
Daniel Goldsmith Jr.	shopkeeper	H	No
Isaac Gomez	merchant	D	No
Matthias Gomez	—	D	No
David Grim	tavernkeeper	A	Yes
Nicholas Grub	—	A	Yes
Whitehead Hicks	lawyer and incumbent mayor	F, G	No
Hugh Kennedy Hoy	merchant	A	Yes
Cornelius Hyer	hatter	A	Yes
Walter Hyer	cordwainer	A	Yes
William Hyer	seacaptain	A	Yes
Samuel Johnson	silversmith	A	Yes
James Jones	laborer	G	No
Samuel Jones	lawyer	F, G	No
Benjamin Kissam	lawyer	C	No
Lawrence Kortright	merchant	B	No
Edward Laight	merchant	A	Yes
Jonathan Lawrence	merchant	A	Yes
Robert Leycroft	baker	A	Yes
George Lindsay	stonecutter	G, I	No
Peter V. B. Livingston	gentleman	A	Yes
William Livingston	lawyer	A	Yes
Cary Ludlow	lawyer	D, E, L	No
Gabriel Ludlow	lawyer	A	Yes
Philip Lydig	baker	A	Yes
John Marston	merchant	H	No
Nathaniel Marston	gentleman	A	Yes
Thomas Marston	merchant	A	Yes
David Mathews	lawyer	D, L	No
Robert McAlpine	bookbinder	A	Yes

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Participation in New York City Election of 1768, *continued*

Name	*Occupation*	*Verification*[33]	*Does Name Appear on 1768 Poll?*
Daniel McCormick	merchant	D, E, G	No
Charles McEvers	merchant	B, C	No
James McEvers	merchant	B	No
Jonathan Morell	—	B	No
Richard Morris	lawyer	A	Yes
Hon. Roger Morris	gentleman	D, E, H, K	No
Rev. John Ogilvie	minister	F, H	No
John Oothout	shopkeeper	A	Yes
James Parker	printer	B, D	No
Thomas Perry	watchmaker	A	Yes
Adolph Philipse	gentleman	D, G	No
Philip Philipse	gentleman	B, D	No
Edward Price	mariner	C	No
Benjamin Y. Prime	surgeon	F	No
Garrett Rapalje	merchant	A	Yes
Richard Rea	gentleman	D	No
John Reade	merchant	E, I	No
Joseph Reade	gentleman	D	No
Joseph Reade Jr.	lawyer	D, E, G	No
Laurence Reade	gentleman	D, I	No
Peter Riker	blacksmith	A	Yes
Beverly Robinson	gentleman	A	Yes
James Roosevelt	merchant	F	No
John Schermerhorn	trader	B, D	No
Isaac Sears	merchant	A	Yes
Barent Sebring	blacksmith	A	Yes
Cornelius Sebring	bolter	A	Yes
John Michel Seydel	tailor	A	Yes
Peter Shackerly	—	A	Yes
Robert Sharp	storekeeper	G, I	No
Thomas Shreve	gentleman	A	Yes
Zacharias Sickles	cordwainer	A	Yes
Isaac Stoutenburgh	gunsmith	A	Yes
William Tallman	—	A	Yes
James Tucker	physician	D	No
Robert Tucker	merchant	D, E	No
Thomas Tucker	merchant	D, E, G	No

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Participation in New York City Election of 1768, *continued*

Name	*Occupation*	*Verification*[33]	*Does Name Appear on 1768 Poll?*
John Vanderspiegel	merchant	A	Yes
Abraham Van Duersen	tallow chandler	A	Yes
Arent Van Hook	sexton	B	No
Isaac Van Hook Jr.	merchant	A	Yes
John Van Pelt	bricklayer	A	Yes
Luke Van Ranst	merchant	A	Yes
Abraham Van Wyck	merchant	A	Yes
Jacob Walton	gentleman	A	Yes
William Walton	merchant	A	Yes
William Walton Jr.	gentleman	B, D	No
John Welsh	mariner	B, D	No
Peter White	cooper	A	Yes
William Wickham	lawyer	D, L	No
John Woods	lawyer	A	Yes
John Yeomans	watchmaker	A	Yes
John Young	schoolmaster	A	Yes

Of the men on this list, fifty—or approximately forty per cent—who were eligible to vote in the 1768 election did not do so. Such a high degree of disinterest is remarkable when we consider the type of person represented in this sampling. Because of the source from which these names were extracted, the ratio of gentlemen, merchants, and lawyers is far higher than would be present in an average cross section of the population. Artisans[34] and shopkeepers comprise the other major occupational groups. These men clearly were solid citizens who had gained enough respect and status to be considered desirable as executors of estates and witnesses to legal documents—the very class which was presumably the most active in running the affairs of the community. The fact that forty per cent of this select group did not bother to vote in the 1768 election would suggest that

[34] Even the "artisans" seem in a number of cases to have been of a special sort, resembling what would be recognized today as large contractors. For example, Abraham Van Duersen, tallow chandler, was the major supplier of candles to the municipal corporation; George Lindsay, stonecutter, was responsible for cutting and setting the milestones for the City; several of the bricklayers were under contract to pave the streets.

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in the future apathy must be given proportionally far greater attention in explaining discrepancies between the actual vote and the total adult white male population.[35]

We know that over fifty-three per cent of the eligible electorate voted in 1768 and it is apparent that there were additional qualified voters who did not participate. Combined with the fact that laborers and craftsmen as well as merchants and great landowners were found on the voting rolls, this would suggest that a substantial majority of the adult white males had the opportunity to participate in selecting the City's assembly representatives. This tends to confirm the view of one eighteenth-century observer who wrote, "the Liberty of Voting is a Treasure possessed by Multitudes who have no Idea of its real Value."[36] This does not necessarily mean that "middle-class democracy" was established in New York City, especially if the elected representatives served a class interest. But there seems to be little evidence that the ordinary citizen felt slighted because his representatives were drawn largely from the upper ranks of the community. It is true that there were some public demonstrations in the streets of New York City in the seventeen-sixties, but it is important to remember that they were directed against very selective targets—the Stamp Act, the Quartering Act, the Townshend Acts, and other imperial policies which infringed the political and commercial freedom of all citizens of New York City. These protests were not directed against the American "aristocracy" and, in fact, these same policies were opposed in the General Assembly by the City's representatives. There is nothing to indicate that the average citizens sought political and economic goals very different from those pursued by the patricians representing them in the assembly any more than that the number of millionaires in public life today bears a significant relation to the existing degree of democratic representation.

[35] A modern study of voting behavior finds that a high rate of voter participation occurs among citizens directly affected by government policies, where access to mass media is great, or where strong social pressure to vote is not weakened by conflicts of party interest. Seymour M. Lipset, *et al.*, "The Psychology of Voting: An Analysis of Political Behavior," *Handbook of Social Psychology* (Cambridge, Mass., 1954), II, 1124-75. The study detects a high voting rate among businessmen and the upper occupational groups. If the implications of this were extended to the present sample, we might by inference expect that the apathy rate among less privileged groups would be even greater.

[36] New York *Journal*, Supplement, Feb. 26, 1768.

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The pattern of voting behavior revealed in the sample group studied above indicates the fallacy of automatically assuming that nonvoting can be attributed to an exclusive franchise. It may be equally fallacious to assume, in the absence of supporting evidence, that the ordinary citizens of New York City were chafing under the strictures of "aristocratic" rule. It is at least possible that the often prosperous, sometimes apathetic, and widely representative electorate were content to accept leadership from wealthy men who had the leisure time to work for legislation usually very much in harmony with the views of their constituents.

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Book Reviews

The Judicial Mind: The Attitudes and Ideologies of Supreme Court Justices, 1946-1963 *by Glendon Schubert. Evanston, Northwestern University Press, 1965.—xix, 295 pp. $10.00.*

It seems that out at Michigan State they have a computer that does new tricks. You feed into it the votes of Supreme Court justices in cases in which the Court was divided, labeling each vote (shades of Gilbert and Sullivan) either "liberal" or "conservative." Out comes a theory, it is claimed, "about how and why the justices arrive at . . . particular decisions," plus a "basis for making predictions about the future behavior of the justices" (p. 5). In accordance with the whimsical vogue of anthropomorphizing computers, this one is named "Glendon Schubert."

The computer handles higher mathematics and advanced statistical manipulations with apparent ease. This reviewer is not competent to evaluate these aspects of its work, and assumes their validity. Yet something manifestly has gone wrong. We are offered a number of conclusions, most carried to three decimal places, about the relative "political liberalism" and "economic liberalism" of each justice over seventeen annual terms of the Court; nevertheless, except in just such crude and conclusionary terms the book does not fulfill its promise to tell us how or why the justices vote as they do.

Neither does the book afford us any adequate basis for predicting future votes—certainly none better than or indeed as good as any trained observer of the Court can offer on the strength of his un-mathematical, un-statistical observations. We do not need a computer to tell us that Black, Douglas, Murphy, and Rutledge frequently voted together in favor of civil liberties during the 1946 through 1948 terms, or that Warren, Brennan, Black, and Douglas often have been similarly aligned in a more recent period. But we are given no basis for prediction of recent

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cases in which justices categorized as politically "liberal" voted "conservative" or vice versa. For example, the computer gives us no clue that Warren or Brennan would uphold censorship in *Ginzburg* v. *United States*, 86 Sup. Ct. 942 (1966), or Harlan or Stewart vote against it. Yet a human observer with only a fair degree of sophistication might have foreseen the possibility of three of these votes after studying the several opinions in *Roth* v. *United States*, 354 U.S. 476 (1957). (Even clearer warning might have been found in *Jacobellis* v. *Ohio*, 378 U.S. 184 [1964], but this was more recent than the period the book purports to cover.)

Where has the computer failed? If we assume its mathematical and technical operations are sound, the fault must be in its input. We do not have to search far for the flaw. Very early in the book, it is made clear that whoever has indoctrinated the computer has treated the most complex questions of constitutional adjudication, not as delicate problems of weighing competing considerations, but as a test of whether a justice is for or against civil liberties, or of whether he favors the downtrodden or prefers big business; nothing explains a justice's vote except his ideology. For example, to regard as pertinent (which "academic dissenters" are accused of doing) such other factors as reluctance to overturn the judgment of the popularly elected branches of government is labeled "scholasticism," an avowed target of the book (pp. 4-5). Small wonder that such simplistic data yield simple-minded conclusions.

All that is needed to trigger the computer into action is that a civil liberties claim be asserted and that the Court be divided as to its disposition; all justices who vote against the claim are assumed to be comparatively insensitive to civil liberties and their batting averages suffer accordingly. Now one of the most difficult problems faced by a free society is the balancing of the right to a fair trial against freedom of the press. When newspapers have been cited for contempt for publishing material which might preclude a fair trial, the Court has had the agonizing task of weighing these competing values. But whoever indoctrinated our computer was not worried by such petty considerations. Since the newspapers claimed a right under the First Amendment, those who favored them are automatically "liberal" and those who placed greater emphasis on fairness of judicial proceedings are "conservative." (See the treatment of the votes in *Craig* v. *Harney*, 331 U.S. 367 [1947] [p. 104].) Yet when the Court divided five years later on the constitutionality of a conviction in which a claim of prejudicial pre-trial newspaper publicity was made (*Stroble* v. *California*, 343 U.S. 181 [1952]), those who stressed the need for a fair trial and voted for reversal are accorded a mark for liberalism; those who voted for affirmance lose some points (p. 106). The shortcom-

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ings of this approach ought to be clear even to a computer.

The book is further marred by carelessness and inaccuracy, much of it clearly avoidable with a minimum of effort. For example, it is stated without citation, on page 5, that "one Harvard law professor . . . by advocating that the Court follow what he termed 'principles of neutrality in constitutional adjudication,' . . . was essentially [filing] an academic brief . . . in support of the general position of restraint attributed to Justice (and former Harvard law professor) Frankfurter." Had the source been checked—it would not even have had to be read—there would have been revealed not merely the inaccuracy of the quotation but also the fact that the author was Professor Herbert Wechsler of *Columbia* Law School (Wechsler, *Principles, Politics and Fundamental Law* [New York, 1961] [pp. 3-48]). If the further step had been taken, of reading what was purportedly discussed, it would have been seen that Wechsler had carefully selected, as examples of departures by the Court from the principled processes he advocated, cases in which the Court, including Justice Frankfurter, had been unanimous and the results of which—though not the reasoning—he welcomed. (For example, *Shelley* v. *Kraemer*, 334 U.S. 1 [1948]; *Brown* v. *Board of Educ.*, 347 U.S. 483 [1954].) Footnotes, documentation, the trappings of scholarship in general, have too often been employed for pedantic ostentation. But if this book is an illustration of what may happen when they are cavalierly omitted, one wonders.

Better understanding of the Supreme Court is a worthy goal. The use of new techniques toward this end should be encouraged. One would hesitate to assert, a priori, whether or not advanced mathematical and statistical methods may reveal relationships and truths hitherto unknown. So many factors contribute to the decision of a Supreme Court justice—the force of precedent, the obligation to guide the lower courts, the desirability of according experimental latitude to the states, and many more of varying degrees of subtlety—that computerized statistical methods may be inherently incapable of achieving meaningful results.

But we cannot tell from this book. With remarkable lack of humility in approaching the task of analyzing the fine interplay of the diverse factors that influence a justice's vote, the study handles its data on the assumption that the justices are motivated almost single-mindedly by the desire to further their several ideologies. Mathematical theory capable of "unfolding multi-dimensional space" (p. 26) and of locating justices with reference to each other in "three-dimensional space" (p. 39) seems wasted if applied to one-dimensional interpretations of complicated matters.

We therefore still do not know whether the jurimetricians and the computers can develop techniques of analyzing the Court and its justices

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which can contribute something beyond what the lawyers and teachers can offer. Whether the computer here employed, "Glendon Schubert," might be rehabilitated, or whether warped indoctrination has been so intensive as to be incurable, is not clear. As of now, the human students of the Court obviously have nothing to fear from computer competition. But there is still a possibility that a team of an able constitutional scholar and a sophisticated computer might together produce results of genuine importance. Unfortunately, the resounding failure of *The Judicial Mind*, the most ambitious effort of its kind thus far, may postpone for a considerable time the possibility of any further attempts.

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E Pluribus Unum: The Formation of the American Republic, 1776-1790 *by Forrest McDonald. Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1965.—xv, 326 pp. $5.95.*

In his earlier work *We The People*, Forrest McDonald stated that "economic interpretation [of the United States Constitution] does not work" and that scholars could now turn from the critique of Beard to the presentation of alternative hypotheses. In *E Pluribus Unum* he seeks to do this. Political scientists will find the new book arresting because it offers the first new ideas in half a century about what happened at the Constitutional Convention, and because its methodology strikes this historian as analogous to that of recent "pluralist" political science.

McDonald's personal orientation is clearly elitist: he lauds the Founding Fathers because they were able to restrain the force of revolution which they had unleashed. Elsewhere, "once the vulgar overstepped the bounds of propriety and got away with it" there was "no logical stopping place." But in America there were "giants in the earth" who, although speaking the language of popular rights, nonetheless led the people. "As a result, the Americans were despite themselves doomed forever to be free."

Incongruously, this fundamental filiopietism is combined with a muckraking attitude toward individual Fathers. Washington "could have added little to the intellectual average of any convention, and his knowledge of what to do in one barely extended beyond rules of order"; Madison "had read so much and remembered so much that he could sound wise when actually he was only quoting somebody wise"; and so on. Moreover, despite *We The People*'s attack on economic interpretation in general and

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on Charles Beard in particular, *E Pluribus Unum* puts at least as much emphasis on economic motives as Turner, Beard, or Becker. Jefferson's doctrine of the rights of the living generation, for example, is casually reduced to a rationalization of Virginia indebtedness: "particularly suited to Virginia's present needs was that part of the gospel of rationalism that preached the desirability of a clean break with the past."

How, then, to put together an essentially pessimistic view of mens' motives with a celebration of their collective achievements? McDonald solves this problem interestingly.

One device is chronological. Thus, he concedes that in 1783 the movement to strengthen the federal government was essentially a coalition of greedy and ruthless public creditors grouped around Robert Morris; but he argues that Beard "inaccurately supposed" a similar coalition behind the Constitutional Convention four years later. Again, McDonald states that August 1787 was "special-interests month" at the Constitutional Convention; yet he insists that in July delegates were centrally concerned with keeping the Union in one piece.

McDonald's basic supposition, however, appears to be simply that of Mandeville and Adam Smith: that individual self-interested bees produce golden honey. Apropos the characterization of Madison quoted earlier, McDonald adds: "practical, free-wheeling politicians can always use a good theoretician, much as practical, free-wheeling businessmen can use a good lawyer." And when he describes the bargain between Connecticut and South Carolina which he believes to be the key to the Constitutional Convention, McDonald says that Ellsworth of Connecticut and Rutledge of South Carolina rose to the occasion "with all the coolness of a pair of twentieth-century congressmen from Texas." A footnote tells us that the reference is to Sam Rayburn and Lyndon Johnson. It would be clear in any case that McDonald's idea of democracy is a manipulated consensus.

Within this framework McDonald argues, first, that the small-state delegates at Philadelphia were more centralist than those from the large states, and, second, that Mason, Madison, and other contemporary observers wrongly supposed that compromises over slavery were central to what happened there. As E. James Ferguson has convincingly shown in his review of *E Pluribus Unum* for the *William and Mary Quarterly*, in both these arguments as throughout his book McDonald combines immense research into the sources with an astonishing readiness to accept contemporary gossip as fact and to present his private speculations as if they were documented truth. Not only (as Ferguson shows) does his whole interpretation of the Convention collapse when one appreciates that McDonald misrepresents what the Convention voted on August 8. It

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is equally the case that to support his theory of a Connecticut-South Carolina axis which dominated the Convention McDonald posits an opposition consisting of "Martin and occasionally McHenry of Maryland, Mason and Randolph of Virginia, Gerry of Massachusetts, Charles Pinckney of South Carolina, and once in a while the delegates from Delaware, New Jersey, and Georgia." He simply neglects the fact that Luther Martin's own description of that caucus lists the delegates from Connecticut among its members.

STAUGHTON LYND
Yale University

The Papers of James Madison, Volume 4 *edited by William T. Hutchinson and William M. E. Rachal. Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1965.—xxviii, 486 pp. $12.50.*

Like its predecessors, this fourth volume of the Madison papers contains the letters to and from Madison, along with the reports, motions, and resolutions with which he was identified and the communications to and from the delegations and committees of which he was a member. The documentation and notes by the editors are exhaustive and constitute a notable contribution to scholarship.

The first seven months of 1782, which are those covered by this volume, reflected both the confidence and the confusion of the interval between Yorktown and the peace treaty. The main attention was still on foreign affairs, for there was keen awareness that the actual power situation in the world would determine the substance of the peace treaty. Rodney's naval victory in the West Indies in April caused much American concern, but it came too late to reverse the trend against Britain, beset by defiance in Ireland, reverses in India, loss of Minorca, threatened loss of Gibraltar, intensification of the war with the Dutch, Dutch recognition of American independence, and political crisis which led to the fall of Lord North and the return of the Whigs. The British were putting out separate peace feelers to America and France, seeking to divide the allies and sow discord among the Americans.

Americans were suffering from the many years without normal foreign trade and from previous war exertions. Absenteeism from Congress reached serious proportions; requisitions on the states for men and money were poorly met; trading with the enemy at New York and Charlestown grew scandalously; the outflow of specie was alarming; the scarcity of hard money made tax collections in the states scanty; drives for new

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loans from Europe were rebuffed (the French again came to the rescue); the intrigues of the anti-French, anti-Robert Morris, anti-Franklin cabals grew apace; the factiousness of the Arthur Lee and Richard Henry Lee clique in Virginia politics produced embarrassments. The conflict over admitting Vermont to the Confederation foreshadowed future East-South differences; and this conflict was further complicated by being tied in with the question of accepting Virginia's reservations to her cession of her Western lands, which in one way or another involved the interests of East, South, small states, and land companies.

Despite frustration, there was an underlying buoyancy produced by expectations of independence and of advantageous commercial treaties with the Dutch and the Spanish, including hopes of Spanish guarantee of free navigation of the Mississippi through Spanish-held territory. The trans-Allegheny country was filling up, Kentucky was agitating for statehood, and in the East the Bank of North America paid healthy dividends in 1782.

Madison's letters reveal growing maturity. He was developing both responsiveness to the needs for immediate practical action and scrupulous respect for constitutional limitations. This dualism sometimes posed a dilemma, as when Madison was faced with formulating his position on chartering the Bank of North America by Congress (pp. 20-23). It was the first facet of the Madisonian mind which would make him a Federalist in 1787, the second, which often would make him a strict constructionist after 1789. The most inclusively informative letters received by Madison during this period were those of Edmund Randolph. The letters of Edmund Pendleton, delightful for their lean and picturesque English, continued to show common sense and shrewd insight into the practical politics of America and Britain.

As one by one these Madison volumes come from the press, it is increasingly clear that they are making readily available a storehouse of information which allows for wider knowledge and understanding of Madison himself, the pragmatic growth of the federal idea, and the events, personalities, customs, ceremonials, conditions, and temper of the times.

WILLIAM G. CARLETON
University of Florida

The Revolution of American Conservatism: The Federalist Party in the Era of Jeffersonian Democracy *by David Hackett Fischer. New York, Harper and Row, 1965.—xx, 455 pp. $8.95.*

In the dust-cover notice a prominent American historian hails this volume as a "contribution of the first magnitude to the literature of American

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political history," one indeed that will oblige us "radically to reconstruct our understanding of the first American party system." The appraisal is generally sound, although Richard P. McCormick understates the contributions of those who have prepared the way for this important study. Based securely on an impressively broad and substantial foundation of printed and unprinted source materials, David Fischer's *The Revolution of American Conservatism* also rests heavily on the work of such scholars as McCormick himself, J.R. Pole, and Noble Cunningham, whose studies in the growth of voter participation and Republican party organization already have opened new vistas into the political history of the Jefferson-Jackson eras.

It is Mr. Fischer's most interesting and significant conclusion that America's "Democratic revolution" (defined as the "sudden and sweeping expansion of voter participation," the political involvement of the voting masses) took place not in the age of Jackson (where textbooks continue to place it) but in the age of Jefferson; and that it did so, not because of the vote-getting efforts of the Jeffersonian Republicans acting by themselves, but because of the combined efforts to win and hold power of *both* great parties of the period. If it was the Republicans who pioneered in creating a popularly-oriented political party, with all its paraphernalia of local committees, party newspapers, barbecues, propaganda, and the rest, their Federalist rivals were not very far behind; and it was the "interaction" of the two in the battle for votes and power that was the "agency of change."

It is the reorientation of the Federalist party from gentlemanly aloofness to hard-scrabble vote-searching that constitutes the second major message of this volume. Portraying skillfully the sturdy independence of "old school" Federalist leaders, men like John Jay and Theodore Sedgwick who had grown up in a "deferential society" and expected to receive and hold power without having to dirty their hands in the political market place, Mr. Fischer then describes the rise of "new school" Federalists—younger, more flexible, and resourceful leaders—men who "deliberately tried to create popularly oriented vote-seeking political organizations which might defeat Jefferson with his own weapons." Their wholesale adoption of Republican party devices—organizational, propagandistic, and rhetorical—is then described in rich and heavily annotated detail. A massive appendix containing individual biographies of the old and new Federalists, well known and obscure, adds further substantiation to the thesis. There are charts showing Federalist organizational hierarchy and Federalist and Republican party newspapers. There is a perceptive analysis of the social bases of Federalist-Republican leadership and popular support.

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Unquestionably the book deals a heavy blow to those who see the American Revolution as a struggle to preserve an already established "middle-class democracy," as it does also to the outmoded notion that associates "Jacksonian Democracy" with the sudden involvement of the "common man" in politics. It affirms also the role of party conflict as a major dynamic element in the Jeffersonian era, a role that went far beyond the hurly-burly of election campaigns. If Mr. Fischer seems surprised by some of the more flagrant inconsistencies and demagoguery of the Federalists, it may help to remember that this was an era when both parties profoundly distrusted each other and sought political power, in some measure at least, to ensure the safety and survival of the new republic. It is a rich and rewarding book, one which may not win agreement in every detail, but one which no thoughtful student of our history and institutions can ignore.

ROGER H. BROWN
The American University

Populists, Plungers, and Progressives: A Social History of Stock and Commodity Speculation, 1890-1936 *by Cedric B. Cowing. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1965.—vi, 299 pp. $6.50.*

This book, Professor Cowing tells us in the preface, is intended to be a contribution to our understanding of the great stock market crash of 1929, treating particularly "the history of controversy over speculation" on the commodity and stock exchanges before the nineteen-twenties, the role of sectional politics in the argument, the identity of the "perennial critics of speculation," and the "assumptions and predelictions" that the investors of the nineteen-twenties took with them to their brokers' offices. Beginning with the Populist assault on the market in commodity futures in the early eighteen-nineties and a discussion of the Hatch Anti-Option bill of those years, Cowing carries his story into the bucket-shop era of the Progressive years when congressional efforts to curb the exchanges foundered, but when the findings of the Hughes Committee stimulated some internal reform of the stock market, when congressional hearings raised public sophistication somewhat, and some state legislatures passed blue sky laws. With the Cotton Futures and the Grain Standards Acts of the Wilson administration, the federal government began gingerly to regulate the commodity markets and the Grain Futures Act of 1922 was a major reform. Criticism of the stock exchanges was much less successful prior to 1929, and Professor Cowing devotes an impor-

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tant part of his narrative to analyses of the stock market during the nineteen-twenties searching for an explanation. With the debacle of 1929, however, complacency vanished, and the critics had their way; banking reforms and the passage of the Security Exchange Commission Act and the Commodity Exchange Act capped half a century of agitation. Cowing located the major source of anti-speculation sentiment in the plains state tier with important support "from adjacent areas where similar politico-economic conditions prevailed." In his discussion of reformers he distinguished particularly between "agrarians," "progressives," and "financial reformers."

There is a great deal of information in this useful book, presented in a clear and well-organized narrative that is enlivened by the occasional highly perceptive or provocative comment on the nature of the business, social, and political processes of the United States. It is based mainly on government hearings and reports, newspapers, periodicals, and secondary literature; the author lists only three manuscript collections in the bibliography. Despite its title the study is fundamentally a history of the ideas about speculation in stocks and commodities in the United States between 1890 and 1936, but one which links these ideas sensibly to both the realities of American politics and to the facts of the market place. It is not, nor was it intended to be, either a definitive study of the commodity and stock markets or of the political aspects of regulation. This reviewer would have appreciated a more elaborate effort to link commentary about speculation to the prevailing styles of formal economic theory. Some may find the author's distinctions between the anti-speculator groups to be a bit unsatisfactory or the descriptions of market procedures somewhat cloudy on occasion. Despite these mild caveats, historians of modern America will be grateful for Mr. Cowing's diligent research and lucid prose.

ALLAN G. BOGUE
University of Wisconsin

La Guardia Comes to Power: 1933 *by Arthur Mann. Philadelphia and New York, J. B. Lippincott, 1965.—199 pp. $3.95.*

In his earlier *La Guardia: A Fighter Against His Times, 1882-1933,* Arthur Mann wrote one of the best political biographies of the decade. In this second volume on La Guardia, he has written one of the very best accounts of a mayoralty nomination and election, combining the skills of a highly competent historian with the political scientists' methods of

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analysis to produce a significant addition to our knowledge about La Guardia, New York City, and city politics more generally.

The events surrounding La Guardia's nomination and election in 1933 were both complex and dramatic. His first necessity was to secure nomination as the candidate not only of the Republican party but also of the "Fusion" group, and he was not the favorite choice of either. His main levers against his opponents were his own determination to win the nomination, the support of Samuel Seabury, and the capacity to spoil the prospects of any rival by a primary contest. Mann demonstrates that a considerable portion of the resistance to La Guardia's nomination had ethnic roots. His eventual nomination was a victory over the Republican and Reform "establishments."

To win the election in November at first appeared to be an easier task. La Guardia found the hapless Mayor John P. O'Brien an inviting target. But ten days after the September primary, Joseph V. McKee entered the race as the nominee of the Recovery party, sponsored by Edward J. Flynn, Democratic county leader of the Bronx and claiming the support of FDR. McKee quickly gained strength as a candidate, and La Guardia's prospects for victory were clearly in jeopardy. At its climax, the campaign was, as Mann puts it, "thumb-in-the-eye style." La Guardia was described as a "Red," O'Brien as a tool of the party bosses, and McKee as an anti-Semite. La Guardia's success on election day was the product of "a crazy-quilt coalition," the author concludes; and, after a painstaking analysis of the election returns, persuasively observes that: "The most explosive ethnic issue of the campaign, and the one with the greatest significance on Election Day, was not anti-Semitism. It was pro-Italianism."

The "crazy-quilt coalition" won La Guardia's election, but it provided an unstable base for his mayoralty. All students of politics, and of New York City politics particularly, may look forward to Arthur Mann's third volume on La Guardia as the culmination of a unique and significant contribution to the understanding of American big-city politics.

WALLACE S. SAYRE
Columbia University

The Southerner and World Affairs *by Alfred O. Hero Jr. Baton Rouge, Louisiana State University Press, 1965.—xvi, 676 pp. $12.00.*

The South for a century has been consistently deviant in its response to foreign policies and to broad international problems. After the Civil War,

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it was for free trade; the North was for protectionism. Before 1939 its Anglophilia jangled against Northern Anglophobia. In 1919, Wilson's internationalism received its chief support in Congress from Southerners. In the nineteen-thirties, Northern isolationists recoiled from war; Southerners urged and welcomed FDR's interventionism. America First, powerful in the Middle West, made no greater inroads in the South than did the Communist party. After 1945, when the nation shifted to "internationalism" and took on extensive overseas commitments, Southern opinion again moved against the mainstream. Regional differences in American foreign policy opinion elsewhere have almost disappeared; but the South remains deviant. Protectionism, hostility to foreign aid, mistrust of the United Nations, hostility to emerging nations now show up more distinctly among Southern congressmen, and in Southern polls, than among even right-wing Republican legislators. The South is the nation's chief locale of effective isolationist sentiment.

Mr. Hero's book about this paradox is simply monumental. Its enormous amount of poll data enable the persistent reader to grasp quite subtle nuances of this complex, kaleidoscopic problem. These data are set against massive historical, literary, and psychological evidence. For a general public this book is too elephantine, but specialists may consider these qualities as its chief merit. The evidence is all there, in meticulous detail.

The South, as America's underdeveloped region, never until recently shared the dominant aspirations of the industrializing North. Before 1939, American egalitarian nationalism took pride in its sharp contrast to the Old World; Southern latifundist democracy maintained close economic ties to industrial England. The North, composed of ethnically diverse Europeans, was torn in sympathy and allegiances among Europe's nations during both World Wars; but there were almost no Irish, Germans, Italians, or Scandinavians in the South. Its white population, aside from Louisiana, was Anglo-Scots Irish. Liberal Americans resented balance-of-power politics and alliances; Southerners recalled their uses to the Confederacy. Southerners brought with them into the twentieth century a tradition of "realism" based upon authentic regional experiences with violence, defeat, and occupation; the North never experienced these at home. Northerners honored the businessman; Southerners, the soldier. Southern internationalism before 1945 was a function of regional divergence from national norms and a function of regional interests at play in world politics. The headquarters of prewar internationalism lay paradoxically in America's most backward region.

Since World War II, the South has been in constant flux, changing more vividly than any other part of America except California. Swift industrialization preceded and now accompanies the civil rights revolution.

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A new urban professional class—composed in part of immigrant Northerners—from now on will play an ever more powerful role in Southern politics. These changes, however, do not signify a break with the past, but an extrapolation of it. Southern protectionism now reflects dynamic elements of new interest; primary products (cotton, tobacco, timber) have been sidetracked as interest-determinants. But Southern isolationism today in some respects is paradoxically undergirded by many of the same considerations which earlier prompted its contingent internationalism. Culture and race are important. The League of Wilson's and the United Nations of Roosevelt's time were European clubs; the United Nations now is predominantly non-European. To the extent that American internationalist policies adjust to this new circumstance, by aiding new nations, many Southerners—including, as Hero shows, almost as many Negroes as whites—are skeptical or hostile. There is a great difference to Southerners between an America surrounded, as it once was, by a seemingly stable Anglo-European order and now by a new world of "emerging nations," clamoring for aid which the South, also emergent and impoverished, must help pay for.

Hero is not confident that more democracy in the South—including full Negro enfranchisement—will automatically iron out this difficulty. It might make it worse. The South still is thinly covered by effective, informed opinion elites. Poverty and illiteracy do not enlarge men's horizons. Southern Negroes in aggregate, Hero finds, are inclined to be as chauvinistic, pessimistic, and authoritarian as their white counterparts. Among the upper classes, new prosperity encourages economic conservatism. Internationally-minded urban professionals are far less influential and more conservative than their Northern counterparts.

Reactions to events in the outside world also will depend upon the intricate vibration between the civil rights revolution and political changes in the non-Western world—especially in Africa. Few Southern Negroes today identify sympathetically with new African nations (surprisingly large numbers of better-informed Negroes identify with Europeans and are cool to non-black, non-white races). Yet serious racial conflict in Africa could intensify the latent hostility of many white Southerners to administration policies which now link America to the non-Western world.

To have a Southerner in the White House helps—as was true in Wilson's time. Many of Hero's Southerners who were unresponsive to Kennedy's cool, pragmatic Harvard Brahmanism now lend an eager ear to a president who himself is the son of a poor Southern farmer. Johnson's homely translation of international problems into the warm anecdotal patois of the Pedernales River helps make even the Mekong Delta

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appear real. Kennedy was good therapy both for disgruntled intellectuals and for Irish Americans; Johnson may be the same for the South.

PAUL SEABURY
University of California, Berkeley

Politics and the Warren Court *by Alexander M. Bickel. New York, Harper & Row, 1965.—xii, 299 pp. $6.95.*

It is true, as Professor Bickel of Yale Law School acknowledges in his preface, that there is nothing novel about the theme of his book.

> Sooner or later, as de Tocqueville remarked, and in one fashion or another, the Constitution is likely to intrude on much of our politics. And the Constitution being, in a phrase of Felix Frankfurter, "not a literary composition, but a way of ordering society," defies understanding outside the context of politics. It is the political process that realizes in American life constitutional rules and principles enunciated by the Supreme Court. The Court's major pronouncements are subjected to the stresses of politics. Thus—and not by some mystic process of self-validation—do they become ways of ordering society, rather than mere literary compositions (p. ix).

Despite the patent validity of the thesis, it is evidently difficult for many to understand and enormously difficult to explain to those who do not understand. These observations grow out of my experience in trying to explain to undergraduates suffering through courses in American government, to visiting foreign students gathered informally around the family hearth to learn more about the United States, and to Peace Corps volunteers wondering how to explain in foreign lands that more than ten years after the Supreme Court decided the *Brown* case so little progress has been made in school desegregation in some of our states. In their view, once the Court has spoken that should solve the problem. For those of us who need help in understanding or helping others to understand, Professor Bickel in brilliant fashion points out the complexities of obtaining compliance to law and the limits of effective legal action in the struggle to vindicate the Negro's civil rights.

Lest it be assumed that only the uninitiated have trouble understanding Bickel's theme, I hasten to mention that in the course of considerable interviewing of lawyers and judges with respect to a current research project, I was surprised to learn that a substantial percentage still give credence to the myth that judges only "find" the law and that "finding" the law is a process divorced from politics.

To those who would push the Court to right every "wrong" in our so-

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ciety, Professor Bickel has much to say in his analysis of the reapportionment problem and what he calls "liberal myths" about it.

Since there are those who are offended by a writer reusing his writings, I am impelled to report that much of the material has appeared before in magazines and law journals. However, as the author points out, most of it "has been recast for inclusion . . . in the hope of sharpening their address to the central theme." Having read these pieces in their original form did not detract one whit from the enjoyment and edification which the book provided this reviewer.

HAROLD W. CHASE
University of Minnesota

Kurt Schumacher: A Study in Personality and Political Behavior *by Lewis J. Edinger. Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1965. —viii, 390 pp. $8.95.*

The study of *homo politicus*, an ancient and honorable pursuit in political science, has fascinated thinkers as disparate as Aristotle, Machiavelli, Freud, and Lasswell. Fashionably interdisciplinary, it cuts into and across history, biography, psychology, and psychoanalysis, and like other components of political science it is seeking to become more scientific in its research methodology. On the one hand, a small but increasing number of scholars is acquiring systematic training in psychiatry and related specialties, so that psychodynamic theories and methods can be brought to bear on studies of political personalities. On the other hand, attempts are being made regularly to develop conceptual schemes or frameworks for the analysis of political types. Given both developments, students of psychopolitics believe, we should be able eventually to move from the individual case study (of, say, Woodrow Wilson, James Forrestal, Kurt Schumacher) to meaningful and testable generalizations about the varieties of political man.

Professor Edinger's study of Germany's foremost Social Democratic leader after World War II reflects these developments and is therefore to be welcomed. But like most psychobiographies it is not entirely successful. The author's efforts to discuss Schumacher's career in role-behavior language is certainly valiant, but these efforts finally seem jargonistic, forced, and ultimately unnecessary. In any style of writing there is always the question of what is being communicated to whom. I suspect this question must have occurred occasionally to Edinger because on one occasion he states, following two paragraphs of role-behavior language: "When I say that Schumacher was perceived cognitively as an effective

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instrumental leader on the basis of performance criteria, I mean that Social Democrats looked upon him as a man who knew what to do and how to do it in the postwar situation facing their party." Is it possible that the preceding references to "counter-players," "role of monocratic leader," "role-assignments," "role-sets," and so forth were not absolutely essential?

A more important reservation about the book relates to Edinger's explanation of Schumacher's intense and exclusive preoccupation with politics. Schumacher, whose health was never good, had an arm amputated following a battle wound in 1914 (the later record includes an ulcer, circulatory ailments, the amputation of a leg in 1948, and at least one stroke prior to his death in 1952). It is Edinger's thesis that Schumacher experienced a "severe personality crisis" after the loss of his arm, and that in response to this crisis he sought to build a new image of himself in a sphere where the "emasculating" loss of his arm would amount to little or nothing. That sphere, of course, was politics, specifically the German Social Democratic party, which career Schumacher chose "because it permitted him to satisfy his private needs in a socially and ethically acceptable manner." Schumacher's "highly dogmatic personality with an extremely closed belief system," more and more manifest during the final years of his life, Edinger traces to inner tensions and increased physical debility.

This is a most plausible thesis, but how much does it really explain? Does it tell us, for example, why Schumacher never married and never had much of a private life? Does it adequately account for Schumacher's unwillingness to compromise and share power with others? Further, what about the other Germans, not to mention French, Russians, British, and Americans—there must have been tens of thousands—who lost arms or legs in World War I? Did their personalities and careers develop in much the same way as Kurt Schumacher's, and if not, why not?

It does not subtract from the considerable merit of the book to point out that the political biographer, however skilled and sensitive he may be, does not possess the resources of the clinician. He does not have the subject on a chair in front of him, or lying on a couch. He cannot, like the clinician, probe, search, question, take account of expressions, gestures, voice tones, body movements, and the like. In essence all he can do is make inferences from occasionally scanty and frequently random interviews with persons who knew the subject, and from the subject's letters and private papers. Since every childhood, like every marriage, is a secret, the biographer must be cautious in attributing to any single episode of childhood or adolescence the later behavior of the mature individual.

In Schumacher's case, moreover, practically nothing is known about

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his early years and adolescence; six pages, albeit interesting pages, are devoted to his first nineteen years. The five years following the arm amputation, that is, the years from 1914 to 1919, are almost a total blank; the only solid evidence that he considered the loss of his arm traumatic is the reminiscence of a female cousin that he shut himself in a room on the occasion of the second anniversary of the amputation (why not the first?), and "went out of his way to assert his virility. He liked to tell ribald stories in mixed company. . . ." This amounts to a grasping at flaws, and confuses the issues toward the resolution of which *Kurt Schumacher* is a significant contribution.

ARNOLD A. ROGOW
Stanford University

The Federation of German Industry in Politics *by Gerard Braunthal. Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1965.—xx, 389 pp. $7.50.*

It is fashionable to deny the usefulness of any case study unless it contributes to the construction of a more general theory (at least of the "middle range") or addresses itself to the validation or refutation of existing hypotheses. Professor Braunthal finds it, therefore, necessary to justify his study of the Federation of German Industry by claiming for it relevance to the ongoing discussions about "group theory," pluralist versus elite theories of power, as well as the Marxist assertion (an inspiration to and special variant of the "elite" theory) that the masters of industry form a ruling elite for which the government is merely a facade. On a lower level of abstraction his analysis claims to attempt an answer to the question on the future of German democracy—which, in turn, requires evaluation of the commitment of the German industrial elite to the democratic process as well as its power to undermine or destroy it.

Let it be said at the outset that the contribution that Professor Braunthal's study makes to the solution of these theoretical questions is very small indeed. But it is my conviction that this is due less to weaknesses in the conceptualization and methods with which the study is approached than to the intractability of the problems dealt with.

As a study of "influence" or "power" the study suffers from an additional handicap, not of the author's making. Power can be observed or measured only in conflict situations, when what may be latently present (or subtly and almost invisibly exercised as "manipulation") becomes apparent as threat, sanction, failure, or success. During the period in which

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Professor Braunthal examines the functioning of the Federation such conflict involving the business community was rare and relatively marginal. Erhard's neo-liberalism and the German "economic miracle" had established a social and political framework so favorable to the business community's major aspirations that conflicts were muted and half-hearted. The fundamental tenet dear to the hearts of the captains of industry—that private enterprise and high profits were compatible with—nay, prerequisite to—the national welfare had also become an article of faith with the government (and, lately, even the SPD "opposition"). Thus the capacity on the part of German industry to mobilize its resources for defensive or offensive purposes has not been genuinely tested.

Still, the picture which emerges from Professor Braunthal's pages is indicative of the fact that, in spite of superficial impressions to the contrary, German industry has by no means had it all its own way whenever its interests clashed with those of other organized groups or ran counter to official convictions of what was "good for the country." In making its decisions the Adenauer government and its high officials had to take into account the congeries of interest—including those of the labor wing of the CDU and small businessmen—and "public opinion" important for electoral success, as well as such "constituents" as the members of the Common Market. Thus, even where "industry" spoke with one voice—and the author makes clear that this was frequently not the case—the government could not allow itself to appear as its "tool." Besides, the conception of "the common good" held by political leaders and civil servants—hardly to be encompassed by any "group theory"—clearly represented weighty elements in the process of policy formulation. In Chancellor Adenauer the Federation had, indeed, a man who was highly accessible to its top spokesman and who, lacking a principled theory of economics, was sympathetic to claims based on power. Yet he, too, found it necessary to balance conflicting claims in the light of political pressures. The record indicates that it was Adenauer's person rather than any intrinsic "power" of the Federation which gave it the occasional leverage over policies and personnel it apparently exercised, a leverage which, one might speculate, is likely to decline with Erhard's accession to office and the introduction of sizable public subsidies to political parties making them relatively independent of private donors. Against the background of a prosperous economy and a highly consensual society the Federation appears as "a very typical interest group" operating "within certain prescribed limits" (pp. 348-49). It is reassuring to know that the present German industrial elite represents no overt and conscious anti-democratic force. What role it would play under circumstances more threatening to

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its interests remains, however, an open and—hopefully—hypothetical question.

KURT L. SHELL
State University of New York, Binghamton

Das Nationalitätenproblem der Habsburgermonarchie *by Robert A. Kann.* Vol. I: Das Reich und die Völker, *472 pp.;* Vol. II: Ideen und Plane zur Reichsreform, *457 pp. Graz-Köln, Verlag Hermann Bohlaus Nachf, 1964. DM 72,—.*

What the title of these volumes does not reveal is that this is a translation and revision of the author's *The Multinational Empire. Nationalism and National Reform in the Habsburg Monarchy 1848-1918* (2 Vols., New York, 1950). The reviewer by no means checked this new edition throughout with the old, but he sampled enough to realize that new sentences, paragraphs, as well as sections had been added, and that the translation at times was rather free. In working over the material the author and translator, while keeping the overall organization of the volumes, have frequently resorted to different paragraph divisions, which makes it difficult to spot the same passages in the English and German versions, a factor of some importance when it comes to comparing these authoritative volumes. But this is a minor matter and only attests to the thoroughness of the revision, or perhaps to variations in English and German practice.

The new material is skillfully inserted and on the whole bolsters rather than changes the content of the English version. The author himself raises the problem whether recent research has altered his basic concepts and answers with a simple, No. There is no need to throw away the first edition, unless one prefers to read the German version, although it might be noted it is in no more limpid prose than the English. Yet significant additions have strengthened the study. The chapter on the Poles has been expanded considerably, with two new sections covering the periods from the "Acquisition of Autonomy to the World War, 1868-1914" and from the "Outbreak of the War to the Reestablishment of Poland." In the second volume sections have been added on Constantin Frantz for the neo-Absolutist period, on Nickolas von Wesselényi in the chapter on "Departure from Centralism," and on Wenzel Frind as an exponent of "Catholicism's National Philosophy in Austria." More important than these additions are the greatly expanded footnotes which number 218 pages in the German as compared to 152 in the English edition. Here Kann has brought the bibliography up to the late autumn of 1963, as well as in-

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cluding new references to earlier studies. Articles, monographs, biographies, with annotations, are cited at the beginning of each chapter or topic, the separate bibliography being restricted to works on the Dual Monarchy as a whole. As compared to the first edition, even this highly selective bibliography has been expanded by inclusion of older as well as more recent titles.

Ever since its first publication no one would think of writing on Austro-Hungarian nationality problems without consulting Kann's volumes, any more than he would omit Joseph Redlich's *Das österreichische Staats- und Reichsproblem* (Leipzig, 1920, 1926). That the Austrian Ministry of Education along with Columbia and Rutgers would help subsidize and further this new edition is a real tribute to its excellence. The first volume after a brief historical introduction discusses each of the eleven nationality groups in the Empire, with more detailed treatments of the five major ones—Germans, Magyars, Czechs, Poles, and Croats. The second deals with various plans and projects for reform which were undertaken or advanced in the years 1848-1918. The attempt to find a supranational bond to hold the Empire together failed, inevitably perhaps, in view of the *Zeitgeist* of the century. Fifteen years ago the author had hoped that his study of Austrian experiences would prove of benefit not only to the countries of East-Central Europe but to the world at large. Now his hopes seem outdated. "The solutions or apparent solutions of nationality problems today are of such a radical nature that they have nothing in common with the conservative, step by step reform attempts, and in part successful reforms of the Habsburg Empire" (p. 14). If the volumes have not provided a guide to present-day statesmen, they have helped us understand how present-day nationality problems are rooted in the past and should always be considered in their historical context.

The excellent statistical appendices have been retained, and it is a joy to find two stout German volumes with a detailed subject index, as well as biographical annotations for all persons.

E. C. Helmreich
Bowdoin College

Statesmanship and Party Government: A Study of Burke and Bolingbroke *by Harvey C. Mansfield Jr. Chicago and London, The University of Chicago Press, 1965.—xii, 281 pp. $7.50.*

Edmund Burke can be called the founder of party government because he made the notion of party respectable. His *Thoughts on the Cause of*

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the Present Discontents (1770) is not a mere factional diatribe, but a closely reasoned political classic directed against Bolingbroke and his disciples. Bolingbroke wished to use party to rally the nation around a patriot-king in order to end party and party strife. Burke prescribed the establishment of a system of small aristocratic parties as a bulwark against the tyrannical potential of a patriot-statesman, and in the process he reduced statesmanship to prudential calculation.

Scholars and students will be indebted to Professor Mansfield, a political scientist at Harvard University, for re-emphasizing Burke's belief in the inseparability of party and free government, and his role in the British utilitarian tradition. Yet the author writes with a greater sense of urgency than simply to confirm in a detailed and systematic fashion the century-old judgment of Lord Morley. The reader soon discovers that the analysis of the dispute between Burke and Bolingbroke is a device to reveal and criticize the philosophical assumptions of contemporary politics. Although political adversaries, both Burke and Bolingbroke, along with Hobbes and Locke, are participants in "modern political philosophy," to be distinguished from classical-medieval political philosophy largely on the basis of differing conceptions of natural law. For the moderns, justice rests upon a natural desire for self-preservation deduced from human nature, and hence the purpose of the state is security for the pursuit of self-interest. A theory of a fixed final natural end of man is fundamental to the ancients' view of justice. Consequently, the object of politics is the molding of the good man in accordance with his *telos*.

Apparently the contest between Burke and Bolingbroke symbolizes the struggle between the Right and Left parties of modern political philosophy, between conservatism and liberalism. With his idea that society can be constructed upon the inalienable rights of man, Bolingbroke is a political rationalist and intellectual ancestor of the welfare-state. By substituting history and prescription for the truth of first principles, Burke is the model of the political empiricist. Professor Mansfield, a partisan of Aristotle, condemns both factions of modern political philosophy. Nevertheless, he implies that conservatism is definitely the lesser evil, and should be supported against the precipitous and doctrinaire techniques of liberalism.

In sum, the book is an ingenious if somewhat devious and circumlocutory attack of a representative of the party of the ancients against modern political philosophy, and political rationalism in particular. Out of his partisanship Professor Mansfield has certainly succeeded in illuminating, sometimes brilliantly, crucial elements of Burke's political thinking. But the uncritical acceptance and veneration of Aristotle as the fount of all political wisdom—other than the two protagonists, he is the most fre-

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quently cited thinker—is as tedious as it is disturbing. Political philosophy for our time of troubles must learn from the past, not idolize it.

NEAL WOOD
University of California, Los Angeles

English History, 1914-1945 *by A. J. P. Taylor. New York and Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1965.—xxvii, 708 pp. $9.75*

Until now the Oxford History of England has ended with Sir Robert Ensor's *England 1870-1914*, published in 1936. A. J. P. Taylor's brilliant chronicle narrows the gap between "history" and the contemporary world once again to two decades, approximately what it was in Sir Robert's day. Taken together with Charles L. Mowat's *Britain Between the Wars* (Chicago, 1955), to which Taylor pays deserved tribute, this book goes far toward destroying the barrier separating the British from serious study of their immediate past. Now all that remains is for Her Majesty's Government to recognize, as Taylor forcefully demands that they do, the indefensibility of the "fifty-year rule" that bars historians, unless they also happen to be former prime ministers, from access to the official papers of government departments.

Taylor's approach is mainly chronological, and politics, foreign and domestic, dominate the book. The two World Wars occupy nearly one half the space, social and intellectual developments less than one tenth. It is a masterpiece of sustained narrative, enthralling to read and enormously informative, even if the coverage is, as Taylor admits (p. vi), somewhat arbitrary and uneven—business organization is largely ignored, philanthropy almost wholly so, science and philosophy intentionally excluded. By a paradox of the kind Taylor himself has always relished, the selection of a perennial academic rebel to conduct this excursion into contemporary history has produced a book that is, in its organization and method, remarkably conservative. It is also somewhat careless concerning details; enough well-known quotations are rendered incorrectly to make one wonder about those that are less well known. Authors' names are misspelled frequently in footnotes and bibliography. Even Pearl Harbor is misdated (p. 532).

On the other hand the text abounds in acute perceptions, adroit reversals of familiar but untenable views, darting strokes of vision or imagination that bring the reader up short and provoke him to think again about matters hitherto taken for granted. The footnotes alone contain more original ideas and intriguing bits of information than many an entire book.

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Taylor does not very often attempt to convert his brilliant strokes into a general argument. At the very end of the book he rather suddenly suggests an overall theme having to do with democratization and the general progress (moral as well as social) of the English people. It is no more than a suggestion, however, and most of the time he is content to stress the causal importance of accident, oddity, muddle, and cross-purposes.

This same emphasis, doubtless abetted by an irrepressible instinct for shocking his colleagues, led Taylor into the quagmires of his *Origins of the Second World War* (London, 1961); to show that this mighty conflagration had burst forth unintended was, so to speak, the ultimate point to which worship of the accidental could be pushed. The mark of this earlier book is unhappily present in the present volume, although much of the time it is consigned to notes either at the foot of the page or the end of a chapter. Indeed, in one such note (p. 424, n. 1) Taylor sidesteps the need to defend his view of Hitler's policy by remarking that "an historian of England fortunately need not debate the subject." Yet the flaw remains: whereas his predecessor, Ensor, blamed Germany too much for the First World War, Taylor blames her too little for the second.

On other matters he is often wounding (Ernest Bevin "objected to ideas only when others had them"; Sir John Simon resigned as home secretary during World War I, "thus drawing on a stock of moral inflexibility not much replenished later"), but usually with good reason. He has certainly written the liveliest and one of the most useful volumes of this distinguished series.

RICHARD W. LYMAN
Stanford University

The Dominion Partnership in Imperial Defense, 1870-1914 by Donald C. Gordon. Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins Press, 1965.—xiv, 315 pp. $7.50.

This useful synthesis, mingling documentary and secondary authorities, helps to explain the immense political difficulties that faced the British government in its efforts to produce an effective defense policy for the Empire. It was obvious at the time that the most power for a given expenditure could be obtained by the maintenance of unified services, but it became equally clear during the first decade of the twentieth century that certain Dominions were willing to pay even in blood for the sake of their separate national identities. The first chapters deal with the reduction of

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British forces after 1870. Consequent gropings for a more economical and efficient strategy led to the Carnarvon Commission on Imperial Defence (1879) and the establishment of a Colonial Defence Committee in 1885, the first permanent advisory committee, designed to educate and guide colonial governments on matters of defense. *Fin de siècle* clearly turns on Chamberlain's "energetic imperialism" (apparently the Chamberlain papers were not available to Professor Gordon, and important work by Professor R. H. Wilde has been ignored); the remaining chapters are concerned with the efforts of successive British governments, chiefly through the medium of Imperial Conferences, to reconcile Dominions' nationalism with a coherent pattern of military collaboration, especially at sea.

Naval strategy consists not simply in placing ships in every sea, but in providing adequate force at the decisive point. "To be strong in the vital places, in the threatened areas," writes Professor Gordon, "was to be strong everywhere. Win the great impending battles in the North Sea, and all else will be open to you." Then somewhat ambiguously he adds: "The essential truth of this doctrine blinded many to the possibility that it was not the whole truth " (p. 295). Professor Gordon never tells us what the whole truth was. Yet it could not have been very different from the "essential truth," for he continues:

> To the end . . . the Admiralty clung to the strategic truth of the need to concentrate all effort in the North Sea, with the complementary idea that the best policy that the dominions could follow was to give the Admiralty all the tools they could to help finish the job there (p. 296).

This was sensible reasoning. No nation expects to have to fight the entire world; indeed, no nation has ever made budgetary provision for such a contingency. The most that the British government could hope to do was to adjust its peacetime policy in the light of mounting German naval strength and an urgent and uncompromising colonial nationalism. The strategic doctrine of concentration inevitably ran counter to political demands for dominion status, and in Canada particularly, where the French-speaking population saw naval preparations as an indication of resurgent imperialism, cooperation remained strictly limited. Although every effort was made prior to 1914 to ensure some kind of uniformity in materiel and training, joint staff work in all the services remained in the embryonic stage. The association was not a real partnership.

This book is written with intelligence and vigor, but not always with grace: "Thus for many in Canada, the only eventuality by which the Dominion might be endangered was an Anglo-American rift . . ." (p. 251); "In true Cobdenesque vein, Bourassa prophesied that doing any-

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thing in the naval arena involved a greater danger of war for Canada" (p. 252); "But Laurier's political foes in the Conservative ranks naturally zeroed in on this issue . . ." (p. 254). There is a good index and a concise bibliography.

GERALD S. GRAHAM
King's College, University of London

The Future of Canadian Federalism / L'Avenir du Fédéralisme canadien *edited by P. A. Crepeau and C. B. Macpherson. Toronto, University of Toronto Press and Montreal, Les Presses de L'Université de Montréal, 1965.—x, 188 pp. $5.95.*

This is the record of a debate between English and French Canadian political scientists and economists in Charlottetown, P.E.I., as a part of the meetings which marked the centennial of Canadian Confederation. It is beautifully printed and edited, but will be a difficult book to read for anyone not fully versed in the literature of the last ten years dealing with the problems of bilingualism and biculturalism in Canada.

The title is something of a misnomer, for the volume contains little about the future and much about the past. The arguments of the French scholars are, for the most part, historical and philosophical, never stating clearly or in practical terminology exactly what they and their countrymen want to see written into the new constitution for Canada which they are demanding. The arguments of the English-speaking scholars are defensive and in some cases too narrow in scope. Perhaps the wisest words in the volume are those of Principal Corry of Queens University, Kingston, Ontario. He is dealing with the plea of J.R. Mallory of McGill that since most of the vital problems in the Province of Quebec at the present time have economic roots they should be settled by economists.

> Let us be clear [writes Principal Corry] that in so far as we defer to the economists as statesmen we narrow the ground for political manoeuvre. And we do need a lot of room for political manoevre if we are to deal with the challenge . . . of finding within a frame of national unity fair scope for the aspirations of Quebec.

The basic difficulty of this reviewer in dealing with the arguments of the Quebecois, as of 1965, is that they are based on historical assumptions which appear to be almost wholly false. The most important of these is that for two centuries—since 1760—the French Canadians have been denied any decisive role in the formation of national policy. Yet to

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the thoughtful reader of Canadian history it seems sufficiently obvious that from 1842 to 1914 most English-speaking leaders taking part in national politics deferred to the French Canadian point of view consistently, for the excellent reason that without French votes they could not continue in office. Moreover the two Canadian prime ministers who, after John A. MacDonald, probably received the most wholehearted support from English voters all over Canada were French Canadians.

Since 1914 the situation has changed for many reasons, most of them connected with the astounding economic growth of the province of Quebec. All the participants in the debate were agreed that the immediate problems rearing their ugly heads today are connected with the economic and social revolution in the French province. In fact most of them fail to come to grips with what is, perhaps, a more basic reason for the change in the French Canadian point of view toward the rest of Canada —namely, that twice during the period of the two world wars, first on the conscription issue in 1916, and later on the issue of war or peace in 1939, the French Canadians were made painfully aware of their minority status. On the conscription issue guarantees might possibly be worked out for the future; on the issues of foreign policy and the right of the Canadian Parliment to vote for peace or war, it is more difficult to see (as one English debater points out) how the Province of Quebec could be given a veto without putting an end to the existence of Canada as a sovereign state.

The other question on which compromise at the present time appears to be the most difficult is the desire of the French Canadians to rid themselves at once of the domination of British commercial and banking interests in Montreal which have been in the ascendant since 1800 if not earlier. Although one French Canadian speaker admitted that this ascendancy was very largely due, in the nineteenth century, to the lack of business initiative among French Canadians, and to the fostering of peasant ideals by the Roman Catholic Church, he did not suggest that the balance could be redressed without legal or constitutional changes now that the French Canadians are adapting their educational system, and in fact their whole way of life, to an industrial age. Patience and increased effort by industrial and financial leaders in Montreal and elsewhere are the only means by which the French Canadians can hope to make themselves the rivals of the British or the Americans in these fields. Unfortunately patience is one of the qualities sadly lacking among those nations and races in the world today who regard themselves, rightly or wrongly, as oppressed and thwarted.

HELEN TAFT MANNING
Bryn Mawr College

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Napoleon and the Birth of Modern Spain, 2 Volumes, *by Gabriel H. Lovett. New York, New York University Press, 1965.—xiv, 884 pp. $20.00.*

Form and content being inseparable categories, to say that this book is twice as long as it ought to be is immediately to say that it is not very good. In fact, it is rather bad. Occasionally, some light shines through the dense mass of footnotes and the excessive concern for trivia, but not often. For the most part, I had the uncomfortable feeling of expecting a voice to cry out: Did Queen Luisa really love Godoy? Was Charles IV as much of a fool as he appeared to be? Had "the Spanish people . . . concentrated all their love on Fernando. . .?" Or more insinuatingly: Was her name really Luisa? Tune in tomorrow. . . .

This book contains two paragraphs (p. 34) on the Spanish economy. As for religion, we are assured that Spain stood behind the Church, "and it could not be otherwise in a nation where catholicism had sunk such deep roots that religion constituted an integral part of everyday life." This explains precisely nothing.

It is difficult to know where to begin in criticizing this work. Mr. Lovett certainly does not lack sympathy for his subject, which is a point in his favor. On the other hand, he completely condemns—and, I think, fails to comprehend in the least little bit—Napoleon, although he is good enough to admit that the Charmartín decrees of December 4, 1808, prove that the Emperor was not entirely a sham. *Merci pour lui.*

The way in which this book is composed, the overlong biographical sketches, the numerous irrelevancies, the long descriptions of battle after battle, bear witness to the author's lack of training for historical scholarship. Is it true that Spain was struggling "to find a new path for its historic trajectory" (p. 44)? Is it necessary to tell us about the passionate nature of Spanish women of the nineteenth century (surely inadmissible as hearsay evidence) and other foibles of the Spanish national character? (pp. 68ff., 83). Numerous other, and more serious, questions must be asked. Was there really a proletariat in Spain in 1807? (p. 46). It is no doubt true that for the lower classes "king, fatherland and religion were ideals binding enough to exclude any thought of rebellion against the existing order of things" (pp. 419-20), but the reasons behind the statement would bear further study. If Lovett had undertaken that investigation, it would perhaps be possible to understand why the revolt of May 2, 1808, in Madrid against the French, which resembles nothing so much as a typical church and king riot of the eighteenth century, was indeed revolutionary, as he maintains. It may well be that the actions of the Cadiz Cortes in 1810-14 constitute a bourgeois revolution (pp. 484-85),

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but there is not sufficient analysis here to prove it. And why, in his sympathy for all things Spanish, does the author dismiss the bandits who participated in irregular warfare as the undesirable "last class of guerrillas" (p. 673), when a study of the relationship between banditry and resistance to foreign invasion would have been most welcome?

And so forth and so on. Is it true that every time a man says that "men form society for the pursuit of happiness, not to forge their own fetters" (p. 443), he is being influenced by Locke and/or Rousseau? Is it necessary to translate "mon bon ami" (p. 494)? And what about "companies of invalids" (p. 580)? I can see them now tearing across the field in their wheelchairs, as the enemy flees in terror.

Last but not least, Lovett suffers from the conceit that "radical changes in a nation's political and social structure are normally brought about . . . by the intelligentsia" (p. 418). This permits him to define the cause of the Spanish Revolution as "the assimilation by the Spanish intellectual elite of Western European philosophical rationalism leading to a critical and scientific attitude toward the essential problems of man in his world [which] encouraged the growth of an enlightened minority . . . that began to pry Spain loose from its age-old manner of being" (p. 845). The above paragraph contains enough material for a full length *explication de texte.* One might start with the use of loaded expressions like "philosophical rationalism" or "critical and scientific attitude," or one might question the excessive importance Lovett attributes to abstract ideas in the fomenting of revolutions. But let us be more charitable and simply wonder in the Norman manner: *peut-etre ben que oui, peut-etre ben que non.* We will have to wait for another book to find out.

JEFFRY KAPLOW
Columbia University

The Three Lives of Charles de Gaulle *by David Schoenbrun. New York, Atheneum, 1966.—373 pp. $6.95.*

The newest parts in this most recent contribution to Gaullology are the beginning and the end. The one explores—all too briefly—the General's youth and the influences which helped to shape his personality and his particular view of France; the other discusses the roots and the unfolding of de Gaulle's "uncivil war" against the Anglo-Saxons, and reveals the calm and understanding Mr. Schoenbrun growing ever more exasperated at his hero's antics. This latter portion also draws on new information which makes slight but illuminating contributions to recent history, as much through the author's informed opinion as through the sources to which he refers.

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In between, a familiar story is expertly told: the war hero, the prophet without honor in his own land, the gangling man of destiny—first in the saddle, then in the wilderness, finally resurrected as leader of a new republic. Too old for dictatorship at sixty-seven, he did not prove too old to revitalize a France whose dynamism and nuisance-value had both been lost from sight.

Skimming perceptively through these incarnations and their several contexts, the book provides one of the best introductions in English to this awkward and impressive figure which constantly reminds us that men of destiny make difficult company, since their destinies tend to be worked out at the expense of someone else's. In this case, the chief losers are Europe, the United States, and France, in that order. The first because, having liquidated *l'Algérie de papa*, de Gaulle now seeks to impose *l'Europe de grand-papa*. The second because the old warrior takes every opportunity to lambaste a foggy Foggy Bottom policy of dominance camouflaged as multinational consensus, insisting on a *tripartisme* where some allies are more equal than others. The third because, lacking the means of a great power, de Gaulle's policies can only be those of the emperor's wonderful clothes, exposing France to trouble when events reveal her without clothes and, eventually, without an emperor as well.

Mr. Schoenbrun explains this admirably. He fails, however, to consider some of the General's more intriguing aspects. Having mentioned his royalist heritage, noted his basic distinction between *pays réel* and *pays légal*, quoted his 1954 promise "to intervene directly by no matter what means, even by the electoral path," which evokes maurrassian threats of achieving power by all means, "even legal ones," he makes no attempt to determine what influence, if any, Maurras may have had on this scion of a royalist Catholic family, this member of an *Action Française*-reading officer corps, this early admirer of Bainville's histories. The question is the more intriguing since, in many ways, de Gaulle appears less the reincarnation of a *Grand Connétable de France* than that of a *grand bourgeois* like Jules Ferry, patriotic, legalistic, authoritarian, and respectful of the Republic though not of its assemblies. And the resemblance increases in the light of Mr. Schoenbrun's remark that "De Gaulle's principles were frequently sound, his policies drawn from those principles were just as frequently controversial, his practical application of the policies was almost always disastrous." One tends to agree and, while awaiting a more thorough, further-pressing study of this "rare old man, half god, half devil," to recommend an honest and enjoyable book.

EUGEN WEBER
University of California, Los Angeles

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Lost Soldiers: The French Army and Empire in Crisis, 1947-1962 *by George Armstrong Kelly. Cambridge, Mass., The M. I. T. Press, 1965.—x, 404 pp. $10.00.*

Ten years ago, books on the French Army's role in society and the state were almost non-existent. Indeed, it then seemed that modern French history (in contrast to modern German history) could be studied almost without mention of the army, save in the brief interludes when the nation was at war. The contrast today is striking. Since Raoul Girardet's pioneering essay, the shelf has been filling rapidly: Planchet, Monteil, Meisel, Furniss, Paret, and once again Girardet have given us serious analyses of the army as an institution.

Mr. Kelly's book therefore covers ground that has already been criss-crossed in various directions, and some of its potential novelty is lost as a result. It is nevertheless a useful addition to the shelf, for it examines the army's growing malaise during the whole fifteen-year period from the outbreak of war in Indochina to the end of the struggle in Algeria. Furthermore, unlike some of his predecessors, Kelly has made a conscientious effort to see things from the army's point of view, and to understand (without approving or condoning) the profound sense of grievance and frustration that ended in a "reluctant groping toward sedition." The tone is not one of denunciation, but of lowering tragedy.

Much of the story is built around the army's new fascination with psychological warfare, as developed not by armchair planners in Paris but by officers in the rice-paddies of Indochina. From an initial phase of mere counterpropaganda against the Vietnamese rebels, there developed a full-scale doctrine, a "recipe for action"—the concept of *la guerre révolutionnaire*. The content of this doctrine, its theoretical sources from Le Bon and Tchakotine to Mao, and the reasons for its appeal to an important sector of the officer corps are examined in detail. How the army sought to apply the doctrine in Algeria, especially after de Gaulle's return to power, constitutes the core of the book. Kelly shrewdly analyzes the relationships between the army psychologues on the one hand and the European *colons*, the activists of the counterrevolutionary Right, and President de Gaulle on the other. As he points out, the doctrine enabled the army to convince itself that it was fighting for a revolution rather than for the *status quo*. It also led the army to view Algeria as "an absolute, when de Gaulle would have it a dependent variable in the mathematics of international affairs." Somehow, the doctrine became rigid and total, an article of faith rather than a tentative theory from which to derive effective tactics of countersubversion.

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One must regret that Kelly has ended his account in 1962, for little or nothing has yet been written on the after-effects of the long crisis. "The Algerian settlement," he concludes somewhat enigmatically, "undoubtedly removed the excuse and temptation for overt sedition. But otherwise the Army's future political course was problematical. The demon of the djebels could not be exorcised by the command to forget." It would be interesting to know whether the demon has shown any signs of life since 1962.

If there is a flaw in this thorough and well-informed book, it is the author's frequent tendency to become inebriated with his own rhetoric. One often has to fight through a verbal jungle to arrive at a simple and sensible idea.

GORDON WRIGHT
Stanford University

Law in the Soviet Society *edited by Wayne R. LaFave. Urbana, University of Illinois Press, 1965.—x, 297 pp. $4.75.*

Seven essays on various aspects of Soviet law, originally published as a symposium in the University of Illinois *Law Forum*, have been put between hard covers and thus made more generally available to those who do not have easy access to a law library. Each of the seven authors has made a useful contribution to our knowledge of the Soviet legal system, but despite a valiant effort by Demitri Shimkin, in the first chapter, to find some common unifying themes, the book remains an anthology rather than a true symposium. The absence of an index accentuates the disunity.

Mr. Shimkin, a distinguished anthropologist and geographer, devotes a large part of the first chapter to a survey and evaluation of the very extensive Western writings on Soviet law during the past four decades. He attributes the "marked limitations" of research on Soviet law in part to paucity of materials on the actual practice of decision-making in the Soviet Union; in part to the failure of legal scholars to take sufficient account of "social, demographic, economic, and military contexts, and of administrative ... motivations for given practices"; in part to the frequent resort to "sweeping psychological, social, and historical interpretations of an ill-defined aggregate of Soviet law"; and "above all" to the subject-matter of Soviet law itself, whose "largely derivative nature ..., frequent incompleteness, crudity and inconsistency, and ... many inequities, deprive its study of much strength as a source of legal inspiration" (p. 36).

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By these standards, however, Professor Shimkin has also condemned his own effort to distill the essence of Soviet legal institutions. Moreover, his characterization of the deficiencies of Soviet law are not borne out by the other chapters in the book.

Three of the other chapters deal with aspects of Soviet law which are certainly not "largely derivative" from Roman or Western law, and whose study is at least rewarding. Dennis O'Connor of New York University analyzes the widespread participation of civil organizations (as distinct from state agencies) in the resolution of civil disputes in Soviet society. Dietrich Loeber, of Hamburg, gives a detailed analysis of the role of contracts between state enterprises in the Soviet planned economy. Zigurds Zile of Wisconsin University analyzes the role of law in the distribution of consumer goods.

In other chapters, Whitmore Gray of Michigan University analyzes the general principles of Soviet tort law; Bernard Ramundo of George Washington University examines the use of information-gathering and publicity mechanisms of the mass communications media from a legal point of view; and John Hazard of Columbia University discusses the extent to which the Soviet legal pattern has become the model for other Communist countries of Europe and Asia.

There is something valuable in these essays for everyone—specialist and non-specialist alike—but it is doubtful that the non-specialist will want to read the whole book.

HAROLD J. BERMAN
Harvard Law School

Mao and the Chinese Revolution *by Jerome Ch'en. With Thirty-seven Poems by Mao Tse-tung. Translated from the Chinese by Michael Bullock and Jerome Ch'en. New York, Kuala Lumpur, and London, Oxford University Press, 1965.—ix, 419 pp. $7.50.*

Jerome Ch'en, lecturer in Asian history at the University of Leeds, in his *Mao and the Chinese Revolution* makes substantial contributions to our knowledge of the troubled Republican interregnum that followed the death of Yuan Shih-k'ai in 1916. He sketches Mao Tse-tung's early years and then, as Mao becomes subject to new influences in the revolutionary ferment introduced by the May Fourth Movement of 1919, weaves the personal biography into a combined history of factional politics, the founding and growth of the Chinese Communist party, and the peasant revolution. The reader is led through the intricate maze of the first Kuo-

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mintang-Communist coalition that ended in 1927, Nanking's five anti-Communist campaigns, the second period of Kuomintang-Communist collaboration in the War of Resistance, and finally the third "revolutionary civil war" that resulted in the Communist overthrow of the Nationalist power in 1949. Professor Ch'en marshals an extensive documentation, and provides, besides some useful appendices, a chronology of Mao's life, and a collection of Mao's poetry.

There could hardly be a non-controversial arrangement and presentation of the vast amount of material pertinent to the several fields of inquiry covered by this book. Professor Ch'en's treatment of various critical episodes in that complicated history is open to some challenge. There are only passing references, for instance, to the April 1927 purge of leftists at Shanghai that effectively marked the beginning of the split between Right and Left in the ranks of the Northern Expedition. The writer has Chang Hsueh-liang intervening to turn the tide in the great civil war of 1930, without remarking that the tide had already turned due to the disastrous defeat suffered by the Shansi forces in Shantung—this circumstance patently shaping Chang's decision. Regarding the Sian Incident of 1936, Professor Ch'en makes no reference to prior clashes between Chang Hsueh-liang and Chiang Kai-shek on the issue of national strategy, and moreover records the Incident (p. 229) without taking account of the contacts that had already been established between Chang and the Communists—a circumstance to which he had however referred some twenty-seven pages earlier.

This points up a weakness in the author's organization: there is some unwarranted chronological seesawing back and forth. This fault is found in its most exaggerated form in the final chapter, "The Coup de Grace." And there are some factual errors. The oldtime governor of Szechwan, described (p. 36, note) as "widely but erroneously known as Ch'en Huan," was in fact correctly so identified, and not as Ch'en I by the present version. The field teams of the Peiping Executive Headquarters (for administration of the Marshall Truce) arrived in Manchuria only in April, although an *agreement* for their despatch was reached in March 1946 (p. 275). The author says (p. 311) that, after Easter 1949, "Chiang [Kai-shek] resumed his control and war began again." Granted that Chiang as Kuominatang *tsung-ts'ai* never fully relinquished political control after his "retirement" on January 21, 1949, Li Tsung-jen nevertheless continued to function as acting president after the breakdown of peace negotiations in April and did not depart the scene until the end of 1949—and Chiang formally resumed the leadership, on Formosa, only on March 1, 1950.

In sum total, in this sweeping survey of China in revolution Professor

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Ch'en shows the ineffectiveness of a government that has lost touch with the times and the people. One sees, even near the end of the long struggle between the rebels and the Nationalist regime, a revolutionary movement whose leaders did not expect to win, as soon proved to be the case. They were helped to victory by the character of their opposition.

The figure of Mao Tse-tung is unevenly depicted, reflecting the irregularities in the biographic materials available. The poems with which Professor Ch'en ends his text, however, contribute admirably to our understanding of the personality of Mao. With these poems Mao finally stands revealed as one who would fit the Confucian ideal of the "superior man" —a philosopher of artistic attributes, statesman, and military strategist. More than Communist, Mao Tse-tung is the essential Chinese.

O. Edmund Clubb
Columbia University

The Chinese Model: A Political, Economic, and Social Survey *edited by Werner Klatt. Hong Kong, Hong Kong University Press under the auspices of The Institute of Modern Asian Studies, University of Hong Kong, 1965.—xix, 233, iv pp. $4.00.*

The twelve essays in this anthology deal with political, economic, and social aspects of contemporary China. The essays do not directly consider the important question that the title raises, Can China serve as a model for developing countries? An introduction by Mr. Klatt and a conclusion by Geoffrey Hudson give a negative answer to this question. "Nothing that has so far been achieved by the communist regime in China," writes Mr. Hudson, "indicates that Marxism-Leninism provides a key whereby the necessary consequences of backwardness can miraculously be avoided" (p. 217). China, in their view, has attempted to modernize on the basis of totalitarian controls and unworkable Communist dogmas (for example, collectivization). China's fundamental economic problems have not been solved by these means, and what progress has been made has been too costly. As Klatt puts it, all growth is painful, but growth in China has been unnecessarily painful. The essays on domestic policies, which stress the importance the regime attaches to control over all aspects of life, support the view that the regime's policies have made much more difficult the efficient utilization of scarce resources such as talent.

Evaluation of Chinese economic development—particularly in terms of the applicability of some or all of its features to other countries—is com-

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plicated by the fact that China has thus far tried three different strategies. Until 1957 China followed the Soviet model of industrialization. During the Great Leap the regime hoped to achieve a breakthrough on all fronts by massive labor-mobilization. Since then China has been giving priority to agriculture and light industry, while aiming for gradual industrialization in twenty to fifty years. Klatt and other contributors believe that this recent departure from the Soviet model of forced industrialization at the expense of agriculture is only a temporary expedient. Current Chinese policy statements, however, indicate the contrary, and it may well be that the contributors have underestimated the significance of the Chinese reversal of traditional Soviet priorities. If the new policy giving priority to agriculture and light industry does turn out to be a long-term one, it may yet become necessary to reappraise the relevance of Chinese developmental strategy to the developing countries.

The brief treatment of the Chinese "model" by Messrs. Klatt and Hudson suggests the need for a full-scale analysis of China in terms of concepts of modernization and political development. It would be useful to spell out in detail the relationship between processes of modernization and the regime's policies and goals. Some essays in this volume give the impression that in some ways the regime is an obstacle to modernization, especially in the realm of economic rationality. Other essays, however, suggest that the regime has made considerable progress in political spheres of modernization. For example, the regime has made persistent efforts to inculcate a sense of new loyalties and to spread basic education and a sense of innovation and experiment in the villages. Many developing countries trying to achieve national integration face the problem of bridging the gap between national elite and peasant masses. The Chinese approach to this and other problems could well be studied comparatively within a common analytical framework.

Because of their brevity the twelve essays do not provide exhaustive analyses or much new material. Their quality, moreover, is quite uneven, despite the fact that all the authors are in some way connected with Chinese studies. The essays on changes in social values, on leadership, and on economic growth are rather superficial, summarizing only the most generally-available information while making sweeping and undocumented assertions. Some of the essays, on the other hand, are either interesting appraisals or concise summaries of topics such as education (C. T. Hu), mass media (H. Howse), planning (G. Barrass), agriculture, and Sino-Soviet economic relations (both by W. Klatt). A particularly interesting essay is one on Communism and religion by J. R. Levenson. A. M. Halpern's thoughtful essay on the foreign outlook of the Chinese elite touches on the question of China as a model for Afro-Asian revolu-

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tionary elites wishing to seize power, an important topic with which Hudson also deals briefly in his conclusion.

THOMAS P. BERNSTEIN
Columbia University

The Urbanization of Japanese Labor, 1868-1955 *by Thomas O. Wilkinson. Amherst, The University of Massachusetts Press, 1965.—xiii, 243 pp. $6.00.*

This book is in two parts; one deals with the demographic aspects of Japan's urbanization and the other with the values that shape it in peculiarly Japanese ways. The first constitutes the substance of the book and accounts for perhaps ninety-eight per cent of its pages; the other is in the form of *obiter dicta* which are scattered through the text.

The first part, which is based on the quinquennial census surveys begun in 1920 and the earlier annual enumerations from household registers begun in 1872, traces Japanese urbanization from somewhat before the start of industrialization to 1955. The treatment is primarily statistical and the text is largely a comment on the tables and graphs, which are admirably clear and uncluttered. They reveal temporal and regional patterns of city growth; the changing sex, age, and employment characteristics of city populations; the differing functions of cities according to size, location, and period; the development of metropolitan areas; the relation of city growth to industrialization; and numerous other trends.

These are valuable distillations from a body of material that, because of its size and special problems, is largely inaccessible to most students of modern Japan. For that reason the book is likely to remain for a long time the standard Western work on the particular aspects of Japanese experience it treats. At the same time it is likely to be used without being much read. It is too severely demographic, too rarely and casually concerned—when concerned at all—with the political, intellectual, and social concomitants of city growth, to be read by non-demographers with sustained interest.

Yet the book is by no means devoid of broader concerns. In fact, the *obiter dicta* are concerned with nothing less than the relation of city growth to national character, to use a term Professor Wilkinson would probably avoid. He argues that Japanese values—called variously "feudal-tinged outlooks," "tradition-tinged values and social mechanisms," and "viable elements . . . of the peasant-agrarian social system"—have given Japanese urbanization a distinctive character; and that

> if there is one overriding conclusion to be drawn from Japanese experience, it is that the technological and organizational means necessary for urban in-

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> dustrialization can be utilized in such a way as to create a unique system which carries the stamp of the particular society's goals and values, both past and present.

As an abstract proposition this seems entirely plausible; the problem is to know what it means concretely.

The author has two major points. First, traditional values are lodged in the family which serves "as a channel for the flow of feudal-tinged outlooks and organizational techniques from the agrarian past into the industrial present." Second, the family is able to do this because, to an exceptional degree, it remains a unit of economic production despite modern urbanization and industrialization. Fifty per cent of Japanese industrial establishments in 1954 had less than five workers (accounting, however, for only twelve per cent of the industrial labor force); and about one third of the total labor force in 1955 was employed in family enterprises, as compared to 2.5 per cent in the United States in 1959 and 0.2 per cent in Great Britain in 1950.

Since the values in question are not defined more precisely than in the illustration given above, the whole argument never seems quite real. The reader feels he is being told something important but does not know what. Aside from this, however, few readers would wish to follow the author's apparent assumption that in so far as the family's economy survives, its values remain unchanged. The evidence is all against this. The Japanese family, in the course of modern urbanization, has been subject to a variety of influences emanating from the educational system, the mass media, the legal system, and foreign examples and ideologies, to mention a few. But even assuming that traditional family-based values are essentially unchanged by buffeting from these quarters, it is a fact that the economic functions of the family, which are supposed to sustain these values, are themselves rapidly declining. The author's data show this clearly. Family employment in 1955 was far lower in cities than in rural areas; in Tokyo and Osaka, in the more modern branches of industry, it was at about the same level as in the United States as a whole. Family employment was also much lower in large cities than small, falling for males to 4.5 per cent in cities over one million.

This is not to say that modern urban society in Japan is no different from that in Western countries; only that the author does not tell us how and whether Japan differs more from Western countries than they differ from one another. However, this criticism does not detract from the value of the greater part of the book, which remains a solid and important contribution to the literature on modern Japan.

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Wax and Gold: Tradition and Innovation in Ethiopian Culture *by Donald N. Levine. Chicago and London, University of Chicago Press, 1965.—xvi, 315 pp. $10.00.*

Ethiopia: A New Political History *by Richard Greenfield. New York, Washington, and London, Frederick A. Praeger, 1965.—viii, 515 pp. $10.00.*

These are two timely and valuable books on Ethiopia, an ancient land now in the throes of dynamic change and recovering from an aborted revolution. In both books the authors have addressed themselves to the forces making for change in Ethiopian societies, but whereas Levine's study places these changes within their sociological and ideological contexts, Greenfield's approach is primarily historical.

Levine, who carried out field research in Ethiopia for three years, approached his study of Ethiopia through an analysis of the culture of the dominant Amhara group. He describes at length the world of the Amhara peasant; the problems of the Amhara adolescent; conflict and cooperation between the old and new elite; and the search among these people for leadership and social progress. Running like a leitmotif throughout his study, however, is the basic ambiguity of Ethiopian culture: wax and gold. The "wax" of any poem, statement, idea, or act is its obvious meaning; the "gold" is the hidden quality which, more than the wax, makes everything meaningful. Thus, social relations among the Amhara are not easy to comprehend, and actions must be carefully scrutinized if all their implications are to be understood.

Levine's study is very good in so far as it deals with the stresses and strains within Ethiopian society and of the efforts being made by the people to forge allegiance to the Ethiopian nation-state. However, what is disturbing to scholars who have worked in other African societies is his attempt to use the psychoanalytic concept of "orality" to explain many aspects of Amhara behavior. This is not to deny that there may be such themes as "orality," or even "anality," in human societies, but socio-cultural processes are usually more strongly influenced by demographic, ecological, historical, and technological factors than by concern for orifices of the human body.

Greenfield, like Levine, spent several years in Ethiopia, but as an administrator at the Haile Selassie I University rather than as a researcher. He, too, recognized the importance of the "wax and gold" in Ethiopian life, but eschews both this theme and "orality" in presenting his view of that country's recent political history. What he does is to outline in detail the political development of Ethiopia, indicating how the ruling family gained power, and delineate the intrigues which apparently were basic

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to Ethiopian political life. He describes the first Ethiopian-Italian war; the conduct of the second Ethiopian-Italian struggle; the massacre of a whole generation of young Ethiopians by the Italians; Selassie's struggle on his country's behalf; and the problems which the Emperor faced both with Ethiopian patriots at home and with the British, before, during, and after the reconquest of Ethiopia.

Greenfield's account of the factors leading to the attempted *coup* by some young American-trained Ethiopians and their military relatives is quite valuable for students interested in the processes of revolution. He treats at length the characters, education, ambitions, and frustrations of the main revolutionaries, and examines the nature of the attempted *coup* and the reasons why it failed. What emerges from this analysis is that any revolutionary attempt is very complex and that the number of ways in which such an attempt can go wrong are infinite. After reading Greenfield's study of the Ethiopian *coup*, one is surprised at how many of these *coups* do succeed.

For the political scientist, Greenfield's book is the more useful of the two. It is indeed a pity that Levine did not address himself directly to the problem of the revolution in his chapter on "Individualism and Social Progress," since one suspects that his sociological background would have made this event much more understandable.

As it turns out, we need both these books for understanding the changes which are taking place in place in modern Ethiopia. Greenfield provides the "wax"; Levine, the "gold."

ELLIOTT P. SKINNER
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The Malagasy Republic: Madagascar Today *by Virginia Thompson and Richard Adloff. Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1965.—xvi, 504 pp. $12.50.*

Virginia Thompson and Richard Adloff have written a first-rate work about "Madagascar today," as their own subtitle suggests. More than half of the text (pp. 187-464) is devoted to the social, cultural, and economic fields. Key questions of how the island got to be the way it is and how it functions today in its public aspects are built in without any pretentious constructs. The authors have sought answers to the first question mainly in the history of Madagascar under France (pp. 13-100). This is, in a way, a pity. Centuries of pre-colonial past are crammed into the leading twelve pages and even here the focus is on the nineteenth century and the Merina of central Madagascar. With this reservation, there is no doubt that this is the best analysis we now have of this historical period.

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To careful study of literature about Madagascar and field trips which allow for many insights, they add a dimension rooted in sure grasp of recent African and Asian history as well as intimate knowledge of modern France. Their discussion of the influence of Japan on the VVS and later of Indochina on the pre-revolt Madagascar, the Ralaimongo-Matsoua analogy, background of the Economic and Financial Delegations, reassessment of Cayla and the nineteen-thirties, role of European officials and settlers in colonial Madagascar and French Africa, comparison of African and Malagasy political evolution, discussion of three distinct and basically aloof societies—European, educated Merina, and rural Malagasy—all underscore this dimension.

Rich detail is another strength of *The Malagasy Republic.* It is rewarding as a reference source and it offers substantial possibilities for further exploration. The Adloffs even report that Europeans were seen as "heart-snatchers" (*mpakafo*) in the eighteen-nineties and in 1947-48. The myth probably served to describe *any* undesirable stranger long before that time. But, in noting it, they point to a recurring problem—which is what the *mpakafo* murders are. The last one took place a year ago. The detail is, in fact, so abundant that sometimes the authors cannot easily develop what it points to. They have discovered, for example, a mechanism which permitted the MDRM to overcome ethnic, religious, and caste divisions *before* it became a "mass" party (pp. 39-40). They thus reopen the issue that had been considered decided, that ideas behind *politique des races* were quite dead from about 1910 until the nineteen-fifties. Yet, they let the matter rest, seeing in colonial opposition to the MDRM the main cause of its success.

The 1947 revolt draws a note of pessimism about the "whole truth" and convincing reasons are cited to show why it may not be forthcoming. The pertinent chapter (pp. 54-69) is nontheless a step forward, and it should be reported that Malagasy university students are beginning to write on various aspects of this tragic event.

The review of Malagasy foreign relations (pp. 172-84) is a weak ending to the section on history and politics and could have received a different treatment if written in Tananarive. On the other hand, chapters covering the transition from autonomous to independent republic, local government, civil service, and the judiciary (pp. 101-71) are likely to remain the last word on the subjects for some time to come. The real *tour de force* comes in the last eleven chapters (pp. 187-464), and it is safe to say that there has been nothing comparable to this volume since Julien's *Institutions Politiques et Sociales de Madagascar* (1908-09). One could only wish for a lower price.

RAYMOND K. KENT
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The Foreign Policy of African States *by Doudou Thiam. New York and Washington, Frederick A. Praeger, 1965.—xv, 134 pp. $4.50.*

Any book on the foreign policy of African states that is written by the foreign minister of one of those states is bound to attract attention—and rightly so. We know far too little of the kind of influences, internal and external, that help to mold African policies and alignments. In general a too simplistic interpretation is given to these policies, one that overestimates the external pressures of the cold war, and underestimates the relation between their internal strains and external reactions. In fact, it may well be too early in their history as independent entities to expect defined patterns of external action, though it is never too early to begin to search for them.

What is disappointing about this particular volume is that it was written at the time of the Monrovia and Casablanca groupings and that so much of the descriptive material is thus geared to the building of intra-African organization through 1962. First published in French in 1963 as *La Politique Étrangère des États Africains*, the revisions made at the time of translation are not extensive. The Organization of African Unity is described only at the very conclusion of the book, and no analysis—or indeed mention—is made of the policies of the African states in the Congo crisis, or at the United Nations.

Nonetheless the book has its own possibly lasting value as one of the rare attempts—*Africa Unbound*, by Alex Quaison-Sackey, former Foreign Minister of Ghana, is another—by an African statesman to define the springs of actions that have influenced the author, and his and other countries. As Foreign Minister of Senegal in 1962, Doudou Thiam opens a vista into the thinking of areas formerly under French control which is the more important because we have greater familiarity with the former British territories. It is perhaps natural, but narrows our view of the thinking of French-speaking Africa as a whole, that M. Thiam puts so much emphasis on Senghor's views on such subjects as African socialism and pan-Africanism. Moreover, if his presentation of views is contrasted with those of more critical observers, who see Senghor's thinking molded more by negative reactions to current ideologies than a positive philosophy of his own, a more balanced evaluation of his concepts may be secured. That Senghor has played a distinctive role as thinker, poet, and politician is true, however, and Senegal, despite its somewhat peripheral position, is far from unimportant.

M. Thiam's general conclusions are not surprising, but are no less useful for that reason. He believes that the OAU was founded on an acceptance of the minimal ideological base that could be agreed upon in the

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light of the efforts at alignment and intra-African relations up to 1963. These minimum common principles are: respect for the values that make up the distinctive African personality; nonalignment; and peaceful coexistence among African states. He underlines the fact that African leaders (with the exception of the Somalis) accept the boundaries bequeathed to them by the colonial power, not so much because they like them as because they recognize the widespread conflicts that would be engendered by attempts to change them. Moreover his interpretation of nonalignment is illuminating. It means, he says, not being a member of a particular non-African bloc, nor adhering to a foreign ideology, but does not prevent an African country from showing partiality for a particular way of life or political experiment.

Here and there, also, in this book are the flashes of shrewdness that often distinguish African statesmen. Thiam notes the unwillingness of the nonaligned conference at Belgrade to face up to the implications of the Soviet nuclear explosion that coincided with its opening, and criticizes the vagueness of the definition of nonalignment formulated at the Cairo conference. He touches on the counter pressures of the need for aid and the requirements of local stability that have psychological as well as material features. When one combines this sensitivity to specific political pressures with the broad generalities with which the book is quite usefully studded, one begins to gain a sense for the underlying factors that have influenced and will continue to influence the foreign policies of African states.

GWENDOLEN M. CARTER
Northwestern University

Islam in the Modern National State *by E. I. J. Rosenthal. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1965.—xxii, 416 pp. $10.50.*

The strength of the present volume, which may be considered a companion volume to the author's *Political Thought in Medieval Islam* (Cambridge, 1958), is twofold. Dr. Rosenthal is one of the relatively few students of contemporary Islam with a thorough grounding in its medieval antecedents in terms of which present-day ideologies are very largely developed and present-day conflicts conducted or at least articulated; and he has a fine sense of the divergent aspirations that are concealed behind bafflingly similar formulations. By setting current movements to steep the modern state in Islam (or the Islamic tradition) or, conversely, to free it from its religious base, against the most mature self-analysis of

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the Muslim polity which we owe to Ibn Khaldūn (1332-1406), rather than the "raw material" of revelation and tradition, Dr. Rosenthal injects a note of realism into his presentation which is all the more welcome because of its absence in most of the constructs with which he deals.

In keeping with his earlier researches, Dr. Rosenthal excels in summarizing and assessing texts and in rendering understandable ideological battles which can be followed from printed materials. Where he endeavors to draw a silhouette of the state of Islam, for example in India or Iran, synthesizing his observations with considerable stylistic skill and an engaging unpretentiousness, he does not always succeed in skirting the danger of impressionistic reporting. Or is the reader who is at fault equally likely to be irritated by complete surrender to quantifying and depersonalizing methods of portraying intellectual and emotional conditions and by the inevitable haphazardness of judgments derived from chance encounters however significant the personalities involved in those meetings may actually be in the context of their society? To avoid censorious unfairness we should perhaps remind ourselves that Dr. Rosenthal is doing precisely what travelers have done since the days of Herodotus, and that it is we who have changed while the plight of the author has remained the same.

The value of the book is, however, only moderately impaired by this intrusion of the accidental, for the first 280 pages are practically free from this kind of subjectivity and the remaining hundred are interspersed with sections that stand up to most rigorous methodological demands or are so full of new material as to compensate for any arbitrariness in its selection as is the case in Chapter IX on "Islam in Malaya." To this reviewer, Chapters II, "Classical Foundations," and IV, its direct follow-up in the examination of the modern disputes on the caliphate on the one hand, and, on the other, the descriptive analyses of the different roles assigned to or desired for Islam in Pakistan (Chapters VI, VIII, and, in less measure, XIV), along with the splendid presentation of the ideas of the Moroccan Allāl al-Fāsī (Chapter VII), are the high points of the book.

Its usefulness for the political scientist in need of material for comparative course work or points of reference outside the Western area is, however, not limited to those chapters. For the weakness of the others is not in what they bring—errors are few and of a kind to be more disturbing to the Islamist than the political scientist—but in what they omit. The occasional indulging of the author in tired clichés—the human problem, the friendly contacts with living human beings—can readily be overlooked. Less easily forgiven are clichés of an apologetic kind, outgrowths of a misunderstood concept of international or intercultural

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courtesy, that invite the Muslim to continue blaming the West or the Hindus, at any rate not himself, for his quandaries. To blame colonialism for difficulties occurring in countries recently become independent as well as in countries never colonized is a shortcut which the outsider should not feel tempted to take. Besides, Dr. Rosenthal's sensitive conscience, or even the objective fact of wrongs sustained, does not bestow moral, let alone intellectual, superiority on those Arab or Pakistani politicians and theologians who perpetuate the age-old circular reasoning of religion sustaining a law which justifies a state which upholds that religion, where all three terms are used like chessmen in an ideal space of changeless conditions, while in actual fact the rules are ceaselessly changing. This is, of course, the problem whose solution the analyst should bring closer rather than blur.

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Federalism in India: A Study of Union-State Relations *by Asok Chanda. New York, Hillary House, 1965.—347 pp. $7.00.*

The claims of diversity and decentralization and the claims of stability and planned development are sufficiently at odds to raise fundamental questions about the adaptability of federalism in serving the needs and expectations of modern societies. In the volume under review, Asok Chanda's breadth of historical and legal analysis in surveying India's Union-state relations is not disparaged by saying that the most interesting point is the author's closing critique of the planning machinery.

Chanda's assumptions are liberal. His treatment throughout is moderate and relatively formal in its method and content. He brought to this latest volume the background of varied experience in high posts, as head of Supply Finance in the World War; as financial commissioner for railways; as comptroller and auditor general of India (with jurisdiction over state as well as Union accounts); and after retirement as head of the Central Excise Reorganisation Committee and as chairman of the third Finance Commission. His service with the latter body—a uniquely interesting device for periodical tax adjustment—doubtless helped to give edge to his critical views about India's administrative structure for planning. Before returning to this matter, however, it is appropriate to note the author's characterization of the country's federal pattern as a whole.

Chanda's selective emphasis is reflected in the book's subtitle: a study

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of Union-state relations. An historical chapter traces the emerging avowal of federal features, signalized in the basic law of 1935 and reworked in the constitution whose details, in turn, have invited an incessant resort to one or another of the four methods of amendment. This analytical narrative leads to a chapter on the "unusual features" of the constitution. The author properly advertises these novelties of recent draftsmanship. He might well have done more to show that the significance of present-day federal charters lies partly in making express what is shadowed in practical tendencies within the older federal systems.

The author's interpretation of the Indian pattern is somewhat ambiguous on the question whether the Union *is* a federation. Assuming that "a constitution is either federal or unitary," Chanda declines to follow those who describe the system as quasi-federal. His own test seems self-contradictory in combining the relative notion of bias with the idea of an absolute standard. Do the provisions of a constitution, he asks, "give it a unitary bias or maintain fully the equality of the national and state governments in their demarcated fields of authority and jurisdiction?" (p. 41). In support of the view that India is a peculiar form of decentralized unitary government, he quotes at length the Supreme Court's decision (with one justice dissenting) in a 1962 case between the Union and West Bengal. The controversy involved a local matter but the Court felt impelled in dictum to discuss the nature of the Union. On this basis Chanda concludes that the analysis of the constitutional provisions and their direct and indirect implications "clearly establishes that though a Union of states, India is not a federal state" (p. 123). Nevertheless he continues to use federal terminology throughout the book. Moreover, he directly invokes certain principles of federalism as standards that exist in the Indian system by which to pass on the inappropriateness of some of its features. This usage is indeed a practical solution of the problem of nomenclature in a world where (as Tocqueville said much earlier in wondering about the classification of a system that is now called a "classic" federation) mankind more easily invents new things than new words.

The troublesome borderlines in classifying the Indian constitution are not the plenitude of central legislative authority, nor the scope of norm-setting in connection with concurrent powers and otherwise, nor the projection of centrally recruited personnel into the states through the high officialdom of the All-India services. Rather, the borderline is the drastic nature of the constitutional right of emergency intervention in the states. Chanda does not say that the power has been abused; it is the absence of legal remedies against possible future abuse that he deplores. Thus far, the exercise of the emergency prerogative has been portentous

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but inconclusive for the long-run course of responsible government. Perhaps a fuller test of the consistency between federalism and the standby existence of the prerogative will come when and if the development of orderly opposition politics leads to frequent situations where different parties are simultaneously in control at the center and in some states. This condition would be different from the crisis raised by the Communist victory in Kerala. As to future possibilities generally, Chanda hints only vaguely about the rise of opposition politics. He does allude to Nehru's concern lest the Congress leaders might be losing touch with, and the confidence of, the people in many places.

The author's experience in fiscal matters helps to give substance, though without personal allusions, to a series of chapters that comprise about half of the volume. They deal in turn with the evolution of financial relations, the financial provisions of the constitution, the work of the Finance Commission, and shared taxes. These carefully concise chapters touch the essence of federalism because, as the author soundly says, "in no federation has it been found possible to provide for allocation of resources to correspond with allocation of functions" (p. 188). The periodical readjustments that can be made by presidential orders pursuant to recommendations of the Finance Commission are outstanding among the novel features of the Indian constitution. A Finance Commission is constituted at intervals of about five years. Among other contributions, it has played a crucial role in guiding the changes that have been made in the basis and the proportions for sharing the income tax. The Commission's recommendations may range widely; they are not always adopted. It was hardly strange that, in the crucial matter of national resources, jurisdictional strains have been felt between the Finance Commission and the Planning Commission. Chanda touches on these issues in his final main chapter.

The Planning Commission is criticized for a structure that includes at least two powerful members of the Cabinet as well as a minister of planning, that has invited a supposedly advisory body to busy itself in operations, that has made its decisions hard to challenge, and that has led to authoritative behavior. Chanda noted that some changes had been made too recently before he wrote to permit an appraisal. Nevertheless he stands by the unfulfilled suggestions that were voiced in the 1961 report of the Finance Commission. The sweep of his complaint in the present volume is shown in the following comment:

> Instead of a devoted team of eminent experts drawn from different branches of knowledge combining pragmatism with scientific attitude of collaging, coordinating and evaluating social and economic data about the life of the people with a view to preparing comprehensive development programmes and

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> policies, we have in the Planning Commission a top-heavy administrative bureaucracy which is increasingly being incapacitated to do the job for which they exist (p. 275).

Unfairly, I think, Chanda seems to blame the alleged miscarriage of the planning mechanism (along with the inadequate participation and leeway of the states in the planning process) for his finding that "despite impressive progress in the field of industrial development, the lot of the common man has not improved, if anything it has deteriorated since independence" (p. 293).

On the crucial point of Union-state relations, Chanda argues that "while an encroachment on the state subjects is implicit in a national plan of economic and social progress, it should be considered whether a scheme could not be evolved to bring about a closer association of the states in the formulation of the plan" (p. 285). Moreover, he believes that the states should be freer to set priorities within broadly approved plans and block grants. Recommendations from a source so well informed and so judicious as the author are entitled to respect. Nevertheless, despite the criticism of existing methods that is implicit in Chanda's suggestions, I believe there is more circularity of influence than he indicates. It includes a relatively informal interchange at the center on the part of state planning officers and others both during the long formative stages of a plan and also in connection with the annual implementary budgets. This influence underlies and precedes the formal participation of states in the semi-final consideration of a plan by the mixed National Development Council. Chanda belittles the Council's present role but not its significance for planning in federal systems. "The Council," he suggests, "should develop into the national economic council" (p. 294). In view of his concern because the Planning Commission has been more than a body of detached expertise, a fundamental issue remains for the reader: the need for an organic relation of thought to the process of decision and action, not least for planning in a setting so exigent and fateful as India.

ARTHUR W. MACMAHON
Poughkeepsie, New York

The Rise of Indonesian Communism *by Ruth T. McVey. Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1965.—xviii, 510 pp. $10.00.*

The history of Communist movements in prewar Asia should be required reading for those who still hold to the myth of monolithic omnipotent communism. Indonesia is a prime example of the personal and

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doctrinal disputes, gaps in communications, paucity of knowledge regarding local conditions, and political bungling that plagued both international and indigenous Communism during that period. Those who have known of Ruth McVey's extensive research on the origins of the Indonesian Communist party (PKI) have waited for this book with eager anticipation. Students of Indonesia and Communism will not be disappointed by this thorough highly readable account of the early rise and collapse of the PKI.

This study concentrates on the political events which transpired during the fifteen tumultuous years prior to the abortive 1926-27 Communist-led rebellion against the government of the Netherlands East Indies. In explaining the factors responsible for the successes and failures of the PKI during these, its formative years, the author effectively attempts to weave a tapestry out of the tangled threads of the international Communist movement, Dutch colonial policy, the nationalist struggle, indigenous Communist personal and doctrinal disputes, and conflicts generated among all of these political factors. Indonesian politics during this period were particularly complex, but Miss McVey has enlightened at least this reader on a number of heretofore unclear issues of colonial and PKI history. In describing these events, the author does not act as a soap-box orator, roundly condemning the evils of Communism, but attempts objectively to account for the personalities, problems, and conditions of the Communist movement. This reviewer must admit that, while recognizing its faults, he would be less critical of the Sarekat Islam leadership than Miss McVey.

To support her analysis the author has included 132 pages of notes which often prove as interesting as the text itself. The sources given in these notes and the introduction show the extent to which Miss McVey thoroughly combed Dutch, Indonesian, and Comintern materials in Europe, Indonesia, and America. She was able to obtain interviews with former Communist leaders such as Semaun, Darsono, and Alimin, and her depiction of these and other Communist spokesmen displays sympathy for their problems while describing their strengths and weaknesses.

While one may quarrel with minor points of analysis, the only major criticism this reviewer has to offer is that the author failed to provide a concluding assessment of the factors responsible for the demise of the PKI in the nineteen-twenties. These are discussed in the body of the work, but the concluding chapter, entitled "Turning Points," is not an analysis of possible and actual turning points in the history of the PKI. It is a disappointment to discover that the chapter is only a short description of what developed after the abortive 1926-27 revolt. However, in spite of this comparatively minor gap, this book will probably stand as

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the definitive book on the early history of the Indonesian Communist movement.

FRED R. VON DER MEHDEN
University of Wisconsin

Brazil and Africa *by José Honório Rodrigues, translated by Richard A. Mazzara and Sam Hileman. Berkeley and Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1965.—xxii, 382 pp. $7.50.*

This work is a translation of the second edition of the author's *Brasil e Africa: outro horizonte* (Rio de Janeiro, 1964). The first thing to emphasize, therefore, is that it is addressed to the Brazilian and not to the North American public. It naturally assumes a background knowledge of Brazilian history and politics which some readers may not possess; and it is liberally sprinkled with quotations from obscure Brazilian politicians and publicists. In the first part, the author reviews Afro-Brazilian relations from 1500 to 1960. In the second and slightly shorter part he analyzes the situation as it was in 1960-64, and he advocates a much more positive Brazilian approach to Africa, based on a strongly anti-colonialist outlook. Among other things, Rodrigues argues that "the African role in the evolution of Brazilian society was such that Brazil is, like Cuba, more Africanized than any of the American states except Haiti, which is the most purely African." He further states:

> we forget our ties with Africa, what we owe to our Negroes, who waited for their release from slavery until 1888 and are still waiting, the great majority of them, for their release from educational and economic deprivation. Our elitist policy seems to resemble that defended by Mr. Louw of the Union of South Africa, who attributes that nation's development exclusively to the white minority.

He argues strongly that Brazil should "support the independence of Angola, for otherwise we should compromise our international political destiny before the new African nations with which we shall have to maintain co-operation in the future." He attacks the Portuguese claim that Lusitanian colonialism is somehow quite different from and much more spiritual than other forms of European expansion. He states roundly that the much-touted Luso-Brazilian community of interests is a hollow sham, since it has no economic basis, and the national interests of Brazil have not coincided with those of Portugal since 1822. For these and many other reasons, he argues forcefully that Brazil should play a much more constructive role in Black Africa's economic and political development,

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for which he considers his country to be better fitted than any other, partly because "Brazil is a Mestizo Republic."

Professor A. K. Manchester in his sympathetic foreword observes that Rodrigues does not represent the opinion of the controlling element in his country. The present reviewer would go further and affirm that he only represents an uninfluential minority in so far as the upper and middle classes are concerned. Of course, nearly everyone in Brazil pays lip-service to the principle of racial equality; but in practice the Negro often meets with much the same social handicaps as he does everywhere else outside of the newly independent African countries and the West Indies. The author gives an unconscious indication of the attitude of the average white Brazilian when he writes (p. 90): "the people glorified the Brazilian mulatto woman in the streets, singing a song that animated the Brazilian carnival for many years:

> Don't deny your hair, *mulata,*
> For in color you are *mulata,*
> But color is not contagious, *mulata*
> So I want your love, *mulata.*

In fact, this song and many others like it, prove the exact opposite of what Rodrigues claims. The white man wants to copulate with the *mulata* but not to acquire her color; and any idea that a mulatto might copulate with his sister is rigidly excluded. This is not the "glorification" of the colored woman, but rather her exploitation and degradation, as Fernando Henrique Cardoso and Octávio Iannui have pointed out in their admirable *Côr e Mobilidade Social em Florianópolis* (São Paulo, 1960) (pp. 199-200). The truth is that the white man, whether Anglo-Saxon, Teuton, Latin, or Latin American, has enslaved and/or exploited the Negro for so long that the subconscious conviction of white superiority over black is too deeply rooted to vanish within a few generations save, perhaps, where the Negro exercizes full political power.

Apart from his interesting if controversial discussion of racial miscegenation, Rodrigues deals very fully with the nineteenth-century slave-trade and with the struggle for the abolition of slavery in Brazil itself. This section is probably the most valuable part of the book. He demonstrates quite clearly that the British cruisers operating in the South Atlantic only captured a small proportion of the slave-ships which plied between Africa and Brazil, and that the abolition of slavery was due more to developments in Brazil itself than to the pressure exercised by the British government. Rodrigues naturally sees this problem from the Brazilian viewpoint; and the facts and figures which he gives in such profusion from Brazilian sources form a valuable complement to those adduced by British writers such as Christopher Lloyd in *The Navy and*

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the Slave Trade (1949) and Leslie Bethell's recent articles in the *English Historical Review* (LXXX [1965], 761-84), and the *Journal of African History* (VII [1966], 79-93). These can, in their turn, be used to supplement and correct Rodrigues on some points.

The author admits that he has never been in Africa; and it is doubtful how far the new African states would be receptive to the more positive Brazilian approach which he so strongly advocates. But this book contains much material that is not readily available to North American and English readers, and it has undoubtedly contributed to arousing a greater awareness of Africa in Brazil.

C. R. BOXER
King's College, University of London

Intervention and Dollar Diplomacy in the Caribbean, 1920-1921 *by Dana G. Munro. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1964. —ix, 553 pp. $12.00.*

Professor Munro's book is a model of intensive research based on careful examination of the existing materials in this country. One only wishes that he had carried the subject further, and discussed the years from 1921 to 1933. Perhaps he will do this in another volume.

The specialist will find this book indispensable. To the general student what is most important is the conclusions to which the author comes. His essential thesis is that the interventions were undertaken for political and strategic, rather than economic, reasons. The object, he declares, was

> to put an end to conditions that threatened the independence of some of the Caribbean states, and were consequently a potential danger to the security of the United States. Revolutions must be discouraged; the bad financial practises that weakened the governments and involved them in trouble with foreigners must be reformed, and general economic and social conditions, which were a basic cause of instability, must be improved.

Professor Munro contrasts the relatively soft approach of the administration of Theodore Roosevelt and of his Secretary of State, Elihu Root, with the heavy-footedness of Philander Knox and the actual military interventions of the Taft and Wilson administrations. To this reviewer, the Wilson period is particularly difficult to justify. For the interventions in the Dominican Republic and in Haiti came about after the outbreak of the First World War, and therefore at a time when there was little need for sweeping action on strategic grounds. There is a certain momentum

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in foreign policy decisions and one wonders if the subordinate officials in the State Department did not have a great deal to do with the course followed.

However this may be, one can agree that the American motives were neither "sinister nor sordid." One can even say that a substantial amount of good was accomplished by the interventions. What was *not* good was the reaction produced in the rest of Latin America. The memories of this period still rankle with many of our "southern brethren."

For this reviewer, there is an additional lesson. Intervention in another country, if sufficiently prolonged, as for example by the British in India, or by the Americans in the Philippines, may produce very substantial results, and perhaps substantial benefits. But brief periods of meddling in the affairs of other states are usually futile. They neither bring about stable democratic institutions nor far-reaching economic benefits. And they reap a harvest of ill-will.

This, essentially, is what Professor Munro concludes. We are in his debt for his careful documentation of an important part of our diplomatic history.

DEXTER PERKINS
Rochester, New York

International Behavior: A Social-Psychological Analysis *edited by Herbert C. Kelman. New York, Chicago, and London, Holt, Rinehart and Winston for the Society for the Psychological Study of Social Issues, 1965.—xiv, 626 pp. $12.95.*

First, tribute, grateful tribute, must be paid to the editor of this fat, double-columned volume. He has not followed the lucrative fashion of the day which is to throw together a set of loosely connected papers and chapters already appearing in print elsewhere. Rather he has assembled a distinguished group of social scientists—with the exception of an offbeat anthropologist, they are all social psychologists or very behaviorally inclined political scientists—who have provided afresh glimpses of the particular portion of the international-relations elephant concerning which they themselves have been conducting research and have had weighty thoughts. In characteristically conscientious manner he has striven mightily to form the resulting fourteen chapters into a coherent or at least into an interconnected treatise: he foreshadows the delights in an introductory chapter, he provides master-of-ceremonies paragraphs between each chapter, and then he offers a concluding section whose content goes a trifle beyond what he has previously foreshadowed.

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Exactly half of the book is devoted to "national and international images" whose societal genesis (LeVine), heterogeneous correlates (Scott), relation to travel (Pool), fluctuation with events (Deutsch and Merritt), influenceability through education and other communication (Janis and Smith: a magnificent section), content in the Soviet Union (White), and importance in affecting policy decision concerning the cold war (Rosenberg) is indicated, generally with skillful clarity. The second half disguises its more miscellaneous character under the heading of "processes of interaction in international relations" and offers, with rare exception, fewer data and more speculation than the invocations to imagery: after an analysis of the "climate" of such relations (Lasswell) and of the strategies that actually or hopefully can be employed to resolve international conflicts (Katz), attention is concentrated upon the conditions affecting decision-making with international implications (Pruitt; Robinson and Synder), the give-and-take of negotiations (Sawyer and Guetzkow), and the role of personal contact between governments with special reference to the United Nations (Alger) and between persons on international exchanges (Mishler). Quite an array.

The entire arsenal of social science has been eclectically exhausted—or at least invoked—in order to face these life-and-death problems. Methodologically the data come from field work, interviewing, laboratory experiments, surveys, documents, newspapers, common sense, and intuition. The upshot varies: a set of principles, a taxonomy, an historical sketch, or—of course, of course—a "model" with or without an impressive diagram, graph, or chart. The cool objectivity of this review must now be demonstrated by a criticism: except for the lonely anthropologist, the writers ethnocentrically, though deliberately and often through necessity, confine their revelations to the West and its protagonists, and thus they neglect the developing nations of Asia and Africa.

What, then, does this volume accomplish? At first glance it would seem to demonstrate that international relations approached psychologically, as the subtitle semi-proudly proclaims, produces chaos; here is no grand synthesis, no facile way to unravel complexities. But it is painfully plain that these social scientists are decently, honorably, and fruitfully struggling to grasp segments, significant segments of the problems. The editor has tidied the Augean stable so well that, though the vocabulary changes from chapter to chapter, it is possible, by taking a deep breath and exercising faith, to become convinced that the parameters have become evident, or almost so. Awaiting as we all do the improbable day when Zeus himself catalyzes scientific rather than strained unity among us, we are able now and in the foreseeable future to turn to this volume for sensible and scholarly as well as for theoretical and practical

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enlightenment concerning discrete segments of international relations. Let us rejoice and shed no tears; each segment has an immediate or remote relation with all the others, while displaying the unique attributes of any person, group, nation, international organization, or event. Kelman's toil leaves us, in short, with a fleeting glimpse of synthesis and an impressive demonstration of particularity. Bravo.

LEONARD W. DOOB
Yale University

International Political Communication *by W. Phillips Davison. New York, Washington, and London, Frederick A. Praeger for the Council on Foreign Relations, 1965.—xii, 404 pp. $7.50.*

In as much as public opinion exists only to the extent that channels of information and channels through which to exert influence on policy-makers are available, an open communication system is the indispensable prerequisite for a democratic polity. In the United States, there is a sizeable foreign policy public. Awareness of foreign affairs is nevertheless limited and the circle of those who exert an active influence is even smaller. Similar limitations apply to other countries, especially to those whose media systems are organized along different principles and where the cultural and political prerequisites for the free flow of information do not prevail. Such conditions pose obstacles to the advancement of foreign policy objectives through efforts to communicate directly to foreign audiences.

W. Phillips Davison endeavors to disentangle the intricate network through which images of countries and of their foreign policies are disseminated across national boundaries. The volume is of considerably more than routine interest in several respects.

In the first place, Davison deals with the whole range of activities that contribute to the international traffic of ideas. Thus he concerns himself with communications from both official and private sources, and whether or not they were deliberately intended to serve a political purpose. Among the official (governmental) activities, he includes those of the U.S. Information Agency, which constitutes a "propaganda" effort, and the U.S. Armed Forces Radio and Television Network, whose broadcasts are merely intended to serve the needs of American troops abroad but which nevertheless enjoy a following among some residents of the host country. He also discusses such private agencies as Radio Free Europe, whose purposes are overtly political, as well as the showing of commercially-produced films, whose purposes are not. All these can have repercussions;

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they are part of the international network. Davison likewise recognizes the importance of business travel, of student and cultural exchanges, of international fairs and festivals. Through the personal contacts so created, impressions travel in both directions. Apparently the Communist states have manipulated and sought to exploit such contacts to a greater degree than the democratic nations. The only subjects omitted from the discussion are official communication between governments and formal diplomatic contacts. They are dealt with only in so far as they become the subject of further communications to a larger public.

Second, the discussion of the flow and effects of communication incorporates much of the current social science knowledge. Davison is acutely aware of the barriers to direct communication impact and of the different interpretations and uses that can be made of any communication. Yet this does not prevent him from recognizing their potential power to shape images of the global reality, to reinforce a sense of identity, and to marshal support for policies to which the leaders and most members of an organization are already committed. But to penetrate effectively into the consciousness of foreign audiences with new ideas one must understand how the mass media are being used by them and try to anticipate how they will respond to any particular content. In this context, the role of communication in democracies, in Communist states, and in developing nations comes in for some searching discussion.

Finally, there is a detailed evaluation of specific communication activities, of the channels relied on and of the techniques employed, as well as the effectiveness of each. These sections are packed with facts. The listing of activities is detailed and the assessments highly specific. Possibilities and constraints connected with various alternatives are taken into consideration. Here the concern with policy becomes most evident. In fact, the chief value of this book lies in the synthesis of theoretical and policy perspectives. Though the author offers no startlingly new insights, he has researched carefully a large field and has applied his general knowledge of communication impact to interpret his data in a sensitive and sophisticated fashion.

KURT LANG
State University of New York, Stony Brook

The Theory and Method of Political Analysis *by Eugene J. Meehan. Homewood, Ill., The Dorsey Press, 1965.—x, 277 pp. $5.50.*

Professor Meehan's objective "is to determine what is valuable and useful for political science in the methods of investigation and explanation

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employed in science, and to inquire into the extent to which it is possible, desirable, or even necessary to cast the study of politics in the same mold." To fulfill this objective he explores "the epistemic requirements of the sciences," "the manner in which scientists explain the phenomena they investigate," "the role and function of theories and models in science," "the methods and techniques that scientists employ," and "the role of values in scientific endeavor." His central conclusion is that "science has much to offer the student of politics," methodologically and substantively, if he will use science, discriminatingly, and "with suitable safeguards."

A more sophisticated understanding of science will advance understanding in politics. Wherever possible, then, the political scientist should emulate the scientist in his concern for precision of meaning, empirical verification, and theoretical explanation. However, Meehan insists on recognizing the dangers and limitations of science. It would be a mistake to tighten methodological standards at the expense of meaningful political content. Political science is not going to become a science on the order of physics, chemistry, or even biology. Moreover, a legitimate concern for science should not lead the political scientist to ignore matters of enormous importance in politics and life: "values, esthetics, the passions and purposes that infuse men's lives and give them meaning." Similarly, he argues that scientific accuracy "at the price of grace, style, and wit might be an expensive luxury." He warns against scientific jargon and obscurity. And he urges political scientists not to be frightened away from controversial matters. "Surely in political science . . . there are stupidities to be exposed, icons to be shattered, injustices to be damned, evils to be remedied, waste to be deplored, and myths to be exploded!" Moreover, science should not inhibit the legitimate speculative temper; and it should leave room "for the flights of fancy," "for disputatiousness and for the 'maverick.' " Above all, science should not preclude political scientists from searching ("not scientifically, and yet scientifically") "for values in a world that appears as our own creation, and for means of supporting those values against all comers." Science, then, is highly desirable in empirical explanation but is limited in other realms of being; and this is why "the omnipotence of science in human life is impossible—and undesirable."

In summarizing the objective, plan of attack, and key conclusions of this volume, one is not, alas, able to do justice to the treatment (rare for a political scientist) of explanation, epistemology, and method and technique which constitute Chapters 4-7. The argument in these chapters contributes to a more sophisticated understanding of the strengths and weaknesses of empirical political science. This understanding will be more

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easily advanced (especially for undergraduates and graduates) if Professor Meehan in the next edition will helpfully provide more specific examples of the men who, and the books and studies which, illustrate his generalizations. Similarly, in a short review one cannot do justice to Meehan's provocative treatment of values in Chapter 8, which includes a bold "reconstruction" of man's "human predicament" in the modern world.

All those interested in the scientific structure and the methodological problems of political science will most certainly profit from Professor Meehan's analysis.

NEAL RIEMER
University of Wisconsin, Milwaukee

Peter and Caesar: The Catholic Church and Political Authority *by E. A. Goerner. New York, Herder and Herder, 1965.—282 pp. $5.95.*

The author of this book, Professor E. A. Goerner of the department of government of the University of Notre Dame, is unduly modest about his own work. He tells us: "I have purposely written a book that will not be widely read" (p. 223). Such humility is out of place. Scholars, unlike artists, do not write books simply to express their innermost feelings. Certainly this work is a significant contribution to the theory of church-state relations and it deserves a wide readership, Catholic as well as non-Catholic.

In the first four chapters Mr. Goerner carefully analyzes several typical positions developed by medieval and early modern Catholic theorists. He discusses in turn the radical papalism of Giles of Rome, the laicism of Marsilius of Padua, the restatement of the Gelasian doctrine of the two swords by John of Paris, and the counter-reformation doctrine of St. Bellarmine. He then turns to two contemporary American views, the defense of traditional principles by several minor figures called "canonists" and the criticism of this position by the noted Jesuit theologian, John Courtney Murray. The author's own positive contribution to the problems is made in the last three chapters of the book.

With admirable frankness and irreverence for authority, a welcome and fortunately increasingly frequent phenomenon in the Roman Catholic Church of today, Goerner criticizes the medieval schoolmen as well as their modern defenders. The American traditionalists, he concludes, "are simply boring. They either lack the perspicacity or the courage to

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be conservative with Burke, or reactionary with de Maistre" (p. 170). Even that hero of many American liberals, Father John Courtney Murray, receives his share of criticism. Murray's characterization of democracy as corresponding to "an intention of nature," Goerner notes, is unsupported by any other evidence than the approval of Pius XII. The doctrines of natural rights have undergone such devastating philosophical critique, the author points out, "that their use today can only cover an absurd and ultimately reactionary attempt by American Catholics triumphantly to reply to the doubters of their patriotism" (p. 273).

Goerner is concerned about the threat to democracy created by the existence of blocs of disciplined Catholic voters following the directives of their ecclesiastical superiors. Instead he proposes reforms which would make political pronouncements of the hierarchy subject to the approval of the laity. More basically, Mr. Goerner argues for a Catholic Christianity of personal responsibility and personal witness. As against integralism, this prophetic Catholicism would deny that evil can be defeated by baptizing a whole people, by reworking legal institutions in accordance with Christian principles, by repressing heretical opinions, or by subordinating political authorities to the Pope. Worship and even the most moving liturgical services in Goerner's eyes are no substitute for prophetic criticism of the existential reality of man and his works.

Goerner's ideas breathe a spirit of freshness and sincerity which will speak even to the non-Catholic. The latter, on the other hand, will be put off by Mr. Goerner's occasional polemicizing against rationalism and humanism. Moreover, when an author is careless enough to speak of John Stewart [*sic*] Mill (the index entry is "Mills [*sic*], J.S."), one wonders how much and how well he has read the thinker whom he proceeds to call a "shameless sloganeer" (p.277, n.21). Such flaws apart, this is an interesting and well written book; it contains loose ends but also much that is original and courageously creative.

GUENTER LEWY
University of Massachusetts

United Nations Forces: A Legal Study *by D. W. Bowett. New York and Washington, Frederick A. Praeger, 1964.—xxiv, 579 pp. $17.50.*

This is an important book, the most complete and scholarly study yet to appear on the legal aspects of the organization and use of United Nations forces. Undertaken on the invitation of a Study Group set up by the

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David Davies Memorial Institute in London, it is, as the author rightly believes, "the first attempt to examine comprehensively the problems of United Nations forces, to state the case for the formation of a permanent United Nations force and to suggest steps which may be taken towards creating a permanent United Nations force."

Part One is a series of case-studies of the attempts to establish international forces with special attention being given to the Korean experience, UN observer groups, the United Nations Emergency Force in the Middle East, and the United Nations force in the Congo. It is on the basis of an examination of these precedents that, in Part Two, the author examines some of the problems of any United Nations force that may be established, and makes proposals for the development of a force within the framework of the Charter as it stands. While Part Two is concerned with the immediate picture, with what "can and should be done *now*," Part Three is devoted to plans for a United Nations force in a disarming or disarmed world as envisaged in the "Outline of Basic Provisions of a Treaty on General and Complete Disarmament in a Peaceful World," submitted by the United States to the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament on April 18, 1962. There is a postscript on the United Nations Force in Cyprus.

It is impossible to think of any important question in connection with the establishment and use of United Nations forces that is not discussed fully and objectively in this book. The author discusses the functions and constitutional bases of UN forces, the structure and control of such forces, their logistical support, the relevance of consent and the forms in which it is expressed, the financing of UN forces, agreements covering their status, and the application of the laws of war to their operations. The study is based on exhaustive research, and is thoroughly documented. The author shows an awareness of the political factors that need to be taken into account in coming to policy decisions in the matters discussed, but the emphasis, as the title indicates, is on the legal. The inevitable result, particularly when the author is looking to the future, is a tendency to emphasize what is desirable and perhaps legally possible more than what can be practically achieved, given the nature of international relations now and in the foreseeable future.

In concentrating on the legal problems in connection with the establishment and use of United Nations forces and consequently the Charter basis of such operations, the author has inevitably been faced with the necessity of relating particular decisions and action to particular chapters and articles of the Charter. This, as anyone who has seriously undertaken the exercise knows, becomes very frustrating and unsatisfying, since we often find decisions being taken without any specific reference to the ar-

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ticle or articles which provide Charter authorization. This happens with special frequency in the case of Security Council resolutions providing for the measures falling within the category of "peace-keeping operations." The customary absence of any explicit determination by the Security Council under Article 39 has led some commentators to characterize such measures as intermediate between peaceful settlement and enforcement action, and to find the constitutional basis for them in a liberal interpretation of Chapter 6 or in a mythical Chapter 6½. Bowett's treatment of this problem is thorough and satisfying. While accepting the possibility that the establishment of observer groups may find its legal basis in Chapter 6, he rightly believes that Chapter 7 is the basis of the Council's authority to establish a United Nations force of the nature of ONUC, and specifically concludes that Article 40 provides an adequate basis, it being assumed of course that the determination under Article 39 which the Charter requires can be implicit as well as explicit.

In his interpretation of Charter provisions, Bowett appears to accept the possibility that organs of the United Nations have powers, beyond those specifically granted to them, that are appropriate to the fulfillment of stated Charter purposes. He cites with apparent approval the opinion of the International Court of Justice in the *Expense Case* that action of the organization appropriate to the fulfillment of a stated purpose is to be presumed valid, but he finds in specific Charter provisions defining the powers of organs the necessary legal basis for the establishment of United Nations forces.

In discussing the financing of United Nations forces, Bowett does not share the view of the Court, accepted by the Assembly and by the majority of members, that apportionment of expenses by the Assembly creates obligations of members to pay their indicated shares. Nor does he accept the view of Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice that the obligation arises from the decision of the Council or Assembly to take measures to maintain or restore international peace and security. His view is that "there is one test, and one only: is the Resolution *intended* as one which will be financed on a voluntary basis?" (p. 478). So far as the General Assembly is concerned this would seem to be making a distinction without a difference, since it recognizes the power of the Assembly to create an obligation. The only difference between this position and that of the Court's would appear to be of form and timing.

Bowett's discussion of the role of a peace force in a disarming and eventually disarmed world is suggestive and reasonable. However, in commenting on the United States Treaty Outline, he does draw some rather optimistic and unrealistic conclusions as, for example, that the force to be established should have sufficient strength to enforce decisions

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of the International Court and also the "more controversial decisions, ordering peaceful change" or "adjusting political disputes" (p. 525). This does raise a question as to how effective any force can be in influencing the conduct of states in desired directions. Certainly it is a different problem from that of controlling individual conduct by force.

All in all, this is a work of exceptional merit and usefulness. The author is to be congratulated on the major contribution he has made to the clarification of our thinking in this important area.

LELAND M. GOODRICH
Columbia University

An Introduction to Strategy *by General André Beaufre. Translated by Major-General R. H. Barry. New York, Frederick A. Praeger, 1965.—138 pp. $4.95.*

General André Beaufre, director of the Institut Français d'Etudes Stratégiques, has written a lucid, vigorous, and exasperating book on the current state of military theory. Originally published in Paris in 1963, *An Introduction to Strategy* has now appeared in an English translation prepared by a British military officer. Paradoxically, though the production of tracts on national strategy has become a flourishing light industry in some American educational institutions, the book has attracted relatively little attention on this side of the Atlantic.

General Beaufre, who was placed on the reserve list in 1961, writes from an extensive background of service as a French military officer. The youngest member of the General Staff of the French Army in 1935, he served in the Tunisian and Italian operations of 1943-44 and in the campaigns of the French armies in France, Alsace, and southern Germany in 1944-45. He was later deputy to Marshal de Lattre de Tassigny in Indochina, commander of the French forces in the 1956 intervention at Suez, deputy chief of staff of SHAPE, and French representative on the NATO Standing Group in Washington. Since retirement, he has written on contemporary military problems. His *Dissuasion et Stratégie* appeared in an English translation in 1965; and he contributed a useful paper on "Liddell Hart and the French Army, 1919-1939" to *The Theory and Practice of War*, edited by Professor Michael Howard of London.

Like its author's career, the coverage of *An Introduction to Strategy* is broad and varied. After defining his subject as "the art of the dialectic of two opposing wills using force to resolve their dispute" (p. 22) and appraising strategy as a mode of thought and operation in conflict situations, Beaufre devotes the bulk of his book to three substantive chapters

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on traditional (land) military strategy, nuclear and deterrent strategy, and indirect or unconventional strategy. In his chapter on conventional warfare, General Beaufre emphasizes the evolutionary nature of military strategy and notes that strategic systems prevalent at various periods in (Western) military history have been functions of the development of military technique and technology. From this concept, he deduces that effective strategy must rest not only on mastery of contemporary conditions but also on extrapolation to take account of future developments and on dynamic adjustment of doctrine to incorporate the expected differential. Not unnaturally, Beaufre is aware that, on several occasions in the post-Napoleonic period, lack of extrapolation and adjustment has been a crucial shortcoming of French military doctrine. His pages on nuclear strategy, though not as incisive as, for example, Chapter 9 of Schelling's *The Strategy of Conflict,* provide basic coverage of the importance and originality of the nuclear weapon; of the evolution of strategy in the nuclear age; and of the simple, but essential distinction between the forms of warfare designed for use and those designed for deterrence.

In contrast to the two preceding sections, which link strategic concepts, military technology, and tactics, the chapter dealing with "indirect strategy" says little about such concrete matters as guerrilla warfare and counterinsurgency. Rather Beaufre views the topic as an aspect of international strategy. His indirect strategy (to be distinguished from the "indirect approach" of Liddell Hart) is a technique by which a nation or political group, capable of only limited maneuverability in direct operations because of nuclear or other deterrents possessed by its opponent, seeks to increase its freedom of action by a combination of "exterior" and "interior" maneuver. By the exterior maneuver, Beaufre signifies political-diplomatic actions in the international arena aimed at minimizing the overall superiority of the opponent; by the interior, he denotes political-military actions taken in a specific geographical theater of operations, usually either direct methods (Hitler's moves of the pre-1939 period) or attrition (Indochina in the early nineteen-fifties). In either case, Beaufre views psychological considerations as decisive; victory is gained not by superior military strength, but by superior will.

In his preface to *An Introduction to Strategy,* Captain (now Sir) B. H. Liddell Hart lauds the book as the most comprehensive and carefully formulated treatise on strategy in this generation and predicts that it will become "a classic . . . on this branch of knowledge." Actually, strategic theorizing is simple; the difficulty lies in rigorous development. Judged by the criterion of performance, Beaufre's book possesses one patent defect, methodological inadequacy, and one major virtue, a comparative or relativistic approach to military theory.

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Like many other seminal works, *An Introduction to Strategy* is informal and intuitive in both approach and content. Informality leads to pleasant reading; but it also leads to intellectual snags in a volume intended to be analytical as well as provocative. Problems of definition—notably of the key word "dialectic"—arise at once; and even a modest investment of effort can identify statements that are vague, tautologous, or even contradictory. As a result, the book will prove disappointing to Western analysts of conflict situations who are bred on game theory, trained in field models, and sophisticated by seminars on computer programming. If military theory is to become a systematic discipline like modern economics or psychology, it must eschew the pseudo-philosophical methods of strategic thinkers from Sun-tzu to Clausewitz and strive for precision and formal clarity.

If the defect of Beaufre's work lies in its lack of rigor, its strength derives from its relativism. The comparative approach permits brief assessment of the contributions of different strategic systems, including those of Clausewitz, Mahan, Lenin, Foch, Douhet, and Mao Tse-tung, and recognition of the validity of apparently contradictory strategies under different sets of physical, political, and psychological conditions. In this simple recognition, Beaufre has gone beyond most previous military theorists, who have tended to seek a single solution to the problem of how war, whether in ancient China or in modern Europe, should be conducted. Further, Beaufre does more than admit the principle of strategic relativity. His basic aim may be seen as the construction of a "metatheory" of strategy: a theory about strategic theories which relegates various systems to appropriate realms of applicability and relates their practical results. Although Beaufre has achieved only partial success in his attempt, the relativistic framework inherent in the approach should become a guideline to makers of contemporary and future strategy. The value of Beaufre's work lies not in the intrinsic "rightness" of his approach or of his conclusions, which in some essentials may be quite wrong. Its contribution lies in the mental flexibility, here demonstrated by a professional military officer, which has helped to lay the foundations for a truly comparative, and hence objective, theory of military science.

HOWARD L. BOORMAN *and* SCOTT A. BOORMAN
Mill River, Mass.

Analytical Philosophy of History *by Arthur C. Danto. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1965.—ix, 318 pp. $10.00.*

Over the last two decades, analytical philosophers have shown an increasing interest in the analysis of historical thought and language. Be-

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yond elementary introductions, a monograph or two, and several anthologies, however, the resulting literature has chiefly been confined to the philosophical journals, and much of it has been tediously polemical in character. Professor Danto's book, which aims at "A systematic network of arguments and clarifications," is the first full-scale survey of the chief problems of philosophy of history in the analytical vein. It is an eminently successful one.

Beginning with the familiar distinction between philosophy of history as analysis of historical thinking, and as speculation about the total "meaning" of the human past, Danto disposes of the latter, not on the ground of its grandiose design, but with the argument that it entails a kind of claim upon the future which the organization of historical knowledge can never warrant. He then considers at length three common philosophical objections against the possibility of historical knowledge. Two of these—that statements about the past are meaningless on the verifiability criterion of meaning, and that they lack genuine reference since the past does not exist—will doubtless appear to some readers as philosophical "puzzles" rather than problems of real importance for the analysis of historical thinking; but Danto skillfully uses them as opportunities for enlightening discussions of the concept of verification and the use of temporal language. A third objection, that history is incurably "relative," he allows historians to raise for themselves, his response leading to a comparison of history and science, and the role of theories in each. The middle portion of the book deals with the logic of historical narrative, the author managing to weave into his account a consideration of issues as diverse as the nature of an ideal chronicle, the different kinds of "significance" sought by historians, and the tenability of historical determinism.

Danto is well aware of contemporary controversy among analytical philosophers of history, and from time to time he makes specific reference to the literature. It is symptomatic of his wish to do more than simply take part in it, however, that for two hundred pages he avoids mention of the problem which, more than any other, has excited that controversy: the problem of the logical role (if any) of general laws in historical explanation. His own claim that correctness of explanation type is a function of the way events are described allows him to present a sympathetic review of several contending theories. His review, in his final chapter, of various positions which have been taken on holism versus individualism in history tends rather toward the conclusion, "a plague on all your houses." The review itself, however, presents a masterful clarification of a very confused philosophical issue.

Professor Danto's book contains a minimum of logical symbols, and

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it has been well produced. It will be read with profit by philosophers and non-philosophers alike.

W. H. DRAY
University of Toronto

Psychiatric Justice *by Thomas S. Szasz. New York, Macmillan, 1965. —283 pp. $6.95.*

This book is an intemperate brouhaha concerning a real problem in legal process: the appropriate social and legal response to individuals who are thought to be incompetent to stand trial. It is a simple book with a simple message. The right of persons accused of a crime to a trial ought not to be abrogated unjustly or unfairly because of psychiatric testimony. It is hard to see how anyone can quarrel with this. Nor can anyone quarrel with similar observations made earlier by other psychiatrists and legal scholars that pre-trial findings of incompetence to stand trial often do result in unfair, unjust, and harsh experiences for the defendants. At least one empirical study has demonstrated this, and a worth-while book might have been written about it. That book remains to be written.

This is not a scholarly book. Most of the significant assertions are unsupported except by reference to other writings or testimony of the author in which the same assertions were made earlier. He has thrown together a concoction of quasilogic, paralegalisms, pseudosemantics, and red-hot journalism. The author is a very good polemicist, not as good as a gifted journalist but better than most psychiatrists. That he contradicts himself, does not get his facts straight, oversimplifies complex issues, postures when he should be positing, weakens his polemic and obfuscates the issue. Such devices make him an interesting writer in the same sense that William Buckley is an interesting speaker. The theatrical virtuosity, the verbal pirouetting, the witty thrust obscures the banality of the simple assertions which the rococo style is designed to grace.

Implausible as it seems, the author appears to be unaware that it is a condition of law, not psychiatry, that requires determination of competence. Moreover this requirement arose in legal tradition, not, as the author seems to think, in the consulting chambers of modern psychiatrists.

Priding himself in making the distinction between a fact and a strategic maneuver, the author parades one irrelevant "fact" after another in what one must assume are self-aware strategic maneuvers, since the only alternative possibility is hopeless confusion. To cite one example out of many: having discussed the problem of pre-trial competence hearings,

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the author suddenly confronts us in the last summary chapter with an attack on the Durham decision. The Durham case was *not* a pre-trial competence hearing, it was a decision affecting a man who had been tried. It was issued in response to an appeal based on a previous trial. The difference is enormous, because the author has insisted throughout the book that he is arguing for the right of trial. The Durham decision, whatever its merits, concerns the criteria for determination of responsibility in a *trial*. Again with typical tangentiality the author tells us that Durham was a Negro. With this slim semantic tool he leaps into a demonstration that all of this psychiatric mental-illness stuff is (or may be) a sinister attack on Negroes. He diverts us again with considerations of publicity. It seems nobody knows or cares about Durham; only the judges became famous. This reviewer wagers that for every one hundred readers of this journal who can recognize the name Durham there is scarcely one who can name his original trial judge or the triumvirate of Appellate Court judges who made the Durham decision. My wager has the same degree of relevance as the author's free-associative dicta on publicity. None.

The dangers which Dr. Szasz fears are real ones. Experts in political opinion might believe that this sort of hyperbole in public communication will prove more effective than sober discussion. It may be that exaggeration, distortion, association by clang and by consensual furor is the best way to combat social problems. Perhaps people will not be aroused except by such histrionics. Perhaps the life work of decent, capable men like the late Dr. Winfred Overholser must be unjustly attacked. But I doubt it. Inadequate and mistaken though the efforts of men like Dr. Overholser may have been, they were competent, concerned, and conscientious; they gathered fragments of knowledge and they achieved the beginnings of wisdom. Democracy, in my view, is better served by such temperate, accurate, factual, logical, and compassionate analysis of its deficiencies.

LAWRENCE ZELIC FREEDMAN
University of Chicago

Sociological Writings *by Vilfredo Pareto. Selected and introduced by S. E. Finer, translated by Derick Mirfin. New York, Washington, and London, Frederick A. Praeger, 1966.—viii, 335 pp. $12.00.*

More than with most books, it is important for the prospective reader to understand just what the present one contains. It contains, first, a series of selections from Pareto's sociological, as distinguished from his eco-

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nomic, writings. There are brief translated passages from his *Cours* (1896) and his *Manuel* (1909) *d'Economie politique*, which adumbrate some of the themes of his later sociological thinking, but which might well have been further abbreviated to give more space to *Les Systèmes socialistes* (1902) and to the *Trattato di Sociologia Generale* (1916). In the latter, a regrettable omission from the selections is any part of Pareto's careful and general discussion of equilibrium (Sections 2067-78 in the French edition), which is still the only sensible discussion of the subject in the whole field of sociological writing.

The selections end with passages from Pareto's postwar essays: *Fatti e Teorie* (1920) and *Trasformazione della Democrazia* (1921). The latter is especially interesting in allowing us to compare what Pareto, at the end of his life, foresaw and what actually happened.

The translation is generally competent but not distinguished. On page 100, for instance, it speaks of "gutrot concoctions" (liquors). Surely idiom calls for "rot-gut."

The selections are preceded by a long introduction, which itself contains diverse items. A discussion of the climate of opinion in which Pareto wrote is followed by a brief biography, which, however, gives us only the important external facts and provides little insight into his extraordinary personal character: no mention is made, for instance, of the dozens of cats that he kept at the Villa Angora. Then comes a useful analysis of the sociological writings, indicating with references where his main ideas first appeared and how they were transformed. The introduction ends with a "Critique and Assessment" of Pareto's work. This seems less satisfactory, particularly in dealing with the relation between Pareto's thinking and that of Marx.

All in all, this book seems successfully designed to prepare graduate students for a question on Pareto on their general examinations.

In rereading Pareto, one is impressed with the truth of Justice Holmes' dictum: "A man's system perishes; his *aperçus* remain." Taken as a whole, Pareto's system of sociology is defective—above all in paying little attention to the actual structure of institutions within which the members of a particular society live. In this respect, Tocqueville's instincts were sounder than either Pareto's or Marx's. But many of Pareto's *aperçus* stand up splendidly. His discussion of rationalization—in his terms, the relations between residues and derivations—is so good that it will never have to be done again—which does not mean in the least that it has yet penetrated the consciousness of many social scientists. So is, for example, his assertion that a great reservoir of persistent aggregates lies in the non-elite members of any society; this is what a modern political scientist would call lower-class authoritarianism. Finally, one

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is always refreshed by Pareto's hard, if sometimes limited, commonsense, a quality in which sociological writing has made no progress at all since his time.

GEORGE C. HOMANS
Harvard University

Individual Freedom and the Economic Organization of Agriculture *by Harold F. Breimyer. Urbana, Ill. and London, University of Illinois Press, 1965.—vi, 314 pp. $6.50.*

This is a thoughtful, imaginative, and thorough study. It sketches the evolution of agriculture and the economic institutions concerned with it from ancient times, but gives its major attention to its development in the United States during this century, and especially since the New Deal. The "attributes of traditional agriculture" are carefully examined, and the traditional American concept of individual independent farmers, choosing their own markets and their own production, is described with vivid historical detail. The recent problem of "agro-business," with great firms intervening to operate mammoth farms or to control farm markets, is posed and carefully examined, both overall and for different sectors of food production.

The alternative concepts of "horizontal coordination" between farmers and related business activities, and the evolution of mammoth farms, are explored, with the conclusion that as yet large-scale factory-type farms have become dominant in only a few special-crop fields—particularly in sugar cane and some vegetable production, where half or more of the total production is in large-scale farms. However, in 1959 only seventeen per cent of total U.S. production was produced on "large-scale" farms.

The major problem considered is the danger of farming becoming dominated by great marketing agencies, developed by wholesalers but now increasingly controlled by retail chains, particularly in the production and sale of broilers and some fruits and vegetables. In these cases, over half of production is controlled by the marketing agencies.

The author pinpoints the issues by examining them in four case studies —broilers; marketing agreements and orders; land rental and retirement (as under the Agricultural Adjustment Act and successor legislation); and farmers' cooperative associations. No hard and fast conclusions are reached; but the pros and cons are discussed from many different points of view, and the known facts are presented so that each reader can reach his own conclusions.

The first case study, "Vertical Integration in Broilers," traces the de-

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velopment of mass production of broilers; of the place of feed dealers entering into contracts with their feed purchasers to market the product through them; the gradual concentration of the feed and wholesaling business in fewer and fewer hands; the gradual reduction of the poultry farmer to almost a hired man contributing part of the capital but required to market the product through the feed supplier; the gradual concentration of the feed and wholesaling business in fewer and fewer hands; the tendency toward integration of the whole complex in fewer and fewer concerns, with consequent disappearance of auctions or other independent market-price setting institutions; and the final danger that great nation-wide chain stores may take over the entire business of arranging for all the production, processing, distribution, and retail sale of poultry and eggs.

The second case study, on marketing agreements and orders, traces this form of public intervention from its start in the New Deal through to the present time. While agreements and orders supported by public authority and under public control are credited with some success in certain fields (as in retail milk sheds) they cannot deal with continuous, chronic surpluses. In some lines—some fruits and nuts, as well as milk and some other perishables—they have helped make the markets less chaotic, and, under direct public regulation, have not harmed the consumers in the process.

The third case study, on land rental and retirement, covers this subject from the massive efforts of the New Deal period through to recent developments in land use for conservation, reforestation, and the like. The early retirement programs were crop by crop, limiting acreages of cotton, or wheat, or corn, without restriction of the alternative use made of the land. The more modern efforts, under the guise of conservation, are beginning to tackle the overall use of all the land, though generally not yet in any very comprehensive manner. "If land retirement is to continue for many more years, it may prove necessary to discard the historical base system and draw terms of participation that will achieve better use of land, and be more equitable farmer by farmer, commodity by commodity, and area by area."

The final case study, on farmers' cooperative associations, surveys the many divergent views cooperatives and their leaders hold, and ways their efforts might be more effective; but concludes that they alone cannot solve the problems of agriculture in an industrial age.

The concluding chapters, on "Possible Courses of Action" and "The Sum and Substance of It," are masterly displays of a free and democratic spirit, which must be read in the original and cannot be condensed without losing their savor.

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This is a challenging and useful book, and is well worth thought and study by every person worried about the future of the family farm or the impact of giant government and giant businesses on our traditional "free" agriculture.

MORDECAI EZEKIEL
Washington, D. C.

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Book Notes

In his recent study of the Franco-German rapprochement since World War II—*France, Germany, and the New Europe, 1945-1963* (Stanford, Stanford University Press, and London, Oxford University Press, 1965; xiv, 397 pp., $8.75)—F. Roy Willis has produced a useful and informative book, but one with definite limitations. After a prologue which recalls some of the main events of the German wartime occupation of France, the book begins with a rather brief account of the evolution of the French occupation zone in Germany, French policy disagreements with the other occupying allies, and policy within the French zone itself. Drawing upon material from his excellent previous work, *The French in Germany, 1945-1949* (Stanford, 1962), the author restates his thesis that the successful educational and cultural program of the French military government in Germany laid the foundation for the postwar rapprochement between the two countries which was to follow. The best part of the book is Willis' lucid presentation of events after 1950—the politics of the Schuman plan, the conflicts over German rearmament which led to the defeat of EDC, the Saar problem and its settlement, and the "relance européene" which yielded the establishment of Euratom and the Common Market. Here Willis narrates the development of Franco-German cooperation on the intergovernmental level with great precision, clarity, and detail. A concluding chapter treats the de Gaulle-Adenauer relationship from 1958 to the Franco-German Treaty of 1963, and an epilogue extends the story to the end of 1964. Although the immediate background of the treaty is covered well, as are Franco-German relations with regard to the Common Market and European political integration, the total result of this last section is less satisfying. Willis fails to offer an analysis of the basic divergences in French and German foreign policy perspectives, such as can be found, for example, in the recent writings of Alfred Grosser. At the heart of these differences lie different concepts of security, but Willis does not treat systematically Franco-German relations concerning defense questions and NATO after 1955. Perhaps the most important deficiency

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of Willis' book, however, is primarily a history of intergovernmental relations and devotes insufficient attention to the history of the cultural and human contacts which made Franco-German reconciliation possible. Willis realizes the importance of the latter; he states correctly in his concluding paragraph that, in spite of the general lack of success of the Franco-German Treaty, the Franco-German rapprochement has become a reality "because it had been brought about by myriad contacts of students, teachers, businessmen, federalists, tourists, soldiers, and politicians, and because it had been institutionalized by ties, not of governments, but of mayors and their cities, historians and their students, universities and their rectors, businesses and their administrators" (p. 327). It was these contacts, begun in 1945 with the aid of such organizations as BILD (Bureau International de Liaison et de Documentation), which provided the real infrastructure of the rapprochement, yet Willis devotes less than a dozen pages to a discussion of them. His bibliography and list of interviews reflect this lack of attention. Professor Willis has provided us with a good first effort at tracing the history of postwar Franco-German relations, but this book does not live up to the high standards of his earlier work.—WILFRID L. KOHL, *New York City*.

Given the climate of crisis and the ineffectiveness of military solutions to the problems that compel the stream of crises, it is evident that treatments of basic issues and means attempted to overcome them should have high priority for our attention. Few matters are more pressing than those concerned with the reformation of basic economic institutions; none exceed in gravity the handling of land reform programs in politically volatile areas of the world which are dependent upon agriculture for a major part of their gross production and income. The way in which "land reform" has been carried out by the Chinese Communists, both before and after their conquest of power, is of particular importance, since it throws light upon the visible development of the CCP line regarding agricultural development, and because it is almost a limiting case of reform, one which has some aspects of the laboratory and test tube for the social scientist. We are happy, therefore, to have a rapid summary and overview of the main programmatic positions regarding land reform held by the Chinese Communist party from 1927 to 1961. Chi-yi Chen, in *La réforme agraire en Chine populaire* (Paris, Mouton et Cie., 1964; 150 pp., 19 F) has divided his treatment into two overlapping sections: a highly condensed summary history mainly devoted to official pronouncements and commentaries, and a section devoted to evaluation and a few mild predictions. There are many interesting points, including

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clear presentation of the opportunistic aspects of CCP policy. The author's self-proclaimed inability to understand why so much effort was lavished on an incredibly transitory stage of freeholding seems naive, as do his philosophical questions about happiness in peasant reactions to the profound changes in systems of land tenure. Until a definitive study is written, however, Chen's contribution will be useful.—MORTON H. FRIED, *Columbia University.*

Essays by business school holders of the master's degree from M. I. T. and Harvard (and one Harvard law graduate) who have served two-year terms in certain African countries as "expatriate civil servants" in " 'positions of operational responsibility as subordinates,' " rather than " 'being in a sheltered [!] advisory or consulting relationship' " are reproduced in *Financing African Development* (Cambridge, Mass., The M. I. T. Press, 1965; viii, 245 pp., $6.00), edited by Tom J. Farer. The countries covered are Uganda (four essays), Kenya and Tanganyika (two each), and Mauritius and Nigeria. The essays will be of some interest to money and banking students and to those specializing in foreign aid programs rather than to the public finance specialist or the general economist; there is nothing on taxation as a means of creating saving that can be matched by government or private investment spending (taxation and public finance do not appear in the index) and the small amount of economic analysis that does appear will not be very helpful to anyone unable to interpret it. Criticism of the several governments' policies, though occasionally muted, is direct enough here and there to post danger signals. The clear picture of Ghana's external debt problem as it stood in 1964 drawn in Scott's well organized essay is a good illustration. A natural limitation of the studies is the fact that they rest so heavily on specific detail for particular years, recent and projected, that some of them may soon be more or less obsolete. But where the analysis covers a considerable period in the past, as in Gustafson's informative study of Nigeria, the essay has a more lasting value. As a series of *ad hoc* descriptions the volume is suggestive of the particular problems encountered in financing, by external means or inflation, the attempts—some of them no more than that—at development in these countries.—CARL S. SHOUP, *Columbia University.*

Field Marshal Mohammad Ayub Khan of Pakistan has found his regime's Boswell in Karl von Vorys, *Political Development in Pakistan* (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1965; xiii, 333 pp., $6.50). After describing

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the milieu of politics and administration in Pakistan, the author notes with approval the official rationale for the 1958 *coup d'état* and proceeds to discuss what has been done since that time.

The great strength of the book is von Vorys' feel for the tenuous nature of public authority in the new states, and his understanding that politics often fails because social diversity is so extreme as to prevent policy coalitions. Thus "the government has yet to demonstrate its ability to serve as an efficacious vehicle for popular aspirations or as a suitable leadership structure for the mobilization of mass support" (p. 67).

Readers will also be impressed by the detailed, if uneven, marshaling of new evidence to document suspected realities and continuities in the public policy process. The field research on which the book is based was a Fulbright year in East Pakistan, and the bulk of new material is East Bengali in origin. This is in itself a useful corrective to the preponderance of research findings from West Pakistan, but it sometimes presents a perspective rather far from the national mainstream.

Critics will find the book unhistorical, and hence unbalanced in assessments of what new elements have been brought into play by President Ayub Khan's government. Political economists will be generally disappointed, both because von Vorys considers (correctly in my view) politics as an independent variable and because he considers only political society in a country where the economy is private, pluralist, and capitalist. By ignoring it, he ignores a crucial entrepreneurial elite which has produced an economc revolution in industry in a little under two decades. Surely the business community exists as a politicized interest group as much as does the *ulama* (p. 3 *ff*).

On balance, this is an important and stimulating book which now joins Keith Callard's earlier work for the period after 1958.—Wayne Wilcox, *Columbia University*.

Yearbook of the United Nations, 1963 (New York, Columbia University Press, 1965; xiv, 821 pp., $16.50) is the seventeenth volume in this series prepared by the Secretariat of the United Nations. To all who over the years have found this an indispensable book of reference, it is a source of great satisfaction that, in face of budgetary stringencies and the common desire of governments to economize in such matters, it has been possible to maintain consistently the high standard of this series. The 1963 *Yearbook* follows closely the model of volumes since 1954. The summaries are adequate and the documentary references are most valuable to those desiring to pursue further the matter in question. The arrangement of materials under topical headings is for the most part logical and helpful.

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The question of financing peace-keeping operations is so basically political that there would seem to be justification at least for a listing and brief review of activity under "Political and Security Questions," with cross reference to "Administrative and Budgetary Questions," a method used in dealing with the question of implementation of the Declaration on Granting Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. The illustrations and charts are well prepared and useful. Two omissions are to be regretted: the map showing members of the United Nations, non-self-governing territories, and trust territories; and the chart showing the flags of United Nations' members, carried up to 1962, and increasingly needed because of the large number of new members that are also new states.—LELAND M. GOODRICH, *Columbia University.*

Since Albert Schatz published his masterpiece on economic individualism in 1907, no one has written a new history of economic liberalism. William D. Grampp's work—*Economic Liberalism* (New York, Random House, 1965; Vol. I: xxi, 186 pp.; Vol. II: xxi, 153 pp.; $1.95 per volume)—helps to fill this gap and opens up a new view of important phases of the subject from the vantage point of our own time. Gone now is the distinction between liberalism old and new, between formal libertarianism and substantive interventionism, a distinction symbolized by the life work of Sismondi who shifted his allegiance from the first to the second type of liberalism. In Grampp's new vista this distinction fades out since he does not identify liberalism with the market economy or laissez faire. Instead he defines the liberal economy as one in which individuals have the ultimate authority to make the economically relevant decisions, an authority which they may exercise either on the market or outside of it, that is, by revocably delegating to the government the decision-making power. Grampp's work is divided into two parts, the first treating of the beginnings and the second of the classical view of liberalism. He starts out with the stoics and founders of liberal thought, and from there goes on to discuss liberal elements in mercantilism, recapitulating an earlier periodical article which has rightly become famous. He then turns to the origins of American liberalism, and, in the second volume, to the classical economists and nineteenth-century thought. Uritten lucidly and with verve, and informed by philosophical insight and profound erudition, the work sheds a new and penetrating light on the road which has led man out of serfdom. It should prove indispensable as collateral reading in courses on intellectual history, the history of economic thought, and political theory.—HENRY WILLIAM SPIEGEL, *The Catholic University of America.*

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In Memoriam

OTTO KIRCHHEIMER

Otto Kirchheimer, professor in the Columbia University department of Public Law and Government, died suddenly and unexpectedly at the age of sixty, when commuting—as he did every week—from his home near Washington to Fayerweather Hall. Born and raised in Germany, he studied law, especially public and constitutional law, fields which at that time took the place on the Continent of a not-yet-existing political science. He was influenced by the most "political science"-oriented German scholars of the twenties, such as Carl Schmitt and Rudolf Smend, and thus became a political scientist from the outset, writing early and brilliant analyses of political institutions and of political systems such as the Weimar regime *(Weimar und was dann?* [1930]). His German career was cut short by the coming of Hitler. He went first to Paris, where he joined the exiled "Frankfurt" Institute for Social Research. When the Institute migrated to New York (there to be attached to Columbia University), he followed it. Thus he became an American, but strong ties continued to bind him to Europe in whose cultural traditions he remained rooted throughout his life.

After the outbreak of the war, Kirchheimer joined other German refugees (among them Franz Neumann and Herbert Marcuse) to form that now legendary group in R and A of the Office of Strategic Services which was in charge of Central European affairs and, in

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particular, the preparation of postwar German reconstruction. He became head of the Central European section in the Office of Intelligence Research of the State Department in the early postwar years and devoted much of his time and effort to building up and encouraging those forces which might imbue post-Nazi Germany with a liberal-democratic and progressive spirit.

Kirchheimer resigned from government office in 1955 to become a teacher, first, in the graduate faculty of the New School for Social Research, and, since 1962, at Columbia. His scholarly interests and writing ranged over a wide field. He was concerned with the analysis of constitutions and legal systems and problems, groups and political parties, and the use and abuse of political considerations in legal procedure, the subject of his one massive *oeuvre*, *Political Justice* (1961).

What distinguished him always was his unique flair for the politically relevant—in asking questions as well as in trying to answer them. The business of the political scientist was "to uncover the basic mechanisms of political order and disorder." In doing so, his brilliant mind, applying the cutting-edge of his sharp concepts, was often able to lay bare what subsequent, more systematic analysis would confirm or enlarge upon. He was a great initiator, instinctively at the frontier of what he considered worthwhile research. This did not necessarily coincide with what, from time to time, was regarded as the fashion. He remained a Marxist to the end, but one for whom, as he said at an early point, Marxism was "not a book of dogmas but the best method of analyzing reality." Hence, much of his thought was devoted to the study of groups and interests using (or abusing) legal institutions and procedures of government, or to the "debunking" of ideologies and the uncovering of rationalizations. But he remained undoctrinaire, open to new insights wherever they might lead. In one of his last articles ("Private Man and Society," Political Science Quarterly, LXXXI [1966]), he found man—especially working man—isolated and alienated in the consumer society of the mass age; but he found him neither, in the Marxian sense, inclined to become class-conscious, with "images of equality" and an urge for justice, nor, in the sense of liberal-democratic interpretation, community-prone and "civic-culture"-inclined.

Otto Kirchheimer never created a "system of politics." System-

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atization escaped him, despite his wish, occasionally intimated, to sum up his insights eventually in the form of the traditional "system." To him system meant constraint, and his thought was too original and ranged too wide to be compressed into one. But it is safe to predict that political science will profit from his ideas longer than from many a more systematic work. This is likely to be so also because of the profound impact of his personality upon colleagues and students. He possessed a rare sense of quality, which manifested itself as much outside his chosen field as in literature and art and in the realm of every-day life, in his love for landscape and hiking, for good food and good wine, but, above all, for people. Merciless toward the commonplace and often biting in his comments on the cliché-ridden, he was humble and generous to those possessing ideas and an original frame of mind. One thing he could not bear was the waste or frustration of genuine talent. Whether it was student or older person, colleague or somebody else, he was helpful to all who deserved it. This humane concern also broke through the powerful overlay of realism and matter-of-factness which characterized his writing. The condition and fate of *l'homme révolté* in particular, of the individual in protest against his times and in "opposition of principle" to ruling powers, never ceased to intrigue him. Thus he dedicated his tough and unsparing *Political Justice* "to all victims of political justice in past, present, and future." Nothing could symbolize better the unique composite of the sharp, penetrating intellect and the warm and humane person who bore the name of Otto Kirchheimer during his all-too-short presence here.

JAMES THOMSON SHOTWELL

James Thomson Shotwell was born in Strathroy, Ontario, August 6, 1874, and died, at the age of ninety, on July 15, 1965. Receiving his bachelor's degree from Toronto University in 1898, and his Ph. D. from Columbia in 1903, he was connected

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with our University, and with the department of history, virtually from the beginning of the century until his retirement as Bryce Professor of the History of International Relations in 1942.

His enormous range of endeavors and achievements in the realm of diplomacy and public affairs has been widely reported, and they need here be cited only briefly: member in 1918-19 of "The Inquiry"; preparatory committee for the Peace Conference; delegate to the Conference; member of the organizing committee for the International Labor Conference of 1919; long-time official and eventually president of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; persistent advocate in the nineteen-twenties of means of filling the gaps in the League Covenant to avert the threat of war and aggression, including a key role in the Kellogg-Briand Pact; consultant to the San Francisco Conference in 1945.

These activities are widely known. To the world's sorrow many were not realized; the goals and many of the means he advocated are, however, still alive, still needed.

James Shotwell's work as a scholar was prodigious; historical, historiographical, diplomatic, and autobiographic volumes flowed from his pen. In many ways, his achievement as a general editor of the Carnegie Endowment's 150-volume *Economic and Social History of the First World War* is symbolic of apparent failure succeeded by ultimate vindication. This was an impressive array of books; inevitably, the quality was uneven, some were classics, some were pretty thin, but what was perhaps most striking in recent years was how *unused* they were. It seemed to be a case of much labor for little use.

And yet, in more recent years, there has been a discovery, or rediscovery, of the abiding value of this series: references to it are sprinkled through the footnotes of new studies, in bibliographies, in reading lists. The books are, in their individual and cumulative contribution, now enriching our historical knowledge, and with it, our general store of insight. This is symbolic of James T. Shotwell's life work. And surely it was he, above all men, who sensed the importance of time and of the need for patience in living in it.

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LYNN THORNDIKE

Lynn Thorndike died at the age of eighty-three on December 28, 1965, barely one month after the publication of his last book, *Michael Scot*. A native of Lynn, Massachusetts, Mr. Thorndike received his B.A. from Wesleyan University in 1902 and completed his graduate studies at Columbia with the doctorate in 1905. A student of James Harvey Robinson, his dissertation announced the direction of a life of research that was to culminate in his famous *History of Magic and Experimental Science* (8 Volumes [1923-58]). In the meantime, while teaching at Northwestern University and Western Reserve University, he gained his first reputation by the publication of a popular and long-lived textbook, *History of Medieval Europe* (first issued in 1917 and revised in 1928 and 1949), a work later supplemented on the popular market by his *Short History of Civilization* (1926, re-edited in 1948). In 1923, the printing of the first two volumes of his *Magic and Experimental Science* established his reputation in scholarly circles and preceded by a year his first appointment to Columbia. Here he joined his already celebrated brothers, Ashley in English and Edward Lee in educational psychology, and here he remained until his retirement in 1950.

During his long tenure at Columbia, Lynn Thorndike published an immense number of books, translations, editions of texts, and learned articles. Together with the many manuscript sources he discovered, these publications did much to stimulate the nascent study of the history of science in America. Great though his contribution to this field was, however, it may be recalled that Thorndike was not primarily an historian of science or of the experimental method. His real business was the hold of magic upon the minds of ancient, medieval, and early modern "scientists." An avid if not uncritical reader of Sir James Frazer and Alfred Maury in his early days, Thorndike was convinced that the impulse toward both magic and science was simply a desire to manipulate or to control nature. He therefore opined that, until well into modern times, a double bent toward magic and toward science had animated the minds of many fine natural philosophers and that, consequently, the love of magic had often advanced the cause of true science. Naturally, this point

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of view not infrequently offended the older devotees of natural history by "muckraking"—as they saw it—their intellectual heroes of the past. Again, Thorndike's concentration upon literary sources and his relative indifference to scientific methodology often elicited barely-stifled cries from the younger and more dialectical historians of science who were growing up during his long professional life. But Thorndike was impervious to criticism and merely continued his own work in his own way. Indeed, he was ever a somewhat crusty individual. Bachelor true-blue, avid tourist, gourmet, and drinker of heroic capacity, he was a loyal advocate and friend to those of his students whom he respected.

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

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

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